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Director's Note

Welcome to the third edition of the North Carolina Journal of European Studies (NCJES). Thank you for reading. The outstanding work of our students and this year's Managing Editor, Jacob Gunderson, have made the publication of this volume possible. We extend our thanks to Rebekah Kati of Davis Library for all her help as we prepared for the publication of this year's volume. A special thanks to the UNC CES Advisory Board and all of the faculty colleagues who mentored students as they worked on their submissions for this volume. And thank you to the College of Arts and Sciences and the Senior Associate Dean for Social Sciences and Global Programs, Rudi Colloredo-Mansfeld, for supporting this project and our students.

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Contributors: North Carolina Journal of European Studies, Volume 3, Spring 2023

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Author Biographies

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Güzin Karagöz is an undergraduate student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill studying Political Science and Contemporary European Studies with a minor in Data Science. She has taken classes in Contemporary European Politics, Migration into Western Europe, and Democratization and International Organizations after Communism. In addition to Turkish and English, she is conversational in German and is planning to study abroad to strengthen her language skills. Born and raised in Turkey, she migrated to the United States in 2014 for one year and later again in 2018. After her own experiences as an immigrant, Karagöz has made it her goal to become an immigration attorney and help others going through the struggles that she did.

Cho Nikoi is a senior at UNC Chapel Hill majoring in History, with a self-designed concentration in Modern Intellectual History, and minoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. She designed her thematic concentration to bridge "intellectual history" (the study of ideas, intellectuals, and ideological patterns over time, with an emphasis on the conditions of their propagation and dissemination) with concepts of "modernity." She has grounded her research in fascist, anticolonial, and pan-national movements in the 20th century, examining their respective visions of history and alternative futures. This year, Cho will complete a senior honors thesis tracking the development of "Black collective consciousness," from early Pan-Africanism to South Africa's Black Consciousness movement in the 1970s.

Collin Tovey is a Senior at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He will be graduating in the Spring of 2023. He is majoring in History with a specialty in Russian, Eurasian, and East European History, and minoring in Russian Culture. In his time at UNC, he has developed a

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Aleksandar Trivanovic is a graduate student in the TransAtlantic Masters program at UNC, concentrating in European Governance. His studies will continue at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin in Berlin, Germany, where he will earn an M.A. in Social Sciences. His research primarily focuses on voter decision-making strategies, national elections, subnational politics, and populism in the 21st century.

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Unified Germany's Role in the European Union: Hegemon, Co-leader, or Mediator?

Tim Frei

ABSTRACT

Germany underwent major historical change since the end of World War II, joining the European Union and undergoing reunification. The major historical and political shifts defined Germany's international leadership and cooperation. Modern political theorizations argue various perspectives on Germany's developing leadership in the European Union since reunification. Arguments define Germany as a hegemon dominating the European leadership, as a co-leader cooperating with other major European countries, or as a mediator finding common agreements between the members of the European Union. The Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and the annexation of Crimea exemplify three modern instances of crisis in Europe that define Germany's contemporary leadership. Through the investigation of these modern challenges, this essay concludes that Germany's leadership role combines the three common political theorizations, each reflecting critical elements.

Keywords: *German leadership, Hegemon, Germany, EU leadership, Eurozone crisis*

Introduction

The Wall separating East and West opened in Berlin on November 9th, 1989, allowing for the movement of people, and beginning the manifestation of a united Germany. The dream that had been deemed a fantasy for years during occupation and the Cold War finally came to fruition in 1990 as Germany reunited 45 years after the end of the Second World War. The international community became increasingly concerned with the reunification of Germany as history still starkly remembered the terrors of World War II and the Nazi regime. The former president of the German Central Bank, Hans Tietmeyer, reflected on Helmut Kohl's attempt to ease the international concern through European integration. Tietmeyer stated, "When asked about the relationship between German reunification and the further advancement of European integration, Chancellor Kohl often invoked the metaphor 'two sides of the same coin' to illustrate the connection" (Tietmeyer 1990, 2). German reunification initially experienced great backlash from other European countries, as they saw the increased economic potential of a larger Germany leading to more influence in the European Council and later the European Union. In 1990, Tietmeyer questioned the role of Germany in a united Europe, expressing the international concern for reunification. The question of Germany's role in Europe began before realistic plans for reunification ever emerged but became bona fide with increased European integration following the establishment of the unified German state.

The concern about German influences in Europe after the reunification illustrated only one of the many instances of questioning and examining the role of Germany. The further integration of the European Union since 1990, including the growth eastward and many crises the modern world faced, reignited the question of the German leadership role in Europe. In hopes of defining the unique role of Germany, academic arguments and resulting descriptive expressions established the discussion of: What is the leadership role of Germany in the European Union? Academics, politicians, and citizens developed this debate and introduced new perspectives. Co-leadership and

hegemony commonly describe the German role, including various adjectives altering the concepts slightly, demonstrated by the Economist's argument of a "Reluctant Hegemon" (The Economist 2013). Naturally, more radical perspectives codeveloped, including the claim of Germany constructing a "Fourth Reich". The German Leadership role, however, still remains undefined and heavily debated. This analysis of modern events in the European Union will seek to determine the leadership role of Germany, its development, and if the prevalent theory of hegemony holds true. The recent historical events of the Euro/Economic crisis, refugee crisis, and the annexation of Crimea, serve as case studies to determine the role of Germany in the European Union as they exemplify its economic influence, policy objectives, and international relations focus. Through an investigation of these case studies, the role of German leadership in the European Union exhibits elements of hegemonic behavior, complicated by historical pressures and differences in stakeholder perception.

Introduction to Theory and Literature Review

The literature surrounding the debate on the German role defines concepts of both hegemony and alternative perspectives. Defined as the power of a state to dominate a system through control of power resources, including both financial and human capital as well as military might, hegemony results in the perceived and accepted dominant stature of the state in the respective region or organization (Wood 2019, 98-99). In the context of Germany and Europe, the definition of hegemony includes a form of legitimacy stemming from both systemic and public acceptance (Szabo 2019, 110-111). The article *German Hegemony?* by Luke B. Wood investigates the regional hegemonic standing of Germany. In a similar article, titled *Germany: Hegemon or Free Rider?*, Stephen F. Szabo analyzes the German role in modern political turmoil, specifically in aspects of international relations and the rise of Euroscepticism (Szabo 2019, 109-115). Wood and Szabo both determined similar conclusions – that Germany is not a hegemon but inherently became a leader in the European Union. Wood argues that the extent of German power in Europe does not meet the necessary criteria to be considered a hegemon, and, moreover, the newfound power since the end of the Cold War established Germany as a leader in the European Union (Wood 2019, 106). Wood's argument sharply resembles that of co-leadership, a more moderate argument detailing Germany as just a leader alongside the other nations of the European Union, specifically France (Wood 2019, 95). Szabo's conclusion highlights a more concerning reality for Germany. They conclude that Germany did not quite qualify as a hegemonic power, but rather that the perspective of the other member countries may classify Germany as a hegemon in the near future (Wood 2019, 115). The warning Szabo presents cautioned of an abstract component of hegemony – public perspective, and the possible conclusion of German hegemony outside the realm of traditional power. The analysis of both articles develops a detailed definition of hegemony and emphasizes the stakeholders in the definition of a hegemon. An investigation of traditional power, popular perception, and alternative theories creates a premise for a review of the leadership role of Germany and an assessment of hegemony since reunification.

