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Director's Note

Welcome to the fourth edition of the North Carolina Journal of European Studies (NCJES). Thank you for reading. The outstanding work of our students and this year's Managing Editor, Jacob Gunderson, have made the publication of this volume possible. We extend our thanks to Rebekah Kati of Davis Library for all her help as we prepared for the publication of this year's volume. A special thanks to the UNC CES Advisory Board and all of the faculty colleagues who mentored students as they worked on their submissions for this volume.

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GMO Framing in the United States and European Union

Jacob Hunter

ABSTRACT

Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have been highly controversial in the United States and the European Union as a result of increasing scientific advancements in biotechnology. The political framing of GMOs in mainstream media plays an important role in developing public opinion and legislation due to the complexity of the issue. This paper analyzes how the frames used in United States and European Union media to advocate or protest GMOs can influence public policy in their respective location. Security and efficiency are popular frames used by proponents of GMOs and resonate with capitalist ideologies in the United States. Safety and ethics are popular frames used by opponents of GMOs and are appealing to the precautionary nature of the European Union. In each location, GMO framing in the media has been and will continue to be a powerful motivator for public opinion and policy change.

Keywords: GMO; Biotechnology; Political Framing; Media Framing; Policy Reform

Background

Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have been highly controversial in the past decade due to the risk and concern of scientific advancements in biotechnology. The public is often unable to understand the complex science behind GMOs and relies heavily on the media, politicians, and scientists to explain the issue (Ruan et al., 2019). Framing has played an important role in determining whether the people of the United States and the European Union are supportive or critical of GMOs and has driven policy change in some cases (Siebert et al., 2021).

GMOs are created by modifying the DNA of an organism to express more favorable traits or to minimize unfavorable traits (Pjesivac et al., 2020). Proponents of GMOs report benefits in agriculture, such as cost efficiency and increased environmental resistance in crops. They are also supportive because of the health benefits of GMOs that have enhanced nutrients and can feed large populations. They believe GMOs will be crucial to human health as we accommodate our changing climate and growing world population (Velardi & Selfa, 2020).

GMO opponents believe that this new biotechnology will have a negative impact on society and the environment. In agriculture, crops will become too resistant to pesticides and herbicides, making them less controllable and natural. Additionally, they believe that the production of GMOs will force small farmers to succumb to a few large corporations that will dominate the mass production of food. This may result in losing the culture and traditions of agricultural food production in smaller societies that cannot compete with these large corporations (Velardi & Selfa, 2020).

Opinions on GMOs have varied around the world, especially between the United States and the European Union. Subsequently, government policies regarding the creation, distribution,

and consumption of GMOs have been different for the two locations (Pjesivac et al., 2020). In the United States, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are the federal agencies that oversee and regulate GMOs (Hemphill & Banerjee, 2015). Their goal is to ensure the safety of GMOs and they have not implemented any restrictive policies to limit production. Most GMO controversy in the United States pertains to the retail labeling of GMO products for consumer rights (Hemphill & Banerjee, 2015). GMO labeling policies have been passed and implemented in some states, yet there has been no national legislation requiring the labeling of GMOs (Hemphill & Banerjee, 2015).

However, the European Union requires that potential GMOs must be authorized by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) through an application and risk assessment before they can ever enter the market (Bruetschy, 2019). In order to maintain transparency, the EFSA publishes its risk evaluation results so that the public can comment and form opinions on the GMO as well (Bruetschy, 2019). Moreover, the European Union enforces a zero-tolerance policy for GMOs on the market that do not apply to or pass the EFSA risk assessment (Bruetschy, 2019). Once a GMO obtains pre-market authorization, the European Union requires GMO labeling for traceability purposes and to further ensure consumer rights and safety (Bruetschy, 2019). Public opinion has been the driver for these policy changes as society expressed safety concerns and speculation towards advancements in biotechnology. Nonetheless, as of 2019, the European Union had authorized 118 GMOs that were safe to be placed on the market (Bruetschy, 2019). Their strict adherence to these regulations is to ensure that GMOs do not threaten human, animal, or environmental health in any way (Bruetschy, 2019).

Theory

Political framing can play a key role in public policy regarding controversial topics like GMOs. Politicians and the media use framing to highlight salient aspects of the issue within communication to persuade public opinion (Siebert et al., 2021). Most people in the United States and European Union do not understand the science of GMOs but have some predetermined opinions based on societal and cultural norms. Successful framing reinforces or changes public opinion by shifting the public's focus to pertinent aspects of the issue (Siebert et al., 2021). This paper theorizes that the frames used in United States and European media to advocate or protest GMOs are indicative of policy changes in their respective location.

For example, one frame to promote the authorization and consumption of GMOs is food security (Siebert et al., 2021). As the population increases around the world, it has been challenging for the agriculture and food industry to keep up with their high demand. GMOs can be a huge asset to fighting hunger because of their ability to be easier grown, yield more food for consumption, and even provide more nutritional value. This frame may resonate with the public as the fear of widespread food insecurity increases. Moreover, it may invoke an emotional response as people realize GMOs could massively reduce suffering in regard to hunger. A similar frame would be progress in scientific advancements for efficiency (Siebert et al., 2021). This frame attempts to maximize economic benefits from GMOs because they are often easier to grow and are cheaper for consumers and producers. There is a responsibility to move forward and find solutions to growing problems as society evolves. If pro-GMO frames, such as food security or efficiency, are

used more often in the media, then public opinion and policy change should reflect a more positive approach to GMO use (Siebert et al., 2021).

On the contrary, the media can also use frames to invoke fear of GMOs to the public. A common frame to protest biotechnology is safety (Siebert et al., 2021). Although the safety of GMOs has been confirmed in a number of studies, the manipulation of DNA can often make the public fearful of potential harm. Moreover, the media often causes the public to have a skewed perception of risk, creating a barrier to the promotion of GMOs. A similar frame would be the ethics frame; considering that this technological advancement may open up a door to more genetic manipulation and uncertainty (Siebert et al., 2021). People fear the unknown and what they do not understand. Altering the genetic makeup of organisms can create an ethical dilemma if it is perceived that humans are attempting to control life and "play God." This may inherently resonate with religious communities and be salient for some societies more than others based on cultural norms. By using frames like safety or ethics, the media can cause the public to fixate on their fear of GMOs and consequently motivate restrictive policy regulation (Siebert et al., 2021).

Data

I collected data to analyze GMO framing in the media using Nexis Uni's search engine and news database. First, I performed a search for "GMO" OR "Genetically Modified Organism" AND NOT(asset management OR investment management)" to identify all published works about GMOs and filter out sources about a large investment company, GMO LLC. I then filtered the search to only newspapers and chose a well-established daily newspaper from each location for data collection. I chose The New York Times to represent United States media and The Guardian to represent European Union media. Both of these newspapers tend to be politically left-leaning and have been prominent media sources in their respective locations for many years. It is important to recognize that The Guardian is located in the United Kingdom, which withdrew from the European Union in 2020. However, The Guardian was chosen due to its wealth of accessible data and its reputation as a major news source of the European Union during the years most relevant

for analysis, prior to 2020. GMO media coverage in these two newspapers over time is displayed in Figure 1.




Figure 1. GMO Coverage in The New York Times and The Guardian

I identified four common GMO frames; two positive and two negative. Proponents of GMOs used security and efficiency framing, while opponents of GMOs used safety and ethics framing. I created strings of search terms to represent the different frames based on keywords and subtopics of each frame. The four GMO frames used in the media, with their search terms, are summarized below in Table 1.

Frame	GMO	Summary	Search Terms
Security Frame	Positive	There is a responsibility to provide healthy, nutritional food for a growing population to reduce hunger and increase food security.	"food security" OR "food insecurity" OR hung* OR nutri* OR health* OR responsib*
Efficiency Frame	Positive	GMOs are an efficient option because they are often easier to grow and are cheaper for consumers and producers.	"pest resistan*" OR "environmental resistan*" OR efficien* OR cheap* OR "low cost"
Safety Frame	Negative	GMOs are unsafe for consumption because they have more risk of harming the consumer than consuming traditional, organic food.	natural* OR organic* OR unsafe* OR tradition* OR danger* OR harm* OR frankenfood
Ethics Frame	Negative	Altering the genetic makeup of organisms is unethical and causes uncertainty because humans are attempting to control life and it could lead to more DNA manipulation with unknown consequences.	"play* God" OR "control life" OR nervous* OR ethic* OR unknown OR uncertain*

Table 1. GMO Frames in the Media

I used the four strings of search terms to search for frames within The New York Times and The Guardian, individually. Then, I downloaded the search results for each frame and displayed the data using charts to visualize the frequency and prevalence of frames used over time in each source. The media coverage of each GMO frame in The New York Times is displayed in Figure 2 and the media coverage of each GMO frame in The Guardian is displayed in Figure 3.