The German hegemon theory exhibits a singular viewpoint of the German role. In combination with the presented conclusion of co-leadership by Wood, the two authors comprise the more plausible end of the popular theories. The article *"The Fourth Reich is Here"* by Julian Pänke explores the more extreme theory, adopted by many populist parties, of the imperialist or dangerous Germany. The dangerous Germany perspective discussed by Pänke highlights an alternative viewpoint that develops the scope of this investigation to encompass further potential realities. Pänke discusses the historical past of Germany and the leadership conundrum faced

during times of European crisis (Pänke 2020, 55-56). Pänke's argument historically analyzes developments in German international leadership beginning with the Nazi regime, followed by a discussion of changes in post-World War II era Germany. Germany's extreme nationalist past prevented the establishment of European power, due to the social and political connotations of a powerful Germany. Pänke recommends Germany accept the leadership associated with its economic and political standing in the European Union and for the other member countries to embrace and enable the international guidance of Germany through co-leadership (Pänke 2020, 56). The argument of co-leadership presented by Pänke reflects similarities to Wood's argument, though an analysis of the populist rhetoric explained by Pänke offers a more diverse perspective. The development of Pänke's analysis offers similar criticism and evidence to that of Szabo, specifically focusing on the failure of Germany to consider the viewpoints of other European member states and acting in the name of the collective good of Europe (Pänke 2020, 57-63).

Following the discussion of the presumed German role in the European Union and Germany's failures to acknowledge other perspectives, Pänke provides the case of three countries' (Greece, Poland, and the United Kingdom) beliefs of German overreach and growing discontent toward Germany (Pänke 2020, 64-68). Pänke offers the following statistics demonstrating the view of citizens in the United Kingdom, Poland, and Greece concerning German involvement in the European Union: 46 percent of surveyed UK individuals and 54 percent of Polish individuals believe that Germany (specifically Berlin) had too much influence in European Union decision-making (Pänke 2020, 66 & 68). In Greece, the public opinion of both European Union and German officials fell dramatically (at least 35 percentage points each) between 2010 and 2016 (Pänke 2020, 64-65). The rise of both Euroscepticism and animosity toward German leadership demonstrates the difficulties facing Germany but also the vehement opposition to German leadership itself. Pänke argues that the origin of this opposition stems from the perception of what Germany's role should be, and the resulting discrepancy contributes to the rise of nationalist-populist views (Pänke 2020, 69). The argument made by Pänke resembles components of both Wood and Szabo but most importantly expands on the importance of structural and popular opposition to hegemony. The populist rhetoric described in Pänke's article contributes to the national perspectives on the possible German leadership role and actuality of German governance in the European Union.

Case Studies

Eurozone Crisis

Understanding the modern economic impact and influence Germany had in the Euro/economic crisis requires an examination of economic development since German reunification in 1990. When Germany reunified, the labor force expanded by 16 million individuals and total land increased by 43 percent (Silvia 2019, 74-94). The years directly following reunification resembled a rebuilding for Germany, and prices and unemployment, specifically in former East Germany, spiked (Silvia 2019, 76). In the article *A Silver Age?* by Stephen J. Silvia, a pendulum swing describes the change from the reality of the 1990s to the 2000s, seeing an improvement both in unemployment and in economic growth up until the 2008 and the global finical crisis. Silvia additionally analyzes the current account balance, measuring the net outcome of global trade, seeing a slow development during the integration and rebuilding of the united German state. Productivity, investment, compensation, and output only slightly improved as the German economy began to re-establish itself in the global market (Silvia 2019, 78-83). Following the period of rebuilding and rebirth of the globally competitive German market,

the financial crisis and subsequent Euro/Economic crisis thrust Germany into a European emergency in need of leadership.

Silvia describes the reaction to the 2008 financial crisis as a "remarkable economic performance," highlighting German policy including emergency measures and a notable subsidized automobile program to spur demand. While Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell, the unemployment rate shrunk, and during the extraordinary period, Germany fared well in comparison to many other countries. The Euro-crisis or Eurozone crisis quickly followed, commencing in late 2010, after a growing imbalance in the movement and usage of capital in the Eurozone. The crisis impacted southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) and Ireland the most. The economies of these countries had become unbalanced by excess German capital and unsuitable interest rates in addition to a unique set of economic circumstances (Silvia 2019, 85). In *Germany: Hegemon or Free Rider?* Szabo states, "It has acted as a hegemon primarily in economic policy areas, and most importantly in the Eurozone crisis," arguing that the economic strength and stability of Germany contributed to its holding of power resources (Szabo 2019, 111). Germany blocked and stalled many reform projects in the Eurozone and ultimately cooperated minimally to resolve the crisis. In *German Hegemony?* Wood describes "the cooperative mechanisms successive German governments attempted to build were, in important ways, doomed projects including the failure of the European Union to create institutions by which future sovereign debt crises might be averted," when describing the German response to the Eurozone crisis (Wood 2019, 100). The animosity and tension between the European Union members, coming from the Eurozone crisis, led to the popularity of far-right parties, specifically the Alternative for Germany Party (AfD) (Silvia 2019, 85). Pänke states, "The more assertive Germany acted—as, for example, during the Eurozone crisis—the more resistance Berlin faced and the more German leadership was perceived as illegitimate," in *"The Fourth Reich is Here"* (Pänke 2020, 55). The quote highlights the unique situation Germany faced as the European Union looked for leadership from the developed economies while still needing to preserve the satisfaction of its own citizens. The Eurozone crisis created immense rifts in the European Union in terms of leadership and affected countries, and Greece specifically became incredibly dissatisfied with the leadership or lack thereof, from Germany.

Refugee Crisis

The migration crisis in 2015 marked another major crisis in German history. Immigration itself occurred a great deal after the reunification of Germany as many East Germans fled westward. The migration crisis, however, differed greatly as immigrants sought asylum in the German state due to the conflicts mainly in Syria, Albania, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Silvia 2019, 87). According to Silvia, Germany initially developed a euphoric "welcome culture" but backlash from the German population and groups like the AfD quickly occurred (Silvia 2019, 87). In addition to the backlash, the German state struggled to accommodate all the migrants; however, Silvia stated, "Merkel nonetheless refused to set a hard cap on the number of asylum seekers whom Germany would accept" (Silvia 2019, 87). The German response to the migration crisis hoped to create a European environment of acceptance toward refugees and encourage positive norms regarding immigration (Wood 2019, 100). Pänke analyzed the refugee policy similarly but cited a Greek editorial that criticized Germany for attempting to compensate for mistakes of the past. "The German response during the refugee crisis might indeed be an expression of that 'pure idealism,'" acknowledged Pänke (Pänke 2020, 64). Historical factors contributed greatly to the German

response during the refugee crisis, both the recent history of reunification but also the atrocities which occurred during the second World War.

Germany attempted to retain the policy of no asylum limits but both internal pressures and lack of external European support for common immigration policies caused a shift of objective" (Silvia 2019, 87). Silvia stated, "Merkel subsequently negotiated an agreement on behalf of the European Union with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to keep the vast majority of refugees who entered Turkey in his country in exchange for up to 3 billion Euro in financial support each year." The common European policy shattered the hopes of the German government, due to internal resistance towards increased refugees and a lack of support from some European Union members, specifically Hungary and Poland (Szabo 2019, 114-155 and Silvia, 2019, 87). Polish resistance to refugees and asylum policies formed from more populist rhetoric but also emerged at the same time as Poland demanded further German reparations for the impact of World War II (Pänke 2020, 65). Szabo argued that the response to the refugee crisis exemplifies an instance of Germany acting and bargaining in the name of Europe but acting on its own (Szabo 2019, 113). Additionally, Szabo claimed that the rift between Poland and Germany exemplified the questionable reliance and relationship of the two in the European Community (Szabo 2019, 115). The actions of Germany hoped to inspire the European community to act collectively in the good of humanity, but instead, the attempt became synonymous with the power dynamic in the European Union. The policy and cooperation, or lack thereof, contributed to the leadership effect discussed both by Pänke and Szabo and the varied expectations of German leadership by different European stakeholders.

Crimean Annexation[1]

The annexation of Crimea from Ukraine by Russia in 2014 resembled another challenge for the European Union, and specifically Germany. The German foreign policy, specifically toward Russia and the former Soviet Union, historically resembled non-aggression but firmer agreements and postmodern arrangements (Koeth 2016, 102). The article *Leadership Revised* by Wolfgang Koeth examined the changes in German foreign policy and its leadership in the annexation of Crimea. The German-Russian relationship stemmed from reunification, and the relationship remained a combination of gratitude and resentment. The Russian perspective wildly differed as the loss of Germany and the ultimate collapse of the Soviet bloc resembled a defeat (Koeth 2016, 107). The election of Angela Merkel in 2005 created a new relationship, compared to the prior colloquial relationship between Putin and Schroeder (Koeth 2016, 108). The agreements and connections between Russia and the European Union complicated the reaction to Russian advancement, and their economic connections established a further barrier to action (Koeth 2016, 107-112). Prior to the annexation of Crimea, Russia experimented with other forms of aggression to discover the line of European reaction (Koeth 2016, 111-112). In the period before the annexation, a leadership vacuum opposing Russian aggression formed. The United States, under Barack Obama, believed in European conflict independence, and the European Union itself had no singular representation. The other major members of the European Union (the United Kingdom and France) prioritized domestic issues as opposed to the growing threat of Russia

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[1] *Given the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24th, 2022, the following analysis no longer reflects the leadership of Germany as an effective prevention and deterrent of further escalation. Rather, this analysis aims to highlight the reaction of Germany in relation to the European Union during the annexation of Crimea.*

(Koeth 2016, 113). Koeth stated, "The annexation of Crimea had challenged German foreign policy in several regards. Germany is a strong supporter of a common EU foreign policy, since the EU, like Germany, has consistently favored norms and rules over intervention in international relations" (Koeth 2016, 113). The final straw for Merkel and Germany arrived with the shooting down of a passenger plane, and Koeth described how, "Merkel fully assumed the role the rest of Europe was expecting from her" (Koeth 2016, 113). Germany stepped into a leadership role due to an existing vacuum coupled with popular domestic support, but most importantly due to European Union expectations.

With Germany at the helm, the European Union imposed a common sanction policy toward Russia. Germany and France mediated a ceasefire agreement later in the conflict, hoping for a peaceful solution (Koeth 2016, 110). German leadership, therefore, demonstrated its leading competence to the rest of the European Union with the navigation of the annexation of Crimea. Koeth argued, "In all three crises, Germany found itself in the driver's seat, first reluctantly, but with increased comfort. The Euro crisis exposed the objective need for strong leadership, and this leadership went to Berlin as a default solution" (Koeth 2016, 115). Szabo interpreted the German leadership in the annexation of Crimea not as a hegemon but rather as a supreme facilitator, applying sanctions and economic approaches to contain the crisis but not resolve it (Szabo 2019, 111). In addition, Szabo viewed the German leadership as a devolvement in the effectiveness of German leadership (Szabo 2019, 109). In comparison, Pänke viewed Berlin's leadership as somewhat effective in unifying and executing successful sanctions (Pänke 2020, 59). The annexation of Crimea uniquely identified Germany's involvement in European Union crisis leadership. The historical context surrounding its relationship with Russia and foreign policy allowed Germany to step into a leadership vacuum and be embraced by the European community.

Analysis

The case studies and literature review provided the theoretical concept and real-world evidence for the leadership of Germany in the European Union and the development of its role since Germany's unification. Since reunification, Germany undoubtedly became a larger member of the European Union on both an economic scale and in leadership potential. The measured effectiveness of German leadership, based on the three cases, certainly paints a more negative picture. The inefficiencies and hegemonic behavior demonstrated in the Eurozone crisis created animosities that defined the following turbulent years. The hegemonic actions of Germany in the Eurozone crisis exhibited its economic power. In regional comparison, the scale cannot actually qualify Germany as a hegemon by definition; however, its behavior still abused its economic stability in a praxis relatively equivalent to hegemonic. The animosity between European member states generated unattainable expectations and furthered the rise of populist rhetoric, coupled with Euroscepticism. The rise of Euroscepticism, caused by the Eurozone crisis, in nations outside Germany such as Poland and Greece hindered European cooperation and tarnished their view of German leadership, as mentioned by Pänke. The growth of the AfD in Germany additionally built internal barriers to successful German leadership and initiatives in the European Union (Pänke 2020, 54).

The annexation of Crimea highlighted the best-received instance of German leadership in European conflicts. The more positive outcome hinged on two major factors – the European Union's expectations and historical context. The historical context not only impacted the communication with Russia but allowed Germany to use its economic potential to achieve a

common European goal. The economic capability and strength of the German state, coupled with its previous foreign policies of reluctance toward harsh sanctioning, authorized it to create strong opposition to the Russian aggression toward Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. The expectations of the European Union clearly set a precedent for Germany to take charge of the collective response. The expectation for German leadership developed from both a power vacuum and a specialization to best address the issue. The communication and expectation of the European Union fostered an environment for well-received and relatively successful German leadership, without appearing hegemonic. Public perception, both internally and externally, depicts a clear image of cooperation, and the transfer of control to the best-suited director exhibits a lack of manipulative and hegemonic intent.

The refugee crisis exhibited the German desire to lead by example but also rectify historical mistakes. The divisiveness of the issue, in Germany but more importantly in the other previously mistreated European countries, halted the progress and success of the initiative. The opposition, developed by previous hegemonic behavior, froze the adoption of the initiative to welcome immigrants to a united Europe. Euroscepticism within Germany, primarily by far-right parties such as the AfD, created resistance to the national success of the asylum initiative. In addition, the challenge of perceived German action stemming from previous German leadership became doomed by the possibly well-intentioned 'lead by example' approach. The refugee crisis lacked the public support of the whole European Union but also lacked the expectation and specialization needed for successful German leadership. The historical shadow cast on German intentions contributed to the failure of the expected spreading of 'welcome culture'. The apparent compensation for historical wrongdoing impacted the accomplishment of the German project – a possible indication of future leadership attempts. The refugee crisis highlights the importance of the perception of hegemonic behavior, specifically at the end refugee agreement with Turkey and the independent action of Germany relying on European adoption. Once again, the actions did not directly qualify as hegemonic; however, the public perception perceived Germany as forcing immigration policy on the entirety of the European Union. The refugee crisis highlights the importance of public perception of intention and the resistance of previously marginalized groups of German leadership.

Conclusion

After the reunification of Germany, Chancellor Helmut Kohl held a speech in 1996 about the importance of European integration in the 21st century. In Kohl's introduction, he stated, "There is no reasonable alternative to an ever-closer bond between the peoples of Europe. We need to build the House of Europe. We all need a united Europe" (Kohl 1996, 1). Kohl's call for a united front originated from a growing German economy and manifesting external threats to security, democracy, and European success. Since the unification of Germany and Kohl's speech, the European Union developed into a more integrated institution, but more recently skepticism of the European Union grew exorbitantly. The German want for more integration, exemplified by Kohl's speech after reunification, defined the original leadership of Germany: wanting to spread risk and grow the Union (Wood 2004, 77). The leadership of Germany expanded due to the growth of its economic might but also an increasing vacuum in other countries' leadership in Europe (Koeth 2016, 113). The involvement of Germany in the leadership of the European Union undoubtedly escalated since its reunification.