Figure 2. Coverage of GMO Frames in The New York Times




Figure 3. Coverage of GMO Frames in The Guardian

Broadly speaking, it can be derived from Figures 2 and 3 that GMO media coverage increases as there are scientific advancements requiring the government to reconsider regulations and make changes. However, the actions taken by the governing body in each location differ due to media framing that reflect cultural and societal views. At first glance of Figures 2 and 3, it is obvious that there was a spike in coverage of GMOs by the media around 2015. This increased coverage aligns with scientific advancements in biotechnology, particularly new mutagenesis (genetic mutation producing) techniques to develop agricultural products, that required regulatory changes to existing legislation regarding GMO production in the EU. These new, stricter regulations were implemented in 2018 after the European Court of Justice ruling on organisms obtained by mutagenesis techniques (Bruetschy, 2019). Alternatively, even though coverage also spiked in the US during the 2010s, there were no national regulatory changes and the only passed legislation has been GMO product labeling requirements in some states (Hemphill & Banerjee, 2015).

Observing the popular frames in each location aids in further understanding their differences in GMO regulation. The safety and security frames were most frequently used in both locations, with safety being slightly more prevalent in the EU and security being slightly more prevalent in the US. In regards to safety, the EU has a legislative obligation to confront issues with an abundance of precautionary measures and has a history of choosing to limit risks of "novelty" products, like GMOs (Hilbeck et al., 2020). Therefore, the commonality of the safety frame is not surprising, especially with European society coining the term "Frankenfood" to refer to their unnatural view of GMOs. The popular, negative connotations of GMOs in the safety frame, coupled with Europe's precautionary nature, increased resistance to GMOs in the EU and ultimately led to more restrictive regulatory action. The US government's view of GMOs is that they are unique enough to require patent production yet are normal enough to require no extra safety testing (Hilbeck et al., 2020). The product-based approach used by the US compares GMOs to their non-GMO counterparts and only requires a risk assessment when there are significant differences (Hilbeck et al., 2020). The safety frame was popular in the US but less effective in triggering restrictive policies because of society's smaller perception of risk and the potential for GMO business opportunities (Hilbeck et al., 2020).

The security frame was popular in both locations but legislation indicates it resonated more with the US than the EU. The capitalist nature of the US is to take advantage of every opportunity and maximize the economic and social benefits (Hilbeck et al., 2020). Moreover, as the population increases, poverty and hunger may do the same in the US. Generally speaking, American public opinion of GMOs is that they should be utilized to increase production of food and ensure food security for as many people as possible. Based on the data, the security frame proved to be a popular and effective tool in framing GMOs to limit restrictive policy action.

Efficiency and ethics frames varied in frequency but remain as respective motivators and barriers to the promotion of GMOs. Similar to the security frame, efficiency is highly valued in the US capitalist society. The low cost and easy production of GMOs provide benefits to both producers and consumers, causing this to be a salient factor that increases GMO dominance and limits regulation in the US. Likewise, the ethics frame lends itself favorable to the precautionary nature of the EU. In the EU, they view GMOs to be distinctly different from their non-GMO counterparts, requiring full risk assessments and triggering nervousness in public opinion. Fear of the unknown possibilities in genetic manipulation is a powerful motivator when striving to maintain the status quo of an ethical society. Uneasiness and uncertainty create an ethical dilemma

surrounding the use of GMOs that could play a role in EU policy change to restrict GMO production and consumption.

Conclusion

In the US and EU, GMO framing in the media has been a powerful motivator for public opinion and policy changes. The capitalist framework of the US creates salience in the public through frames like security and efficiency that maximize opportunity. Subsequently, politicians and policy makers have been reluctant to introduce restrictive legislation on the production of GMOs. On the contrary, the EU's precautionary nature signaled that safety and ethics frames would be prominent in the media consumed by the public. Emphasizing caution for public health and fear of the unknown, the EU has been able to implement regulations that limit GMO production and consumption in their countries.

As new challenges present themselves in these constantly changing societies, the salience and popularity of frames in the media may shift. The EU may reach a time when GMOs are necessary to feed a growing population or reduce costs in the agriculture industry. Likewise, the US may shift its priority to public health or setting ethical boundaries if negative consequences arise from the increasing popularity and usage of GMOs. Nonetheless, media framing will remain an influential factor in the prevalence and regulation of GMOs in each of these dynamic societies.

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Dominance to Detestation: The Emergence of Afrophobia in Western Europe

Kezia Kennedy

ABSTRACT

This research delves into the roots and manifestations of Afrophobia, a term referring to discriminatory beliefs and actions against Africans and their descendants. Focusing on the United Kingdom (UK), the study investigates why pervasive hatred persists and how these beliefs are manifested in Western European society. By examining the historical relationship between Britain and Africa, the paper reveals the evolution of European behavior towards African immigrants. The analysis highlights concerns of Afro-Europeans about white counterparts, tracing the origins of Afrophobia from European colonization to the present. Despite pushes towards equality in recent decades, Afrophobia endures- a direct result of the deep-seated history between the United Kingdom and the African continent. This paper seeks to acknowledge the complexity of the situation, a step towards dismantling prejudice and driving meaningful change.

Keywords: Afrophobia; African Immigration; United Kingdom; Historical Roots; Discrimination



Background

The introduction of modernity in Europe is defined by significant changes in many arenas. These include the implementation of new economic and political cooperation, further understanding of the implications of large-scale conflicts, advances in a multitude of fields, and finally, shifts in population and growth of more interconnected communities. Today, Europe is far more heterogeneous than ever, with its inhabitants hailing from locations around the globe. The rise in dissimilarity has brought the continent closer to being a ‘melting pot.’ In spite of this, Europe remains far from being a land of acceptance. European attitudes have frequently been labeled as Xenophobic, and more recently, Afrophobic. A newly coined term, Afrophobia refers to the discriminatory beliefs and actions directed towards Africans and their descendants. It has been said to permeate everyday life, from being present in employment and education to public and political representation (Sanaullah, 4).

The creation of the term Afrophobia is undoubtedly due to the steady rise of African residents in Western Europe, with push factors intensifying particularly in the last decade of the 20th century. Due to the conflicts occurring in several African countries as well as other established factors such as few job opportunities, African individuals sought alternative avenues for progress, turning to a new solution - migration. In 2020 there were over 10 million African migrants in Europe, making up less than one-third of all African migrants across the globe (“Facts and Figures,” 2). Despite the data that shows Africans are not overwhelming Europe, there is plenty of hatred directed toward the people. In this paper, I seek to understand both why there seems to be a pervasive culture of detestation and how these beliefs have manifested themselves in Western European society, focusing on a particular country of interest, the United Kingdom (UK). By looking back at the relationships between Europe and Africa during and before the 1900s, it becomes easier to see the evolution, or lack thereof, of European behavior toward African immigrants.

In this comprehensive exploration, the concerns and fears of Afro-Europeans regarding their white counterparts are brought to the forefront. Cécile Kyenge's poignant quote serves as a touchstone, encapsulating the apprehensions that persist today. Through a historical lens, the essay delves into the roots of Afrophobia, tracing its evolution from the era of European colonization in Africa to the present day. The enduring impact of British imperialism, the challenges faced by Black African immigrants in the UK, and the veneer of social change are dissected to unveil the entrenched nature of Afrophobia. Despite legislative efforts and the global reach of movements like Black Lives Matter, the essay concludes that Afrophobia persists due to its deep-seated historical roots and a complex interplay of societal, political, and cultural factors. Recognizing this is essential to pave the way for meaningful change and dismantling the deeply ingrained prejudices that continue to affect Black and African communities.

Introduction

“I worry about the times we are living in” (Kyenge).

While only a short line from her discussion on the increasing racism in Europe, this quote from Cécile Kyenge, former Italian Minister of Integration and Member of the European Parliament, encompasses the fear many Afro-Europeans feel regarding their white counterparts.