The question of the identification of the role of Germany in the leadership of the European Union remains unclear and complicated. The case studies analyzing Germany's leadership illustrate the lack of explicit rejection of the established theories of German hegemony, co-leadership, and manipulation. The arguments of Szabo, Wood, and Pänke all hold elements of truth after analyzing the Eurozone crisis, refugee crisis, and the annexation of Crimea. As often in modern theoretical and academic discussion, this analysis points to a combination of the three theories. The definition of hegemony as presented formerly cannot explicitly characterize Germany as a hegemon. In conclusion, the leadership of Germany expresses economic capability and isolating actions exhibiting hints of hegemony. The desire to rectify German's historical failures and an unclear expectation of leadership from the European Union complicates an explicit conclusion, as the presence of internal and external opposition and growing public perception of German manipulation in Europe enforces the relevance of stakeholders in the discussion of international leadership. The warning Szabo presents about the growing perspective on German dominance, the co-leadership potential of Germany mentioned by Wood, and Pänke's alert for the need for public support of German leadership all prove accurate (Szabo 2019, 115; Wood 2019, 95; Pänke 2020, 54-76).

However, the unclarity of the German leadership role raises concern for the future of the European Union. Donald Rumsfeld, the United States Defense Minister, presented a point of advice for European unity in 2003, which might provide some hope for the future after this conflicting analysis, "In those places where unity among the many EU members is visibly struggling, according to calculations, the entente between Berlin and Paris could point to a way out. That would really be a New Europe" (Rumsfeld 2003, 2). The question of Germany's role became bona fide with increased European integration following the establishment of the unified German state. The analysis of recent historical events including the Eurozone crisis, refugee crisis, and the annexation of Crimea, serve as case studies to help explain the role of Germany in the European Union as it exemplifies its economic influence, policy objectives, and international relations focus. The role of Germany remains undetermined but the theories and warnings surrounding German leadership and hegemony remain.

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How Retrenchment in Kemalism is Preventing the Accession of Turkey into the European Union

Güzin Karagöz

ABSTRACT

Turkey's accession to the European Union has been a key topic of debate in the past few years. This paper aims to explain how current policies under the Erdoğan administration are causing a retrenchment in Atatürk's efforts of westernizing the Turkish state and further hindering Turkey from joining the European Union. Research on this topic tends to discuss contemporary Turkish and European politics but fails to include its roots going back to the establishment of the nation itself. To tackle why Turkey has faced difficulty joining the EU, I address how both Atatürk and Erdoğan dealt with the same struggles from differing perspectives, leading to opposite results. I tie together discourse on Turkish history as well as contemporary politics using analysis by authors like Darden and Skocpol. This approach explains current trends and sheds light on how Turkey's history affects contemporary outcomes.

Keywords: Turkey, European Union, Atatürk, westernization, backsliding

Introduction

Due to its geographical location, Turkey acts as a bridge connecting Europe and Asia. Even though a majority of its landmass is in Asia, the Green Card lottery system, as well as the European Commission both, consider Turkey a European country. Whether the country belongs in Asia or Europe is often a matter of ideology and politics rather than geography. However, despite its established Europeanness in many aspects, Turkey's accession to a formal institution like the European Union has been a controversy for decades.

What is preventing Turkey from joining the European Union after its numerous attempts? The 1999 Helsinki Council agreed that Turkey was eligible to join as long as it adhered to the Copenhagen Criteria, however, the internal shift in ideology via the retrenchment in Kemalism by the Erdoğan administration has prevented the nation from doing so.

In this paper, I analyze how the religious and cultural shift back to its Ottoman roots has prevented Turkey from joining the European Union. In forming the nation-state, Atatürk reformed cultural and religious aspects remnant from the empire to fit a more western model. These spheres have a large impact on the politics of the country, which made Turkey eligible to join the Union. However, Erdoğan reversed many of the reforms brought by Atatürk and took a different stance on international politics. The current backsliding in Turkey, therefore, is making future accession efforts very difficult to achieve.

The rest of this paper is divided into five sections. In the first section, I outline a brief history of the nation, which is imperative for the reader to contextualize both Atatürk and Erdoğan's actions and beliefs. In the second section, I categorize the difficulties Atatürk faced in forming contemporary Turkey and his controversial methods in doing so. In the third section, I explain Turkey's struggle in joining the EU and elaborate on the grounds for accession. In the

fourth section, I elaborate on the Erdoğan administration and his impact on the religious, cultural, and political spheres. In the fifth and final section, I discuss the possibility of future accession.

To support my argument, I cite peer-reviewed articles on Turkish politics as well as Turkey-EU relations. Additionally, I support established theories by well-known political scientists to illustrate the textbook example of backsliding occurring in contemporary Turkey.

History of Turkey-From an Empire to a Republic

When the Ottoman Empire was in the process of transitioning to modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) played a prominent role in shaping the country into the nation-state that it is today. He faced religious and cultural difficulties but was able to overcome them.

Atatürk was the first president of the Republic of Turkey following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. His origins were from the Ottoman ruling class, since his father served in the military during the Russo-Turkish war (Itzkowitz 2022). His early secular education coupled with his father's influence formed the foundation of the ideas he wished to implement in order to form a nation-state in the future. This supports the impact of education and upbringing in forming national identities, as Darden (forthcoming) argued in his work. As time passed, the Ottoman Empire started to lose its legitimacy due to outside pressures from other European countries following the industrial revolution (Editors 2017). Mustafa formed a secret group with his friends in school and conducted anti-government activities rooted in secularism and a sovereign Turkish state. They called themselves the Young Turks and started a revolution that weakened the Ottoman Empire from within (Itzkowitz 2022). Skocpol's theory of why revolutions occur (Skocpol 1979) highlights the build-up to the insurrection that pushed the empire to its limits. Mustafa observed that the Ottoman empire was on the verge of collapse, and went to Ankara in order to establish a Turkish nation (Itzkowitz 2022). He persevered in forming the nation, regardless of the orders coming from the sultan in Istanbul demanding him to cease.

Difficulties in Forming the Nation-State

After coming to power, Atatürk faced several difficulties when forming the nation-state. To overcome these struggles, he set a number of principles, known as Kemalism, which constituted the foundation of Turkish republican statehood and consisted of "republicanism, populism, nationalism, etatism, laicism, and revolutionism." (Makaradze, 2020: 154). Even though these principles are built upon Western ideals, specific conditions had to arise in Turkey for their implementation (Makaradze, 2020: 155). We can identify said conditions when looking at Anderson's (1983) perspective on nationalism as a modern phenomenon. He states that there arises a need to replace previous connections to the past (in our case, religion and language), a need to create harmony and cohesion after state creation since the process of state building is violent in and of itself.

In the Ottoman empire, there was respect and inclusion of other religions, however, most governmental affairs were structured around Islam. Atatürk disagreed with the heavy integration of religion in everyday life and thought it led to a division among the people of the country.

After coming to power, he abolished both the sultanate and caliphate, thereby removing expressions of "the religion of the state" from the constitution (Saygin, 2008: 38) and founding a

new state around Western ideals (Makaradze, 2020: 156). By rejecting the Ottoman-Islamic aspects of the country as well as its Islamic identity, Turkey was able to adopt a secular identity that was based on the pre-Islamic glory of the Turks (Aytürk, 2004: 2).

Language was another important aspect in the republican project of identity building (Aytürk, 2004: 2). Because the Ottoman Empire consisted of many ethnic groups, Ottoman Turkish incorporated aspects of Turkish, Arabic and Persian with some Italian, Greek, Armenian and other European elements, and was written using Arabic characters (Aytürk, 2004: 1). The inflectional superiority thesis, founded by F. Max Müller, states that even though "capacity for language and articulation is universal, creativity in articulation is not equally distributed among human beings" (Aytürk, 2004: 3), which allowed Müller to make sweeping and biased generalizations concerning the language and the history of the Turks (Aytürk, 2004). According to this claim, "Ottoman Turkish was not... palatable for the westernizing, nationalist elite, who wanted to create a nation state for the Turks and to burn the bridges connecting the nascent republic to its Islamic, oriental predecessor." (Aytürk, 2004: 1). In addition to false claims that connected capability to language, the Arabic alphabet made it difficult to disperse information to illiterate peasants that experienced difficulty reading it (Saraçgil, 2013: 198). In order to establish Turkish as an Indo-European language (Aytürk, 2004: 7), Atatürk established Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Institute) in order to "'purify' the language by ridding it of its non-Turkish components and to coin new, 'authentic' words to replace them." (Aytürk, 2004:1). Atatürk not only deemed the alphabet underdeveloped, but also most cultural aspects of the Turkish identity. The previous "alphabet, calendar and traditional clothing" were eliminated by the current regime to proclaim the secular nation (Saraçgil, 2013: 211) as well as to address the problem of accessibility when using a Semitic alphabet to communicate a now agglutinative language (Aytürk, 2004:1).

In contemporary Turkey, Atatürk is a savior for the people and schools teach his successes in creating Turkey as a nation-state. However, he was violent and abrupt in his efforts and acted against democratic ideals to accomplish his goals. In addition to acting as the autonomous ruler of Turkey, he also perpetuated white supremacy and false ideas of cultural development in doing so. Even though he himself was a radical abolitionist in the process of forming Turkey, he banned organized opposition to his regime through a violent military response, which prevented democratic and pluralist possibilities. (Saraçgil, 2013: 199). He was "…constructed in the image of a single, brilliant and ruthless general, over-anxious to modernize from above and with little time for parliamentary procedures or a free press." (Saraçgil, 2013: 214). Mustafa himself explained later that voters did not have the capacity to make informed decisions, and that he was "the only person qualified to decide who was to be a candidate and who was to be elected to parliament."(Saraçgil, 2013: 215). In addition to corrupt policymaking, he established the view that religion and tradition could not coexist with modernization and development. This and the abrupt reaction to Müller's racially motivated theory set the stage for white supremacy and seeing the Turkish people and their cultures as undesirable.

Struggle of Contemporary Turkey

Even though the foundations of Turkey were built in a seemingly radical fashion, they still provided the building blocks for politics in contemporary Turkey. It is likely that if Turkey were to continue on the path of westernization Atatürk set, its accession into the European Union would be more plausible compared to the current state of the country. The 1999 Helsinki European

Council declared Turkey could join if it adhered to the Copenhagen Political Criteria (Cámara, 2021). These criteria are set to ensure that the accession process is universal for all candidates and that the legal procedures set in place in candidate countries align with the overall aim of the European Union. The Copenhagen Political Criteria are as follows: "Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved:

‹ Stability of institutions guaranteeing
   o Democracy,
   o Rule of law,
   o Human rights and
   o Respect for and protection of minorities

‹ The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union.

‹ Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union." (Emerson, 2004).

Turkey was on track to improve its democracy and meet the stated criteria. An example of this would be that "Article 28 of the Constitution would be amended to guarantee constitutionally the right to express opinions without censorship, the freedom of the press and the right of individuals to obtain information." (Emerson, 2004: 3). If Turkey were to follow through, member states could not say their efforts weren't enough for a positive reaction from the European Council (Emerson, 2004: 3). As expected, the EU Commission soon stated that Turkey fulfilled conditions to accede in 2005. However, in December 2006, the EU suspended negotiations on eight of the 35 chapters due to "the refusal by the Turkish government to apply the 1995 Customs Union agreement to all new member states, in particular, Cyprus" (Cámara, 2021). In addition, societal and religious policies under the Erdoğan administration raised concern in both Europe and the USA.

Erdoğan's Rise to Power

The 2001 economic crisis led to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to come to power. The leader of AKP was Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was previously Istanbul's mayor. Contrary to Atatürk's beliefs on secularism, Erdoğan believed in Islam as a political force (Cámara, 2021). The most glaring difference between Atatürk and Erdoğan is that whereas Atatürk's effort provided for a more westernized Turkey, Erdoğan reversed this process and decreased Turkey's chances of being admitted to the EU as a result. One of the earliest examples of this would be their differing outlooks on foreign affairs. Atatürk was more conservative when it came to Turkey's foreign stance, however, Erdoğan used foreign policy to consolidate power among other countries. After the atrocities of World War I, Atatürk decided it was best to not get involved in foreign entanglements (Cámara, 2021). In contrast, AKP saw Arab uprisings as an opportunity to demonstrate influence in the region through a "neo-Ottoman foreign policy" that strayed away from Atatürk's ambitions (Cámara, 2021). Since Turkey's establishment, Europe and westernization have been the main goal, but the AKP used reforms to reduce the impacts of Kemalist regime and push a more Islamist agenda (Cámara, 2021).

Some religious concerns Erdoğan faced were the lack of the place of Islam in everyday life. Some of the reforms he brought about, as a result, were access to more Islamist graduate schools, an increasing number of imams in mosques, and a mandatory hijab policy for women on university campuses at a certain point (Cámara, 2021). This, however, was not well received by Kemalists who wished to continue Atatürk's secular regime. AKP then introduced constitutional amendments via the September 2010 referendum, which aimed to curb the tutelary powers of the military and the judiciary (Cámara, 2021).

Referring back to the reforms outlined for Turkey's accession, Erdoğan failed to carry out the statement on amending Article 28 of the constitution aiming to allow freedom of speech. After a planned coup, the AKP put pressure on the independent press and consolidated its power over social institutions like schools and the police, as well as legal institutions like the constitutional court and judges (Cámara, 2021). There was pressure against freedom of speech and efforts to centralize all power in a single figure, which strays further away from democracy.

After winning the presidential election in 2014, Erdoğan immediately moved to change the constitution with the goal of concentrating power in the figure of the President (Cámara, 2021). Even though the Copenhagen Criteria includes respect towards minority groups, this was loosely enforced and even acted against. There were military operations in eastern Syria against Syrian Kurds which led to strong reactions from other countries in the EU such as Germany and France, which supported an arms embargo on Turkey (Cámara, 2021). There also existed a lack of attention to women's rights issues since Turkey withdrew from the Council of Europe's Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women, signed in Istanbul in 2011(Cámara, 2021). In general, "The wide purges in military ranks, the civil service, the courts, and the academia and further suppression of the press that followed, raised concern in Europe and in the US." (Cámara, 2021). The continued trend of suppression led to Turkey being considered an illiberal democracy (Cámara, 2021) according to the Copenhagen Criteria.