Kyenge has been a strong advocate for increased education and acknowledgment, or as she puts it, "greater efforts in terms of memory" ("We Must Talk"). Citizens throughout the continent have echoed Kyenge's sentiments, reflecting a long history of feelings of hatred. Beginning with European colonization into Africa and the remaining corners of the world, white Europeans exerted their self-superiority to force compliance. Although dozens of nations participated in the "Scramble for Africa," the United Kingdom was the indubitable victor. Establishing colonies in nearly every continent and nearly 20 in Africa, this powerful nation has left its mark in perpetuity. This story provides the background for what can be seen today in Europe, a majority of African immigrants in the UK coming from the nations previously controlled by the British government. If decolonization began seventy years ago, meaning most countries have been independent for half a century, why have the attitudes towards the people not shifted? Why do Western Europeans, the British particularly, seem to have systems that have maintained their discrimination well into the 21st century? The persistence of intolerance is due to a perceived yet inauthentic evolution of the European mentality- white Europeans claim they are different, but the rectifications are only surface level. Small changes have been made—people understand that saying slurs or committing hate crimes is wrong—however, the larger, more systemic changes, have not been accomplished. Afrophobia emerged due to the loss of the power hierarchy established in Africa - the British and other nations on top and Africans below them. Decolonization brought the end of these structures, so - whether knowingly or not - Europeans sought other ways to maintain their supremacy. It is necessary to understand these methods and what preceded them in order to begin dismantling Afrophobia and remedying the aftereffects.

British Numbers Today

In the 2011 census, it was shown that 1 million British citizens identified as Black Africans (Black British). Despite making up less than 2 percent of the United Kingdom's population, Africans in England are the constant victims of discrimination. A study from September 2022 found that more than half of Black and brown workers said they had been the victims of racism in their workplace in the past five years (Nabbi and Cooban). Additionally, figures from England and Wales showed that Black people were nine times more likely to be stopped and searched by police officers than white people (Dodd). This is not a new problem in the country or continent, yet nothing seems to be improving. Getting to this point can be explained by the past treatment of Black Africans in British colonies and as Africans became more involved in European affairs.

British Imperialism in Africa

Beginning in the late 19th century, the UK started its pursuit of colonial Africa. Following the 1884 Berlin Conference, the British army quickly conquered, splitting tribes into new and meaningless territorial lines and implementing a system of indirect rule. Long before this, England was known as a formidable force across the globe, and this was only reinforced when the campaign for Africa began. For British men like Rudyard Kipling or Arthur Balfour, the establishment of British colonies seemed necessary in order to improve the conditions for the people. Instead of being about gaining resources or advantages, British imperialism became somewhat synonymous with making barbarians sophisticated. In 1906 Balfour explained that Africans were "less intellectually and morally capable" (Cronin). Naturally, to people who hold these beliefs, imperialism was the responsibility of the enlightened Europeans and the only solution. This may have been the view of some, however, the British system of indirect rule did not completely align with these ideologies. The English government argued that indirect rule was used so that

indigenous culture could be preserved, but despite this, African culture before and after British interference were two contrasting images. Thanks to Bismarck and the Berlin Conference, stable nations became new countries filled with clashing tribes, strengthening British and European domination.

Impact of Global War

Moving ahead to the time of global conflict, World Wars one and two led to the formation of a new dynamic. As World War I broke out, the British military tried to recruit soldiers from countries such as the Gold Coast (now Ghana), Nigeria, and the Gambia among others. Regardless of the fact that every man fought for the UK, Black soldiers received substantially lower pay, faced discrimination, and were forced to do labouring work as non-combatant soldiers. The inter-war period was the beginning of a large population of Black Africans making England their home. Many men decided to move, angering some white residents. As a result, there were several anti-Black riots in multiple English cities. A June 1919 letter from the Cardiff Chief Constable to the Under Secretary of State states, "There can be no doubt that the aggressors have been those belonging to the white race" ("1919 Race") He continues to explain the reasons he believed the riots occurred, saying the tensions exist because Africans regard themselves as British, the lack of economic opportunity, and the "association" between some white women and African men. Two decades later, World War II was an even larger event, causing over 600,000 African men to be recruited by the UK. Despite the 20-year difference, the conditions faced by African soldiers during the Great War were the same as in 1939. Veteran Eusebio Mbiuki recalled "When I got out, they gave me nothing. They should have known how much we had helped them. They would have given something. But that was not the case. We were abandoned just like that" (Losh). Tens of thousands of Africans sacrificed their lives and were rewarded with close to nothing, somehow being even less than an afterthought. The men who returned home came back different, impacted both by the toll of war and by the lack of acknowledgement and appreciation from the nation they gave so much up for.

Decolonization and Immigration

Although it seemed like the sun never set on the British Empire, everything must meet its end. In this case, the sunset of the British Empire meant the beginning of the Commonwealth of Nations. Even though ideas of African Nationalism had been simmering for a number of years early into the 20th century, the ideology became widespread following the closing of World War II. Labeled by some as the father of African Nationalism, Kwame Nkrumah, the eventual first president of the Republic of Ghana, proclaimed that Africa must liberate itself and discard its colonial yoke. Countries across the continent began to make a move towards emancipation and, no longer able to justify preventing the rapid changes happening in front of them, the British scrambled to make themselves appear in favor of decolonization. The Prime Minister of the time, Harold Macmillan traveled to Africa to show just how much the English believed in the creation of independent nations. In South Africa, he delivered what is known as the "Wind of Change Speech," saying, "The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it" (Macmillan). Praised for his support of African independence, Macmillan was successfully able to make the British appear to be advocates of this new change whether or not they truly were. Macmillan's speech was part of the United Kingdom's efforts to make themselves seem less like the aggressors or perpetrators and more like the

advocates for change. A cartoon from the January 5th, 1960 edition of the Herald newspaper entitled "That's the load no one can carry for you," shows three African men carrying boxes, one of which is labeled "Mac's goodwill tour of Africa" (see Appendix). The same man points to a remaining box on the ground in front of Macmillan with the label "The white man's conscience" (Coffey, 151). The cartoon implies that PM Macmillan and the government were solely concerned with clearing the British consciousness and appearing as change agents rather than passive bystanders, instead of focusing on facilitating independence. Many news outlets praised the British, believing they had begun to take the necessary steps to rectify their past actions, and this satisfied the government. They had been able - at least to some extent - to take culpability without having to feel especially guilty or seem inferior. It was clear that decolonization would be a turning point in history, and the United Kingdom managed to still view itself as standing at the top while power shifted and the world took one step closer to globalization.

Large Scale Immigration

After Decolonization, the real movement to Europe began. Although most of the initial immigrants came from northern nations like Morocco and Tunisia, West and East Africans soon joined the diaspora in Western Europe. Concurrently, an influx of people from the Caribbean, Jamaica especially, were entering England to join the workforce. As the number of Black inhabitants increased, so did violence. Upon arriving, Black Africans congregated in a few select areas within the UK - the southern and eastern regions of England and Wales, often the areas targeted in attacks. This transition in the UK was not easy for white people to cope with. In the 60s, signs had phrases like "No Irish, no blacks, no dogs," a message to growing populations that they were still unwelcome ("No Reason"). Despite the many attempts to prove themselves and gain European respect, Black people were still thought of as inferior and undeserving. The British government inadvertently supported this sentiment by introducing the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. The act outlined new immigration policies, the largest of which said that only those with work permits could enter the United Kingdom (Yeo). This of course restricted access to the country for Africans immigrating to find new opportunities, as work permits were typically only for high-skilled workers. The act serves as a perfect example of the more discrete ways the British tried to maintain their past demographics without explicitly othering the African expatriates. As Yeo states, "By the time the 1962 Act came into force, this would have excluded citizens of Ghana, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, for example. This was considered desirable by policymakers." The fear of even larger influxes of Black people and Black Africans pushed parliament to create a law justifying discriminatory policy by putting it under the guise of importing solely skilled workers. The British population could not sit by and watch as unskilled Africans were permitted into the country and provided with the same resources that British citizens had to struggle for, so the 1962 act solidified how unwelcome foreigners from Africa were.

Social Change or Superficial Advancement?

The second half of the 20th century was an age of change. Mass protests in areas like Nottingham and Notting Hill took place as a consequence of violent attacks from citizens and police beginning in the 50s and continuing well into the 70s and beyond. From the Black Power marches in 1970 to the 1980-81 race riots in Brixton, Liverpool, Manchester, and Birmingham, Black Britons refused to back down and be steamrolled. While laws were put into place in years like 1965 and 1968 (Race Relations Act and Campaign Against Racial Discrimination respectively) ("1968 Race"), eventually, the rhetoric shifted, appearing subdued and not directed

at any groups in particular. The era of Margaret Thatcher and “law and order” featured strategies that many historians argue had specific racial targets and that increased public fear of African immigration. In a 1978 interview, Thatcher herself is cited as saying, “I think it means that people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture” (Tomlinson). Thatcher facilitated the reintroduction of xenophobia in the UK by suggesting that there was something to be feared about immigrants and their culture. This was the perfect storm for Afrophobia to reemerge and evolve into what it is known as today.


Current Implications

With major disparities in health, education, employment, media, and policing between African and non-African Britons, it is clear that Afrophobia continues to prevail in British society. Its embeddedness in the culture is the direct result of past actions of British leaders, individuals, and society as a whole. This then begs the question of what can be done to fix the issue since Afrophobia is so deeply linked to England’s expansion and transition into a world power. Some, like Swedish politician Momodou Malcom Jallow, argue the path to remediation is multi-pronged, encompassing the efforts of intergovernmental organizations, those who collect data, politicians, and civil society (“Combating Afrophobia, 5-11). Creating new legislation and action plans directed at combating Afrophobia and anti-black rhetoric in addition to increasing awareness on what Afrophobia is and how it is perpetuated in society could be the first steps in the right direction.

Conclusion

What made the 2020 Black Lives Matter movement so powerful was its wide reach. Protests did not only occur in the United States, but other nations, including the United Kingdom. This showed international audiences that racism and violence against Black people was prevalent outside of America, and that England was far from being a country that understood and respected its Black population. Though the term Afrophobia gained prominence somewhat recently, its practices had been taking place for decades, well into a century. From early imperialism, the hatred of Africans has persisted, simply evolving over time. This detestation started out as easily recognizable, with Europeans making it clear that they considered Africans subservient. Persisting well past the end of the second World War, attitudes only began to shift as African colonies strove for independence and their oppressors feared being labeled evil. As decolonization and immigration to Europe transpired and Black Africans began to advocate for their rights, it became unacceptable to express racist ideals. Afrophobia’s emergence is due to this - a more discreet way of showing hatred towards Africans. Afrophobia continues to exist in modern society, forcing people to ask, where are Africans welcome and how can they overcome the hierarchy if it is ingrained in nearly every sector of the United Kingdom and the rest of the world? Black and African Britons have long been exposed to poor treatment from the British and other Europeans, and until Afrophobia is faced head-on and real action is taken to confront it, Afrophobia will continue to afflict future generations, ensuring that the prejudiced aims of 19th-century Europeans are still achieved, despite our advancement several decades later.

Appendix



"That's the load no one can carry for you"

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Should Italy Remain in the European Union?

Dallia Lindell

ABSTRACT

The increased integration of Europe has prompted many Italians to become more Eurosceptic. Italian euroscepticism has ramped up amid issues caused by an influx in migration to Italy’s southern Mediterranean border. As the migrant population increases, the perception of Italian welfare decreases due to resource shortages and security breaches. Amid the electoral victory of Giorgia Meloni and her party, Fratelli D’Italia, in 2022, many Italians now have hope for socioeconomic change. Fratelli D’Italia’s neo-fascist roots have been a cause for concern within the European Union (EU). Many member states are weary that Italy will invoke conflict or consider leaving the EU (an “Italexit”) in an attempt to accomplish their political agenda. This analysis argues an integrated interest-based method of negotiation resolves the tension between the EU and Italy. Five solutions that incorporate both Italian and EU-based tactics provide a resolution to the immigration issue while maintaining the Italian membership.

Keywords: Italy; Immigration; Italexit; Giorgia Meloni; European Union; European Integration; Negotiation

Italy should remain a member of the European Union to ensure that the national economy, security, and social welfare are continuously made a priority on the national and international levels. As one of the founding members of the European Union, Italy has created and reaps the generational benefits of European integration. According to Derek Gadd, a European-based government officer, Italy is a major beneficiary of the European Union’s funds especially in post COVID-19 pandemic times. The conflict that arises between Italy and the supranational body is the issue of immigration (asylum seekers) and national sovereignty. The increased integration of Europe economically, politically, and culturally has prompted many Italian natives to become more Eurosceptic (Donà 777-778). Italy’s new dominant party, Fratelli D’Italia (Brothers of Italy), led by new prime minister Giorgia Meloni has distinguished their political stance by prioritizing welfare chauvinism. With this, the European Union is left with a frustrating agitator that will likely hinder the cohesion of member states. In the height of this conflict, *how can Italy achieve its nationalistic political agenda while maintaining a good-standing membership in the European Union?* In a three-section exploration, I will prove how Italy can effectively implement its national agenda while remaining in the European Union.

Background: who represents Italy, and what is their political stance?

After more than seventy years, Italy has elected their country’s most right-wing government since the end of the Second World War. Italians have shifted right to exhibit their dissatisfaction with the lack of welfare for natives and lack of security due to the dramatic increase of asylum seekers. The Libyan Migrant Crisis has caused migration to Italy’s Mediterranean coast to increase tenfold over the course of six years (Hermanin 2). Migrants from various countries including Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and Nigeria have come to Italy in hopes of being liberated from

sociopolitical abuse from dictatorial regimes (*Libyan Migrant Crisis*). In response to the crisis, the European Union (EU) acknowledged Article 18 in the Charter of Fundamental Rights to introduce the Asylum Policy made by Parliament. The policy assigns Italy, and other bordering member states, with the responsibility of examining all asylum applications, providing resources for temporary welfare, and upholding the principle of non-refoulement (Sandu). Though essential for human rights, various Italian far-right politicians note issues that arise from the policy. First, the monetary burden from the influx in population, second, migrants go to other member states without being identified, third, irregular migrants often attempt to smuggle illegal items through Italy's Mediterranean border (Herрманin 4-6).

To heighten the burden, the COVID-19 pandemic triggered economic strife within the country which prompted Italy's public debt to fall to 150.4 percent from the government's target 153.5 per cent according to Financial Times. As the Union's third-largest economy, many Italians blame the EU for the socioeconomic stress that has occurred throughout the last five years (Nahmen). Popular far-right political parties, like Fratelli D'Italia and Lega, emphasized immigration and the EU's obscene effort to improve immigration policies as a substantial dilemma in the maintenance of Italian welfare (Donà 777). In response, Italians have begun to advocate for national sovereignty which insists on promoting nativism, a common populist principle. Meloni's campaign promise is founded solely on re-empowering both Italy and its' people (Raney). This means supporting a traditional, conservative, nationalist way of life that most Italians want to revert to. This political agenda directly conflicts with the European integration agenda that sustains the EU. Reporters and political theorists from BBC News and CNBC International have predicted that Italy could pose another problem for the cohesion of member states and future opportunities for globalization.

The European Perspective

It is certain that Italy's stance and the neo-fascist roots of Fratelli D'Italia have caused many member states within the Union to be cautious of rebellious conflict or an "Italexit." Meloni's apparent political agenda could either make her a target for isolation or spark an agitating alliance with other far-right parties within the Union. With either path, the Italian government is perceived as resisting EU sovereignty and national authority. Previous situations of resistance from other former/active member states, the United Kingdom (UK) and Hungary highlight the potential negative impacts that Italy could experience. The United Kingdom's severance of ties with the EU, also known as Brexit, was initiated by a 2016 referendum which was officially granted in January of 2020 (Riley and Ghilès 1-2). Brexit was the British government's attempt to show their ecopolitical frustration with the Union and to flaunt their ability to stand as an independent nation. Consequently, the UK experienced inflation, labor shortages, and a decrease in trade intensity, which caused the pound to drop to a record low against the dollar (Financial Times Film). These circumstances essentially mean that inflation will cause British citizens to be poorer and market prices will become more expensive.

In connection, Hungary is experiencing backlash and possible sanction from the EU due to its right-wing government being claimed as corrupt (De Búrca 20-24). The Hungarian government has implemented asylum laws that directly conflict with the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In addition, many internal and external sources have claimed that basic civil rights have been infringed (De Búrca 17-18). The European Parliament has begun formal censure proceedings under Article 7 of the TEU. As it stands, the Hungarian government has not been particularly

cooperative, but the government is suffering from the withdrawal of member funds from the EU which can cause economic instability in the future (De Búrca 18-19). Given the cases of the United Kingdom and Hungary, Italy has two clear examples of possible outcomes if there is any resistance to the EU. Neither outcome would benefit Italian citizens nor allow Italy to achieve their political agenda without facing far greater turmoil. If Italy endured the issues caused by an influx in migration and sanctions and/or economic decline, the nation would quickly collapse. Meloni has discussed taking Italy out of the common currency and the EU in general during her campaign (Raney), however, her current cooperation with the Union could prove that she has rethought resisting integration.

The Five Solutions

Any leader, including Meloni, is responsible for giving their best effort to ensure welfare and unity within their nation. The primary goal of the current Italian government is to reimplement a lifestyle that was directly converted into what Italians say disregards the welfare of the native citizens. Accomplishing this goal while maintaining good standing with the EU can be achieved through integrative interest-based negotiation. Integrative interest-based negotiation in this context is a mutual solution that must be made based on the best interest of directly affected member states. Considering much of the Italian dilemma originated from an influx in the migrant population, a first step in fostering change could be creating a committee comprised of the member states that are directly impacted by the immigration issue. Many migrants have been entering through Italy, Greece, and Hungary (Hermanin). The formation of a committee could help centralize specific quantitative and qualitative data that objectively gets the message across to the Commission, the Council and Parliament. Furthermore, two of the proposed member states can uphold their far-right populist immigration strategies on a more subtle level.