Future Prospects

The current state of the country is one that is far from Atatürk's vision. "The failed coup in 2016 gave Erdoğan the opportunity to stage a 'final blow' to the Kemalist establishment...In fact, the President was the main beneficiary of the botched coup, as he quickly moved to eliminate all opposition." (Cámara, 2021). The European Commission stated that, even though Turkey is a strategic partner in many issues such as security, counter-terrorism, and migration, it has been backsliding in areas of democracy and fundamental rights. (Cámara, 2021). That same year, due to an autocratic drift in the overall state of the country, "the EU Council decided that no new areas would be opened in the accession talks...Turkey has been moving further away from the EU, and accession negotiations have, therefore, effectively come to a standstill." (Cámara, 2021). However, improvements have been implemented throughout Erdoğan's presidency, and might reverse Turkey's path in the near future. "Poverty incidence more than halved from 2002 to 2015. In just over a decade, Turkey has increased the share of renewables-such as hydropower, solar, wind, and geothermal-in electricity production from 17% to 46%" (Cámara, 2021). These improvements go hand in hand with the European Union's interests as it directly impacts overall stability and economic relations highlighted in the Copenhagen Criteria. Additionally, joining the EU has been an interest of the citizens as well: "With economic difficulties fueled by COVID-19 increasing, and clear symptoms of dissatisfaction among many Turkish citizens, Erdoğan seems ready to put

some limits on his assertive foreign policy...he said that his government wanted 'to build Turkey's future together with Europe'."

Even though Turkey still has many aspects to improve upon, accession isn't implausible. "If the EU strictly followed its prior doctrine, the conclusion would have to be that Turkey does not yet fulfill the Copenhagen criteria" or they could take "not an absolutist position, but one in which it might decide that 'sufficient progress' towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria had been made to warrant the opening of negotiations." (Emerson, 2004: 2). There has been debate on Turkey's accession on the European end of the spectrum as former president Giscard d'Estaing raised concern and stated Turkey joining would mean the end of the EU due to public opinion over the place of Islam in Europe as well as the impacts of September 11th and March 11th. (Emerson, 2004: 5). However, d'Estaing fails to consider the fact that "Turkey could play a significant role in the connection between the Muslim world and the West." due to its geographical function as a bridge between the two (Cámara, 2021). It is best to consider the possible accession as an asset rather than a threat to foster an environment for multiple cultures to coexist within Europe as well as among the wider Aran-Muslim neighborhood surrounding it. (Emerson, 2004: 5).

Conclusion

The shift away from Kemalism has negatively impacted Turkey's probability of joining the European Union. Erdoğan's policies have undone most of the social and religious reforms Atatürk implemented. As demonstrated above, Atatürk's reforms were to escape the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, whereas Erdoğan's reforms shifted back to the Ottoman ways. Both reforms were controversial in their times, and the back and forth between secularism and theocracy hinders Turkey's ability to join the EU. Even though Turkey has advanced in some fields, it will take more to be considered for accession in the future.

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Third Rome: Reconciling Antiquity and Modernity in the Fascist Conceptualization of Time

Cho Nikoi

ABSTRACT

Despite the ideological diversity that exists across fascist movements of recent history, one characteristic has come to be seen as endemic: the glorification of a national past and/or lost national character. In the case of Benito Mussolini's Fascist regime, the Italian nation-building project required the resurrection of a much older past – namely, Italy's Ancient Roman heritage. This recourse to antiquity appeared in the regime's public communications, literature, and propagandist media. However, in this paper I argue that this turn toward the ancient was not indicative of an *anti-modern* stance. Rather, the regime's classicist language coexisted with broader modernization projects. Narratives around time served different functions in different domains – both material and immaterial. This paper moves beyond an analysis of fascist political rhetoric to consider the *spatial* projects mobilized under Fascist rule, specifically in the areas of modernist architecture and urban planning.

Keywords**:** Fascism, Third Rome, romanità, temporality, fascist rhetoric

When Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini unveiled the Augustan Exhibition of Romanità in Rome's Palazzo delle Esposizioni in 1937, he left an inscription at its door: "Italians, you must ensure that the glories of the past are surpassed by the triumphs of the future." Not only did Mussolini's remark establish a symbolic relationship between Ancient Rome and Fascist Italy, but it also indicated the unique way in which fascism constructed temporality.[2] From its conception, Italian fascism had neither a delineated ideology nor unified programming across its many sects. Early Fascism, as developed by Mussolini, was much less a party than an "anti-party": a multifaceted category comprising distinct subsects, generally with a shared animus against liberalism. Under one title, fascism subsumed many often-clashing ideologies and aesthetics, incorporating aspects of national syndicalism, revolutionary nationalism, corporatism, and Futurism, among other movements and trends.[3] The Fascist regime that ruled over Italy during the *ventennio* (1925-1945) exemplified this lack of discernible ideology, and this tension appeared particularly in the regime's relationship to *temporality*.

Corresponding to the heterogeneity of its constituents, Mussolini's Fascist regime presented a highly eclectic conceptualization of time, marked by the unification of contradictory temporal models.[4] Characteristic of Italian fascism was the tension between its clear classicism, on the one hand, and its model of modernity, on the other. "*Romanità*," the political and cultural

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[2] Flavia Marcello, "Mussolini and the Idealisation of Empire: The Augustan Exhibition of Romanità," *Modern Italy* 16, no. 3 (2011): 230.

[3] A. James Gregor, *Mussolini's Intellectuals: Fascist Social and Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 54.

[4] Helen Roche, "Mussolini's 'Third Rome', Hitler's Third Reich and the Allure of Antiquity," *Fascism* 8, no. 2 (2019): 131.

concepts comprising Ancient Roman identity, was highly regarded by Mussolini, and it manifested presently in his public rhetoric. In *The Doctrine of Fascism*, Mussolini and co-author Giovanni Gentile stated that the fascist conceptualization of life venerated "duty, elevation, and conquest."[5] The authors posited fascist values, such as discipline and the spirit of self-sacrifice, as fundamentally imperial. Their idealization of the Roman Empire appeared not only in literature but also in physical space, which supplied a form of *material rhetoric*. Mussolini's architectural projects throughout Rome reclaimed and developed ancient monuments and public spaces to revive a lost imperial aesthetic.[6]

This paper will argue, however, that Fascism's recourse to classical Roman virtues and motifs cannot be viewed as definitively nostalgic, as Mussolini's prescriptions of *romanità* were inherently transformational and forward-looking.[7] Although there has been a dominant strain in historical scholarship to characterize fascism as staunchly "anti-modern," with its criticism of liberal, multicultural societies, its stance on modernity is not quite so dichotomous. Rather, the fascism of the *ventennio* exists in a transient chrono-political space. While it sought to usher in a mythic "new" era using the achievements of development and modern technology, it paradoxically posited said era as a revitalization of the *past*. Thus, the fascist conceptualization of temporality can be characterized by the aesthetic and cultural modernization of Italy and a simultaneous hearkening back to imperial Rome through classicist and nationalist rhetoric.