Another solution to the influx immigration issue is to modernize existing immigration and asylum laws and/or add policies that incorporate a structured secure border entry procedure to southern Europe. This can include but is not limited to, creating a border security administration that models the United States' Transportation Security Administration (TSA). A TSA-based border security can ensure that migrants have a proper form of identification that shares birth records, political parties, criminal backgrounds, and additional information upon every entry attempt. Border security can also check for illegal items that could be smuggled overseas and identify irregular migrants. In addition, Italy has an extensive problem with the overflow of migrants living in inhumane conditions often referred to as slums (*Libyan Migrant Crisis*). A frequent complaint made by Italians is that slums have eroded the cultural identity and tradition in southern Italy (BBC News). A culture of honor policy can be created that allows affordable quality housing to be built in different cities within each member state to ensure a balanced distribution of refugees. This way, Europe can provide proper protection for asylum seekers and balance the distribution of refugees amongst each member state so that not only one nation bears the burden. Decreasing the overflow population of migrants in Italy will likely decrease the socioeconomic stress natives have been experiencing.

Economic policy can also be created to allow Italy, and the other member states, to support the border security locations with troops from the nation's military in exchange for an incentive (monetary funds or resources). The implementation of troops will support a non-hostile environment while operating border security. To decrease the migrant population in general, the European Council of Foreign Relations can create a space to talk with North African countries,

where most migrants originate from, concerning political issues and/or peace treaties. However, this option would require the cooperation of governments outside the EU. If the EU were to consider and implement these solutions, there would be a lasting promise for European integration. The immigration efflux can prevent extensive national resistance from right-wing countries like Italy and Hungary. Italy is liable to work closer with the EU to ensure that similar strategies can be implemented for other European and national issues. Businesses in Italy (or other member states) are not hindered by location, staffing, or lack of support which strengthens the European single market. There is less stress among citizens, which means no interference with one’s quality of life in Italy or in Europe. Meloni will have successfully “liberated” her country from the pressing issues tied to immigration, which will likely decrease euroscepticism and increase the likelihood of Meloni holding office for more than thirteen months.

Conclusion

After in-depth analysis, there is not a strong reason for Italy to leave the EU, as mentioned, Italy is a founding member who receives, and can potentially receive more, extensive benefits. Instead of far-right Italians seeing European integration and globalization as a national threat, it is more beneficial to realize the greater influence Italy can have on *how* integration and/or globalization occurs. Using integrated interest-based negotiation as a method of compromise for issues, national and supranational, can aid in the enhancement of European integration. Further exploration into the feasibility and reliability of integrated interest-based negotiation is encouraged.

There is a strong likelihood that the five solutions can successfully accomplish Italy’s political agenda while maintaining a good-standing membership with the EU. The five solutions include (1) creating an immigration-focused committee, (2) implementing a TSA-based border security administration, (3) creating quality affordable housing in each member state, (4) implementing economic policies as an incentive for supporting border security efforts, and (5) having the European Council of Foreign Relations discuss political issues and peace treaties with Northern African representatives. As a currently identified agitator in the EU, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni could shift Italy’s perspective from Eurosceptic to pro-Europeanist by taking these solutions into consideration. For the sake of peace, it is crucial that the Italian government and European Union are strategic and can appeal to shared values. Finding common ground, through methods like integrated interest-based negotiation, aids in maintaining unity and peace within the Union. There is no European Union without Italy, and there is less of an Italy without the European Union.

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Public versus Private: Inequality in Education Access & Welfare State Structuration

Dale Seufert-Navarro

ABSTRACT

Economic inequality is on the rise in many postindustrial countries. Explanations for this have identified multiple factors facilitating this trend, with recent economic transitions playing a key role. Previously Fordist-organized economies deindustrialized into knowledge-based economies. As such, education has become important for labor market integration. Therefore, education, or a lack thereof, is a central mechanism behind inequality. But what of different methods of educational access – *public* and *private* education? Using cross-national data between 1995 and 2016 for 19 postindustrial countries, this work finds that heavier reliance on private education results in greater measures of market income inequality and wage dispersion. Conversely, higher levels of public education spending are associated with lower levels of both. Additionally, this work finds a mixed association between tertiary educational attainment and wage dispersion.

Key Words: Inequality; Public Education; Welfare State; Human Capital; Knowledge Economy.

Introduction

Since the late 1970's, economic inequality has risen in a majority of postindustrial countries. In fact, this occurred after its steady decline following the Great Depression, and is partly attributable to postindustrial transition; contemporary late capitalism has seen rapidly shifting economic modes of production. During the postwar era, the international division of labor was characterized by core countries engaged in capital-intensive manufacturing, and (semi)periphery countries as sites of raw material extraction and less skill-intensive production (Wallerstein 2004). But, by the late 80's a new global trend had manifested within core economies. Previously Fordist-manufacturing countries in the Global North deindustrialized and transitioned into knowledge-based economies (Smil 2013; Thelen 2021). During this transformation, different occupations and industries have become more privileged over others. This, then, centers education as particularly important for advanced, and newly, deindustrialized economies.

With manufacturing labor in decline, demands on the macro level have elevated a different set of skills. As such, skills related to more highly technical work increase competitiveness and labor market integration on the micro level (Mallick & Sousa 2017). Education attainment, as a means of skill acquisition that increases social and human capital, therefore, becomes important for the knowledge economy (Pont 2001). Thus, an insufficient distribution of education on the macro level potentially shapes inequality through the mechanism of skills distribution. Recent attention has increasingly turned to different educational systems and the resulting variability of access to skills. While previous research has examined aggregate education spending, what has not been explored in great depth until now, is the way in which different funding sources influence skill distribution and inequality.

For this work, the objective is to show that the compositional mix of public and private education expenditures shapes inequality in a particular fashion. Previous work has shown that social investment via education, has the potential to influence the distribution of income and recent investigations suggest that differences in public and private education shapes this distribution differently. Moreover, a growing body of innovative research points to the variability of skill acquisition between public and private education, with greater public investment in education associated with higher measures of skill formation for bottom income percentiles and lower rates of income inequality. This is achieved by examining sources of investment and by rightfully situating educational policy within the context of the welfare state. Although education is a means of social investment, investigations of education policies have been somewhat divorced from broader welfare state research. This is an attempt to further reintegrate education policy research into the scope of the welfare state. As previous research has successfully connected the variation of inequality to welfare regime structuration, this work connects inequality to comparative education systems and, therefore, welfare regimes. Just as different welfare regimes variably structure their policy agendas, their resulting outcomes likewise follow parallel paths. Moreover, the differences between the welfare regimes of Europe and those outside of Europe – particularly, in the United States along with the rest of the Anglo-sphere – as well as differences between European welfare states, detail the mechanisms at the heart of contemporary inequality.

Literature & Theory

Contemporary determinants of economic inequality are shaped by a multifaceted framework (Huber, Machtei, and Stephens 2021). In short, however, shifting economic modes of production over recent decades encompass a significant entanglement of factors contributing to this rise – namely, educational access and the distribution of skills necessary for integration into new economies.

As workers are displaced by economic shifts, access to newly privileged skills determines individual and, potentially, societal outcomes. Somewhat different from manufacturing labor, skills favored in the knowledge economy are largely gained through educational means outside of work (Autor, Levy, & Murnane 2003). Therefore, individuals lacking the inability to attain said skills, are relegated to occupations with lower wages and fewer mobility opportunities. It is no surprise, then, that this precarity of work has contributed to the rise in inequality.

Anecdotal as well as empirical claims assert that education plays an important role in fostering human capital development for individuals (Russ 2017). Rubinstein and Weiss (2006) show a positive ordinal correlation between education level and individual income. This phenomenon holds across much of the developed world. Recent OECD (2022) data show that on average, adults with a tertiary education earn 54 percent more than adults without post-secondary training, and earnings tend to increase with each additional level of educational attainment. Greater access to education and, thereby, greater overall attainment of education also has a negative effect on inequality at the macro level. Countries with higher levels of educational attainment tend to have lower inequality measures than those with less (Barro and Lee 2013). The assumption is that

the more education is accessible, the more likely a greater share of the bottom attains necessary skills; an egalitarian distribution of skills creates an egalitarian distribution of income. The problem, however, is that a country’s level of educational attainment does not always correlate with levels of inequality. For example, the United States is one of the most educated countries in the world, yet has some of the highest levels of inequality in the postindustrial region. Recent estimates rank the U.S. as the 12th most-educated OECD (2021) country, but the third highest in market income inequality and the highest in terms of wage dispersion (Brady et al. 2020).

Since growth in wages does not neatly fall in line with education level, some argue, without sufficient nuance, that links between education and inequality are spurious at best (Krugman 2015). While it is true that income has stagnated even amongst college graduates, STEM and business degree holders have seen relative wage growth (Rothwell 2015). This points to the importance of certain skills in contemporary economies. Goldin and Katz (2008), advancing the skill-biased technological change hypothesis, argue that as technology has progressed, the demand for education has likewise increased, and in particular, education related to the knowledge economy. The problem, however, is that the supply of education meeting those demands has not kept up with this increase.

Where initial studies relied on aggregate education spending and years of educational attainment (Barro and Lee 2013) to measure skill transfer and acquisition, newer research better accounts for the variability of skill distribution via different educational systems. To begin, countries with greater investment in public education usually have lower levels of inequality (Busemeyer 2015). In addition, using OECD test score data, Huber, Gunderson, and Stephens (2020) show that greater spending on public education is associated with higher scores for the bottom income percentiles. Weistanner and Armingeon (2020), further show the extent to which increased public spending on education lowered education premiums and wage dispersion.

Comparative education systems are intrinsically linked to comparative welfare regimes. Just as partisan balances of power form the basis of welfare states (Huber and Stephens 2001), educational regimes mirror those same orientations (Busemeyer 2015). In Europe, there has usually been greater public investments in education. Historically, inequality has also been much lower for the region. Within Europe, public spending as a form of social investment, is, to differing degrees, seen as a social right. As such, the extent to which a system allows “emancipation” from commodifying market forces accounts for educational and inequality variation (Esping-Andersen 1990). Social democratic welfare states have centered public spending as a major form of social investment, largely as a *universal* social right. The liberal Anglo countries, on the other hand, follow a more privatized market approach to social welfare. Similarly, Southern European welfare states have a fragmented and far-less universal policy regime (Ferrera 1996). Somewhere in the middle, yet closer to the social democratic states, the conservative Continental European countries adhere to welfare as a social right, but in more stratified terms (Esping-Andersen 1990). Accordingly, since inequality is shaped by the mediation of welfare regimes, and education plays an important role in the distribution of skills, variation in those systems flesh out the causal mechanism between education and inequality.

Post-secondary education usually takes shape one of two ways: academic tertiary and nontertiary vocational educational training (VET); both provide individuals with access points to human capital and skills (Busemeyer 2015). Academic education is theoretical and broad-based training in a field or discipline, while VET, on the other hand, is either school-based or firm-based training in specific industries, trades, or skills (Busemeyer 2015). VET is especially significant for the lower rungs of the income and skills distribution, providing opportunities for employment to those with limited possibility for academic higher education.

Cross-national variation in post-secondary education exists between countries in and outside of Europe, as well as between welfare states within the continent. VET, for example, is much more prevalent in Europe but is limited in existence in the outside Anglo-sphere. Within Europe, their implementations also differ between welfare regimes. Their presence is strongest in the Continental states in which there is a firm-based structure. In the social democratic states, VET tends to be integrated in their school-based system. European liberal regimes, closest in similarity to the those outside of Europe, have the weakest VET programs (Busemeyer 2015).

The most significant difference in academic tertiary education between Europe and non-European countries are funding sources. In most European countries, tertiary education is predominantly public. Levy (2012) estimates that between 15 and 12 percent of European students are enrolled in private universities. This is contrasted with 29 percent for the United States. While there are private universities in Europe, they are much smaller in number and influence. In the United States, the proportion of public-to-private schools in 2021 was 32 to 68 percent respectively (NCES 2022).

At the other end, early childhood education (ECE) funding follows similarly. Between 1995 and 2016, public spending (as a percentage of GDP) on pre-primary education was highest in social democratic countries (0.72) and the lowest in liberal welfare states (0.23). Further, on average, European countries (0.48) invested much more heavily than non-European countries (0.26) (Brady et al. 2020). While the long-term socioeconomic impacts of ECE remain mixed at best (Shafiq, Devercelli, and Valerio 2018), evidence does suggest that its influence lies in the egalitarian preparation of young children for future academic and non-academic work (Heckman 2006), as well as familial material stability in the present (Kitchen 2007).

This all implies that public education more equitably distributes skills in society, while heavier reliance on private education reproduces disparities by constraining distribution to those in the middle- and top-income percentiles. There is also the implication that differences in inequality are explained by differences in welfare regimes. Potential complications, however, to the power of public investment sources is the presence of school choice voucher programs and the way public education is potentially financed, both most starkly observed in the United States. Given that private institutions are regulated differently, additional fees and the limited eligibility of voucher programs create barriers of access, and potentially shape how skills are distributed. Beginning in the 1980s, liberal welfare states have led the way in the expansion of school choice policies. However, in Canada and the United States, where voucher programs are strongest, a

majority of children with the option of school choice chose to either attend their assigned public school or attend other public institutions (Asadolahi et al. 2022; Musu, Rathbun, and Wang 2019). Even a neoliberal bourgeoisie Swedish government experimented with school choice in the early 90’s (Busemeyer 2015). This further suggests that welfare states, in determining the way school choice policies are implemented, mediates their effects on education and skills distribution.

As noted, the United States stands out in that it draws a significant source of public school funding from local property taxes. Nationally, between 2016–17, 82 percent of public school funds were derived from local property taxes (Husser et al. 2020). Due to historical features of institutional racism and class-impacting zoning policies, a perpetual degree of residential segregation exists in the U.S. – based on race, ethnicity, and immigrant and socioeconomic status. By creating poorly funded public school districts in under-resourced communities, this inegalitarian public investment produces an inegalitarian distribution of skills.

The theoretical foundation informing the following assumptions are that: i.) educational attainment on the micro level results in the acquisition of human capital as skills, and, ii.) the more broadly and equitably skills are distributed on the macro level, the result will be lower levels of inequality. Consequently, the following relationships are hypothesized:

H1: *Countries with larger social investment in public education will be associated with lower rates of inequality.* Conversely, countries with a greater reliance on private education spending will be associated with higher rates of inequality.

H2: *Countries with a larger proportion of adults with tertiary education will show decreased levels of wage dispersion, and fewer adults attaining tertiary education will be associated with increased wage dispersion.*

Methodology & Measurement

The scope of this work is limited to 19 postindustrial economies that have successfully made the transition to the knowledge economy: many countries of Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), along with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. The time frame analyzed – 1995 to 2016 – is dependent on the data availability for public and private educational spending. Moreover, countries are classified for analysis using their welfare state typologies: Anglo-American, Continental European, Nordic, and Southern European. States existing within these broad, yet specific, worlds tend to have similar policy legacies as well as politics, and therefore follow similar paths of social investment and inequality outcomes.

Statistical estimation for the first hypothesis utilizes pooled time-series regression. Modeling uses the *prais.winsten* package in RStudio, as it adequately addresses the issue of AR(1) serial correlation of linear regression model errors. Where possible, periodically missing observations are interpolated and imputed. Otherwise, missing observations are dropped. While imperfect, this still leaves sufficient data to allow for meaningful analysis. As attainment data is much more limited, a different approach is used for the second hypothesis. Simple regression and

bivariate correlation are used in tandem to add robustness. Additionally, since welfare regimes are hypothesized to mediate the relationship between educational attainment and wage dispersion, analysis is broken down into welfare state groupings.

Market income inequality, the first dependent variable, is measured as the Gini Coefficient of the distribution of market income for working-age individuals – 18 to 65 years old. Market income constitutes all income from labor, investment, and private transfers before taxation (excluding government transfers). For the second dependent variable measuring the variation of wages, *wage dispersion*, the 90:10 ratio measures gross-earnings of full-time workers at the 90th percentile compared to those in the bottom 10th percentile. Both variables are drawn from the *Comparative Welfare States Data Set* (CWS Data Set) (Brady et al. 2020).

The primary independent variables are *educational expenditures* assessed as aggregate levels of spending, and then broken down into total public and total private expenditures. All are calculated as a percentage of GDP (Brady et al. 2020). Lastly, *educational attainment* is used as the independent variable for the second hypothesis. Complete tertiary education is measured in 5-year intervals as the percentage of the population, aged 25 and older (Brady et al. 2020). Previous work asserts that higher rates of tertiary education depress the education premium and closes the wage gap (Weistanner & Armingeon 2020). However, this may be potentially mediated by the welfare regime present in a given country. The same particularities that are unique to welfare states may likewise uniquely influence the observable outcomes of this relationship.