At the core of Fascism's surge to power, as well as its own ideological eclecticism, was the lack of unified national identity present in early twentieth-century Italy. Although the unification of the Kingdom of Italy in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, otherwise known as the *Risorgimento*, contributed to a newfound sense of national *identity*, it did little to create any resounding sense of national unity; various socio-political movements sprung up as a result.[8] The nation had long been culturally, infrastructurally, and linguistically diverse, so, despite its eventual unification during the *Risorgimento* and occasional nationalist movements, internal tensions and domestic unrest within the population inevitably remained. Following the nation's victory in the Great War, nationalist sentiments generally heightened among Italians, which would render Mussolini's political messaging all the more compelling. With the rise of fascism came increased appeal specifically toward Italy's former status as a unified and expansive empire. When Mussolini stepped into power as dictator in 1925, glorification of Ancient Rome became a consistent feature of his rhetoric and vision for Italy as a new Fascist state. Ancient Rome was a unifying national symbol with which all Italians could identify and for which they could feel universally nostalgic, despite regional differences. Manifestations of this nostalgia ranged from tangible reforms, such as the declaration of April 21 (the mythical "founding of Rome") as a national holiday, replacing May Day celebrations, to more substantial political projects.[9] The expansionist regime claimed to have spurred the rebirth of the Roman Empire, as Italy entered the imperial scene and invaded current-day Ethiopia (then known as Abyssinia). However, this glorification functioned emblematically as well; Mussolini increasingly ascribed to himself the qualities of a Roman

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[5] Benito Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism* (Florence: Enciclopedia Italiana, 1932).
[6] Borden Painter, "Mussolini and Rome," in *A Companion to the City of Rome*, ed. Claire Holleran and Amanda Claridge (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2018), 683.
[7] Roche, "Mussolini's 'Third Rome,'" 151.
[8] Ibid., 144.
[9] Ibid., 134.

emperor, likening himself to Caesar and forging a metaphorical connection between Italy under Augustan rule and Italy as a fascist dictatorship.[10]

While *romanità* (and the pursuit thereof) was never an *explicit* normative demand of the Fascist state, it was acutely present in the literature of prominent scholars, intellectuals, and political leaders of the time. Moreover, ordinary citizens accessed this rhetoric from the likes of artists, teachers and scholars of antiquity, and mass media.[11] One such example is Pietro De Francisci, a professor of Roman Law at the University of Rome, who published many works in the 1930s codifying and canonizing *romanità* in the Fascist ideology. As a result of his steadfast propagation of *romanità*, he was highly regarded by Mussolini himself, and his work was circulated among the regime. However, with the regime eliminating virtually all academic and journalistic freedoms, it was not always the autonomous choice of teachers and public figures to support the regime's presentation of history. Rather, the regime mandated that all schoolteachers and university professors swear an oath of allegiance to the party and *Il Duce*. The press was also carefully curated, with Mussolini's cabinet personally selecting and granting approval to newspaper editors. Once approved, the press would disseminate Fascist propaganda and patriotism to the masses on behalf of the regime.[12] As a result, the regime was able to create the impression of not only a "free press," but of universal support for the party.

This strategy deliberately targeted children, as well. Imperial patriotism became an integral, mandated feature of the history curriculum in primary and secondary schools. With the compulsion of the regime, scholars and the press were able to posit classical Roman history as Italian *national* history, not only in the minds of adults but in those of children at crucial developmental and formative stages.[13] The "cult of *romanità*" and its propagandizing ability were not merely the result of "top-down" messaging. Rather, the power of *romanità* as a nationalizing force lay in the fact that it was distributed from a higher authority and then propagated by many at a local level, making it accessible to various sub-sects of the larger populace.

The familiar yet temporally distant figure of Ancient Rome offered a flexible point of reference for the Fascist regime. The notion of "Ancient Rome" could be used opportunistically to validate a wide range of ideals, whether that be vaguely defined "Roman virtues," architectural projects, or the pursuit of colonial expansion. Additionally, and arguably most significantly, it provided necessary political imagery and symbolism for the ideologically eclectic Fascist Party. An idealized image of Ancient Rome provided Mussolini and his administration a means of cementing Fascist power, as it acted as a symbol of a powerful and unified mythic past — an appealing offer to both classicist intellectuals and ordinary citizens seeking respite from regional and social divisions. As professor of architectural history Flavia Marcello indicates in her spatial analysis of Fascist exhibitions, "the idea of Rome took on material aspects through a kind of 'recognition effect' for the visitor by presenting *Romanità* as a collective mirror in which to view an image of their own social visage."[14] Upon this image, the regime could shape a *new* revitalized

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[10] Painter, "Mussolini and Rome," 683.

[11] Romke Visser, "Fascist Doctrine and the Cult of the Romanità," *Journal of Contemporary History* 27, no. 1 (January 1992): 8.

[12] Ibid., 10.

[13] Ibid., 6.

[14] Marcello, "Mussolini and the Idealisation of Empire," 227.

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civilization and gain much aesthetic inspiration, not only for a common cultural identity but also for architecture, visual arts, journalism, and other media.

Members of the Italian bourgeoisie maintained a particular attraction to fascism's apparent classicism, though they required a more "scientific" convincing than a dogmatic one, as was generally the case with the general public.[15] The historical aims of the regime appealed to educated, wealthy Italians, who had positivist proclivities and were likely impressed by the measurable results and successes of Fascist governance. Such achievements included the introduction and development of the corporatist state; Italy's growing colonial presence; and the Lateran Treaties, wherein the papacy recognized the state of Italy with Rome as its capital, and Italy in return recognized papal sovereignty over the Vatican City. Classicism and the cult of the *romanità* were also of particular importance to the many right-wing intellectuals who supported the Fascist state, such as reactionary Catholics and monarchists. In their view, fascism appeared to defend their conservative and generally nostalgic interests.[16] The regime needed this base of bourgeois intellectuals -- in addition to propagandized masses, as established bourgeois conceptualizations of history often corroborated fascist ideals. Fascism's usage of cultic and patriotic approaches toward *romanità* was thus able to attract intellectuals and otherwise unlikely demographics to its doctrines.

It is important to note, however, that the Fascist Party did not *invent* romanità or any such approaches toward examining the Roman past. Rather, it took advantage of this existing notion that had appeared in many colonial and bourgeois discourses from the late-nineteenth century onwards.[17] In fact, one can look as far back as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to see *romanità*'s earlier incarnations. The Italian Renaissance period can reasonably be considered the start of the sociopolitical and national rebirth of Italy, as its intellectual authorities venerated Ancient Greco-Roman systems of thought and aesthetics as the peak of human civilization. Many of the key figures involved in the eventual *Risorgimento* considered the movement to be an imperative historical event, as they held the glorious Roman past in high regard — in some ways, even, as a *paradigm*. Garibaldi and Mazzini, prominent figures of the *Risorgimento*, both believed that Ancient Rome served a symbolic purpose, particularly because one could consider the Roman era to be the only period of national unity and cultural prosperity in Italian history prior to the unification of the peninsula.[18] Additionally, during the early-twentieth century, various aspects of Roman history were used frequently in conservative and reactionary propaganda, though not so emphatically.

The *romanità* of the Fascist era was not merely a rhetorical feature of lofty discourses and propaganda; it also had tangible manifestations, in practice — albeit often in opportunistic ways (the regime was generally inconsistent and would direct support to any institutions that provided it with historical justifications for its goals and projects). However, if we consider the transformational way that *romanità* was presented and injected into quotidian Italian life, in tandem with the prominent temporal philosophies of the time, we can begin to see how fascism, in fact, utilized history as a means for achieving modernist aims. Mussolini frequently framed

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[15] Visser, "Fascist Doctrine and the Cult of the Romanità," 9.
[16] Ibid., 10.
[17] Ibid., 9.
[18] Roche, "Mussolini's 'Third Rome,'" 150.

fascism as the forward-thinking movement that would usher Italy into a wholly new era. As he stated in *The Doctrine of Fascism*, "a nation, as expressed in the State, is a living, ethical entity only insofar as it is progressive."[19] This progressive conceptualization of time is fundamentally modernistic. If we look to Gentile, considered by many to be the father of Fascist philosophy, we see language that corroborates this notion. Based on his philosophy of actualism, Gentile argued that history "belongs to the present."[20] In saying this, he rejected the notion of history as a discrete past containing fixed or objective truth. Instead, Gentile articulated a unique view of history as mutable and interpretative in the historic imaginary of a people. In this sense, he rationalized the use of *narrative* for politically expedient purposes, suggesting that history was wholly submissive to its contemporary deployment. This actualist philosophy was culturally modernist, positing fascism as a historical agent called upon to interpret history to the present masses and revitalize it accordingly.