As inequality is also shaped by labor market and political institutions, as well as contemporary economic transitions, operationalized variables for each are used for controls. *Labor market institutions* affect labor market integration, employment levels, and wages (Brady, Baker, & Finnigan 2013). Acemoglu (2002) further argues that skill-bias is less tangible in Europe compared to the United States because of heavier labor market regulations and greater density of union membership. Labor strength is measured as union density by net union membership as a percentage of employed wage and salary earners. Minimum wage setting is measured by the degree of government and labor intervention in the wage-setting process as a scaled variable denoting degree of centralization. Lastly, since high employment levels are associated with lower inequality, unemployment rates are controlled – defined as the number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the civilian labor force. All measures are taken from the CWS Data Set (Brady et al. 2020).

Political institutions denote the partisan color and structural nature of government. As Left parties typically advocate for larger public investments and greater coordination with labor, the prolonged presence of Left party control of government has significant ratchet effects on social policy (Huber & Stephens 2001). The Left party variable is a cumulative score representing the share of legislative seats held by leftist parties relative to all other parties in government over time (Brady et al. 2020). Constitutional structures also impact how easily policies can be implemented, and to what extent actors can exert influence on those policies (Immergut 1992). This is operationalized in the CWS Data Set (Brady et al. 2020) as a harmonized scaled variable – federalism, bicameralism, presidentialism, and judicial review represent *veto points*.

Contemporary economic transformations attempt to capture de-industrial transitions. As noted, ongoing economic transitions have played a large role in the structural reorientation of postindustrial economies (Thelen 2021). To control for this, the following are used: industrial employment (as a percentage of the civilian workforce) and trade openness (measured by the Trade Intensity Ratio [TIR]: sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP) (Brady et al. 2020). Financialization has also drawn much academic and political attention. Huber, Petrova, and Stephens (2022), however, found that its associated relationship is largely constrained to income shares of the top 1%. As such, it is hypothesized that financialization should not have a significant effect on wage dispersion. Nonetheless, given discursive prominence, a variable of stock market capitalization is included – measured as the market value of publicly listed stocks as a percentage of GDP (Brady et al. 2020). Lastly, accounting for the global financial crisis between the years 2008 and 2010, period dummies are included in subsequent models.

Results

To begin, descriptive statistics for trends in the dependent and independent variables suggest the correlating plausibility of the noted hypotheses – especially when situated within welfare states. Table 1 shows that market income inequality has risen in 13 out of 19 countries, with Ireland seeing the highest increase of 8 points. Even countries traditionally associated with inequality mitigating measures saw increases. The Nordic countries of Norway and Denmark saw rises of almost 4 and 3 points respectively, and the EU giant of Germany had a 3-point rise. In Table 2, for wage dispersion, 11 countries saw an increase, 4 saw no change, while 4 decreased. The largest increases were in the United States and Germany with 0.8 and 0.5 respectively.

Additionally, by comparing welfare states clear patterns can be observed. On the high end, Anglo-American and Southern states have higher levels of market income inequality with Gini means of 43.8 and 44.6 for the most recent time period. The Southern European countries fared the worst, with an average increase of almost 3 points while the other three groupings averaged 1.5 points. While also seeing increases, the Nordic region has the lowest Gini Coefficient average. Assessing wage dispersion, welfare regimes trend similarly. The Anglo-American states have the highest mean for the measure, the Nordics have the lowest, and the Continental countries are clustered in the middle. The Southern countries, however, all saw decreases.

Table 1: Market Income Gini by Welfare State Regime

	1995-2000	2001-2005	2006-2010	2011-2016
Anglo-American				
Australia	41.0	41.3	40.8	40.9
Canada	40.1	40.6	40.6	40.2
Ireland	42.5	42.7	48.3	50.6
N. Zealand	43.1	41.8	40.2	41.2
UK	43.8	43.2	43.9	43.2
USA	43.5	44.2	45.1	46.4
<i>Mean</i>	<i>42.3</i>	<i>42.3</i>	<i>43.1</i>	<i>43.8</i>
Southern Europe				
Italy	40.9	40	39.6	43.3
Portugal	...	44.9	43.9	45.6
Spain	42.5	37.1	39.3	44.8
<i>Mean</i>	<i>41.7</i>	<i>40.7</i>	<i>40.9</i>	<i>44.6</i>
Continental Europe				
Austria	39.2	39.1	41.2	41.2
Belgium	41.5	41.5	39.4	40.1
France	40.4	40	41.5	41
Germany	38.5	41.4	41.2	41.5
Netherlands	37.1	38.3	38.2	38.5
Switzerland	30.9	29.8	31.8	32.8
<i>Mean</i>	<i>37.9</i>	<i>38.4</i>	<i>38.9</i>	<i>39.2</i>
Nordic				
Denmark	36	36.3	36.8	38.8
Finland	38.8	38.8	37.8	38.3
Norway	34.7	39.5	38.4	38.5
Sweden	40.2	38.5	39.2	40.1
<i>Mean</i>	<i>37.4</i>	<i>38.3</i>	<i>38.1</i>	<i>38.9</i>


Table 2: Wage Dispersion by Welfare State Regime

	1995-2000	2001-2005	2006-2010	2011-2016
Anglo-American				
Australia	3	3.1	3.3	3.4
Canada	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7
Ireland	3.6	3.7	3.9	3.9
N. Zealand	2.6	2.7	2.9	2.9
UK	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.5
USA	4.6	4.7	4.9	5.1
<i>Mean</i>	<i>3.5</i>	<i>3.6</i>	<i>3.7</i>	<i>3.8</i>
Southern Europe				
Italy	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.2
Portugal	...	4.5	4.1	3.9
Spain	...	3.4	3.1	3.1
<i>Mean</i>	<i>2.3</i>	<i>3.4</i>	<i>3.1</i>	<i>3.1</i>
Continental Europe				
Austria	...	3.3	3.3	3.3
Belgium	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.4
France	...	2.9	2.8	2.8
Germany	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.4
Netherlands	...	2.8	2.9	3
Switzerland	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.8
<i>Mean</i>	<i>2.6</i>	<i>2.9</i>	<i>2.9</i>	<i>3</i>
Nordic				
Denmark	...	2.4	2.4	2.5
Finland	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6
Norway	2	2.1	2.2	2.4
Sweden	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3
<i>Mean</i>	<i>2.2</i>	<i>2.3</i>	<i>2.4</i>	<i>2.5</i>

In assessing the dependent variables spread, Ireland presents itself as an outlier for market income inequality, with a Gini averaging as high as 52 between 2009 and 2013 – twelve points higher than the overall mean. Ireland was hit particularly hard by the 2008 global financial crisis, in which the structure of its domestic financial-capital system is partly attributable (Hardiman 2010). Similar to other liberal market economies, the country has a weak fiscal regulatory regime, but more uniquely, Ireland is increasingly seen as a “conduit tax haven” (Tørslø, Wier, & Zucman 2018). Similarly, the United States is an outlier for wage dispersion, averaging 4.8 and even topping 5.2 in 2012. This is well above the mean of 3.1 for all countries. This divergence in wages can partly be attributed to private-sector job growth in high-paying industries associated with the knowledge economy and low-paying service occupations (Acemoglu 2002). Therefore, each are excluded from their subsequent models.


Figure 1 compares education expenditures to market income inequality and wage dispersion. The Nordic countries rank highest in public education and are likewise clustered on the lower end for both measures of inequality. Conversely, the Anglo and Southern European countries spend much more on private education and also tend to do much worse on inequality. The Continental European countries are generally positioned in the middle for both education spending and inequality. These are in-line with expected welfare regime generosity and lend support for the hypothesized associations.

Figure 1. **Education Spending & Inequality**
Market Income Inequality
 1995 to 2016



Source: Brady, Huber, & Stephens, Comparative Welfare States Data Set, UNC Chapel Hill/WZB Berlin Social Science Center, 2020


Wage Dispersion
 1995 to 2016



Source: Brady, Huber, & Stephens, Comparative Welfare States Data Set, UNC Chapel Hill/WZB Berlin Social Science Center, 2020

Public Education Expenditures


1995 to 2016



Source: Brady, Huber, & Stephens, Comparative Welfare States Data Set, UNC Chapel Hill/WZB Berlin Social Science Center, 2020

Private Education Expenditures

1995 to 2016



Source: Brady, Huber, & Stephens, Comparative Welfare States Data Set, UNC Chapel Hill/WZB Berlin Social Science Center, 2020

For the first hypothesis, stepwise modeling begins by analyzing total education expenditures. Next, focusing on the central question of this work, public and private education expenditures are tested singularly, and then together. Finally, controls are introduced in final models. Subsequently, I find that higher public education spending is associated with lower levels of both market income inequality and wage dispersion, and conversely, higher levels of private education spending increase both measures.

In Table 3, both total (Model 1) and public education (Model 2) spending are negatively associated with market inequality, although total education is not statistically significant. In Model 3, private education spending is positively associated with the dependent variable and is statistically significant. Tested together in Model 4, the coefficients for public and private spending remain directionally as hypothesized and similarly significant, yet with a slight decrease. Finally, with the introduction of controls in Model 5, the directional associations for public and private education spending remain as expected and statistically significant. What’s more, the substantive effects of both public and private spending are the strongest indicators.

The relationship between wage dispersion and education is examined in Table 4. Models 1 and 2 show that total and public education spending are negatively associated with wage dispersion and are both statistically significant. In Model 3, private education spending has a substantive effect in the positive direction and is significant. Model 4, results in a similar effect, but with a large decrease in the substantive value for private education; both remain statistically significant. Finally, upon the addition of controls in Model 5, the absolute value of public education’s effect decreases, but remains significant and directionally negative. More importantly, while the substantive effect of private spending decreases minimally, it becomes the most statistically significant indicator for wage dispersion.

Table 3: Edu. Expenditures & Market Income Inequality

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Total Edu Ex.	-0.089 (0.206)	---	---	---	---
Pub Edu Ex.	---	-0.810*** (0.199)	---	-0.535** (0.195)	-1.158*** (0.244)
Priv Edu Ex.	---	---	1.987*** (0.322)	1.737*** (0.327)	1.084** (0.361)
Union Density	---	---	---	---	0.048*** (0.013)
Min. Wage	---	---	---	---	0.753*** (0.089)
Unemp. Rate	---	---	---	---	0.207*** (0.060)
Stock Mkt. Capitalization	---	---	---	---	-0.262*** (0.003)
Trade Openness	---	---	---	---	-0.021*** (0.006)
Left Seat Share	---	---	---	---	0.092*** (0.020)
Veto Pts.	---	---	---	---	0.271* (0.133)
Constant	40.365*** (1.357)	44.222*** (1.107)	37.757*** (0.375)	40.942*** (1.219)	40.408*** (1.443)
N	217	217	217	217	217
R ²	0.004	0.085	0.162	0.202	0.608

Note: All models include period dummies. **significant at .05; ***significant at .01; ****significant at .001; †significant at .1

Table 4: Edu. Expenditures & Wage Dispersion

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Total Edu Ex.	-0.205*** (0.032)	---	---	---	---
Pub Edu Ex.	---	-0.284*** (0.030)	---	-0.267*** (0.030)	-0.173*** (0.044)
Priv Edu Ex.	---	---	0.296*** (0.072)	0.191** (0.62)	0.176* (0.068)
Union Density	---	---	---	---	-0.008** (0.002)
Min. Wage	---	---	---	---	0.041* (0.016)
Unemp. Rate	---	---	---	---	0.018 (0.011)
Stock Mkt. Capitalization	---	---	---	---	0.0004 (0.0007)
Trade Openness	---	---	---	---	0.003**
Left Seat Share	---	---	---	---	-0.003 (0.004)
Veto Pts.	---	---	---	---	-0.085*** (0.025)
Constant	4.211*** (0.204)	4.454*** (0.165)	2.638*** (0.073)	4.191*** (0.183)	3.575*** (0.252)
N	217	217	217	217	217
R ²	0.168	0.300	0.077	0.330	0.553

Note: All models include period dummies. **significant at .05; ***significant at .01; ****significant at .001; †significant at .1

Finally, testing the second hypothesis, the scatterplot in Figure 2 shows wage dispersion and educational attainment. As evidenced, the United States and Portugal are outliers. Accordingly, analysis is demonstrated with and without the two countries. I begin first by discussing the findings with all countries and then the results with the outliers excluded. Using bivariate correlation, as measured between 1995 and 2016, Figure 2 demonstrates a positive association between educational attainment and wage dispersion. Regression estimation reveals a similar effect. In Table 5, Model 1 shows that tertiary education results in higher levels of wage dispersion and is statistically significant. Since the extent of unionization has an established influence on wages, union density is added as a control in Model 2; the directional and statistical effect remains the same. Next, outliers are dropped and the analysis repeated.

Figure 2. Wage Dispersion & Educational Attainment





Figure 3. Wage Dispersion & Educational Attainment

*Without Portugal & the United States



The new scatterplot in Figure 3, without outliers, slightly sharpens the relationship’s positive association. Regression estimation in Table 5 is virtually unchanged, even with the inclusion of union density as a control. In the aggregate, these results appear to refute hypothesis two of this investigation. However, basing the analysis on individual welfare regimes constructs a more nuanced account. Figure 4 shows scatterplots for wage dispersion and tertiary attainment broken down by welfare state typology. With the exclusion of Portugal, observations for the Southern European countries are too few to draw meaningful conclusions. Therefore, the region is not included.


Table 5: Wage Dispersion & Tertiary Edu. Attainment

*All Countries			*Without Portugal and the United States		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	
Tertiary Edu.	0.054*** (0.014)	0.045*** (0.011)	0.046*** (0.013)	0.043*** (0.011)	
Union Density	---	-0.018*** (0.003)	---	-0.013*** (0.003)	
Constant	2.117*** (0.239)	2.918*** (0.240)	2.095*** (0.210)	2.637*** (0.205)	
N	59	59	53	53	
R ²	0.216	0.505	0.212	0.472	

Note: **significant at .05; ***significant at .01; ****significant at .001; †significant at .1


In Figure 4, there is a positive association between tertiary educational attainment and wage dispersion for the Anglo countries. In contrast, there is a negative association for the relationship in the Continental European countries, and a nearly flat regression line for the Nordic countries. The results for the Nordic region imply a very mild and unsubstantial effect.

Figure 4. **Wage Dispersion & Tertiary Education by Welfare State**
Anglo-American Countries




Source: Brady, Huber, & Stephens, Comparative Welfare States Data Set, UNC Chapel Hill/WZB Berlin Social Science Center, 2020

Continental European Countries



Source: Brady, Huber, & Stephens, Comparative Welfare States Data Set, UNC Chapel Hill/WZB Berlin Social Science Center, 2020



Analyzing the data through the lens of welfare regimes show that welfare states do in fact mediate the relationship between educational attainment and wage dispersion. The Anglo-American countries, which emphasize a liberal market approach, tend to have a larger proportion of private tertiary institutions; this helps explain their positive association. In Europe, tertiary education is predominantly public. While there are also private institutions present, they are outnumbered by public universities. This largely suggests support for the hypothesis. Additionally, wage dispersion is likely mediated by higher union density as well. This is especially true in the Nordic region where average union density for the years examined is 67 percent; none of the other welfare regimes reach above 26 percent (Brady et al. 2020).

Discussion

This work both builds upon and corroborates the findings of previous work examining the determinants of economic inequality. Moreover, these results further stress the importance of the power of public investment over the reliance on private allocation regarding social distribution. We consistently show that higher levels of public education spending decrease inequality as measured by market income inequality and wage dispersion. Conversely, heavier reliance on private education spending increases both measures of inequality. While the results of the examination into tertiary attainment and wage dispersion present a slightly different relationship as hypothesized, a more granular dissection does suggest support. A nuanced understanding of the particularities of different regimes helps to explain this. Since liberal welfare states and non-European countries have a larger share of private universities, this likely influences the results. This further suggests, and supports, the assertion that the proportional mix of public and private

education spending shapes inequality in a particular fashion. Moreover, this indicates that welfare state structuration has the ability to influence this relationship as well.

The implications of these findings are clear. Broadly speaking, social investment, and particularly human capital investment, is advantageous for individual and societal outcomes. What’s more, economic transitions are not likely to ease in the future. Likewise, skill-biased technological change will continue to pose a problem for countries that fail to sufficiently increase access to education and more specifically, the distribution of skills. In particular, this work stresses the relevance of not just any source of investment, but in *public* investment. Public investment is associated with a more egalitarian distribution of skills, whereas private investment constrains distribution to middle- and upper-income groups. This simply reproduces preexisting inequality, while public education lifts up the bottom.

The occurrence and fluctuation of inequality are intrinsically linked to structural social policy. In addition, the balance of political power has a direct connection to policy choice and degree of implementation. If the mechanism behind the trajectory of inequality is social policies, then the mechanism underpinning the availability of particular policy choices is politics. This work shows that certain outcomes are path-dependent and thereby not simply naturally occurring. Thus, the same is argued about inequality – economic inequality is politically and socially constructed. Invariably, some level of inequality is outside of human influence, but the global landscape of comparative policies and outcomes demonstrates that inequality is largely shaped by political will.

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