Another relevant reference is the contemporaneous Futurist movement, which argued a similar position. Founded by Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, the flourishing artistic and social movement often worked closely with Fascists, as it too had a modernizing mission for Italy. Adherents of Futurism were self-described radicals who glorified modernity and hoped to overthrow backward-looking tradition with force and virility.[21] Naturally, the philosophies of Futurism and Gentile's fascism were highly compatible, and they soon became inextricably connected by their modernist aims.

While the modernist movement is typically understood in terms of aesthetic renewal, the notion of modernism necessarily extends to social organization and social reform. As Mussolini's close associate, Gentile wrote numerous essays on the ways in which fascism was a necessary alternative to liberalism, communism, *and* socialism. In this regard, fascism was a clear attempt at modernist societal renewal, as the regime aimed to birth an entirely new culture and era. Numerous scholars have characterized Mussolini's aim of subverting both capitalist democracy and communism as fundamentally anti-modern. However, his regime continually embraced and acknowledged the utility of modern technologies, mass media (as a tool for the dissemination of propaganda), elements of welfarism, and urban renewal.[22] Fascism was a project of *total* cultural renewal in reference to a gallant history, and necessary to this project was a modernist approach towards societal evolution. Not only were modernist ideals being amplified within literature and public discourse, but modernist architecture also flourished under Mussolini.[23] Throughout its tenure, the Fascist regime granted approval to numerous modernist architectural projects, designed predominantly by members of the Rationalist School — an architectural current which would lead to the development of the Modernist style.

The architecture of the Fascist period often paralleled the regime's consistent recourse to antiquity, a concept which manifested in a specific style of architectural neo-classicism known as *stile littorio*.[24] This architectural style attempted to create structures that were classical yet

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[19] Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*.
[20] Claudio Fogu, "Actualism and the Fascist Historic Imaginary," *History and Theory* 42, no. 2 (2003): 199.
[21] Felipe Fernández-Armesto, O*ut of Our Minds: What We Think and How We Came to Think It* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019), 350.
[22] Roche, "Mussolini's 'Third Rome,'" 128.
[23] Painter, "Mussolini and Rome," 685.
[24] Jan Nelis, "Back to the Future," *Fascism* 1, no. 3 (2014): 9.

minimalist and abstract, influenced by both traditional and modernist ideas (with touches of functionalism and art-deco). *Stile littorio* was most observable in buildings and structures in the capital, built by Futurist and Rationalist architects. For Rationalists, an element of classicism was necessary, as this celebrated the achievements and timelessness of ancient architectural forms; yet they simultaneously transformed these styles by re-interpreting certain critical elements and ultimately modernizing them.[25] The EUR area of Rome offers a particularly salient and renowned example of Fascist architecture and planning. Now a bustling residential and business district, the EUR (*Esposizione Universale Roma*) area was originally established with fascist rationale. Although it was completed decades after the demise of the Fascist regime, the urban project began in the 1930s under the direction of Mussolini, who hoped to establish a location for a World Fair celebrating twenty years since the March on Rome. The area contains many Fascist-era buildings and sculptures, but one of the urban project's most epochal components is the *Palazzo della Civiltà del Lavoro*, constructed between 1938 and 1943 and referred to by many as the *Colosseo quadrato* ("square Colosseum").


Fig. 1. Palazzo della Civiltà Italiana, designed in 1938 by architects Giovanni Guerrini, Ernesto La Padula, and Mario Romano.

As a renewed take on a classical form, the *Palazzo della Civiltà del Lavoro* offers a paradigmatic architectural translation of Fascism's primary aim: to mingle antiquity and modernity. As with many other structures in the area, the building features modern, angular axes, while being made of traditional materials associated with the Roman Empire, such as limestone and marble. Although he did not necessarily *enforce* any particular architectural style, Mussolini himself encouraged this eclectic approach toward design among his commissioned architects — a

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[25] Aristotle Kallis, "Futures Made Present: Architecture, Monument, and the Battle for the 'Third Way' in Fascist Italy," *Fascism* 7, no. 1 (2018): 50.

notion that came to be known as "aesthetic pluralism."[26] Under the regime, Italian architecture and urban planning became the token medium used to materialize the Fascist "Third Way" — a purposeful interaction between futurity and tradition, which overcame a previously established polarity.[27]

Ultimately, Mussolini's Fascist regime intended to both restore *and* innovate Italy, and its mission to do so manifested clearly in both its public rhetoric and its aesthetic projects. It is admittedly difficult to characterize a temporal model which is both nostalgic and forward-looking. Thus, the fascist conceptualization of temporality can most appropriately be labeled as just that: fascist. The regime's approach towards classicism and modernity is a unique construction that evades strict definition — and it is possible that this was intentional. *Risorgimento* activist Mazzini once famously proclaimed: "After the Rome of the Caesars, after the Rome of the Popes, there will come the Rome of the people."[28] In the eyes of Mussolini and his party, fascism achieved this revolutionary "Third Rome" not only through its totalitarian politics but by embracing both an imperial heritage and a supreme modernity. In the words of Mussolini himself, "the Fascist State [was] not only the present; it [was] also the past and above all the future."[29]

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[26] Painter, "Mussolini and Rome," 688.
[27] Kallis, "Futures Made Present," 58.
[28] Roche, "Mussolini's 'Third Rome,'" 150.
[29] Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism.*

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Means, Ends, and Perpetrators: Connections Between the Holocaust and the Genocide of Ethnic Poles in Volhynia and Galicia

Collin Tovey

ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the connections between the Holocaust and the massacre of ethnic Poles in Volhynia and Galicia during World War Two. It argues that the latter is a genocide and that both acts share similar methods, motivations, and perpetrators. The limited English language scholarship on the massacre of ethnic Poles typically addresses it in the context of Polish or Ukrainian national history rather than that of comparative genocide. I consulted an interview with a Holocaust survivor and a collection of primary sources translated by Dr. Tadeusz Piotrowski. The connections between these acts of mass killing weaken the claim that the Holocaust was an exceptional act, call for further study of smaller acts of mass killing, and emphasize the moral ambiguity of the sovereignty of nation-states.

Key Words: Holocaust, Genocide, Massacre of Poles in Volhynia and Galicia, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, World War II in Ukraine.

Between the years of 1941 and 1945, the vast majority of the Jews in Volhynia were killed.[30][31] They were targeted for destruction by a racially motivated political organization that saw their continued existence as incompatible with national greatness. Between 1943 and 1945, the Poles of Volhynia and Galicia were likewise targeted for destruction by a racially motivated political organization that saw their continued existence as incompatible with national greatness. The organization in the former case was Adolf Hitler's Nazi Party, while in the latter it was Stepan Bandera's Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Both instances of mass killing took place during the same time period and within the same region, but these are not their only points of crossover. The murder of Jews in Volhynia and Galicia was organized by Germans, but many of the men who personally committed these murders were Ukrainian nationalists affiliated with the OUN. In this paper, I will argue that the massacre of ethnic Poles in Volhynia and Galicia was an act of genocide that was inextricably linked with the Holocaust by the Ukrainian nationalists who perpetrated it, their motivations for doing so, and the brutal methods they used.[32]

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[30] The people who occupied this region of Europe spoke different languages, practiced different religions, and professed different national identities. What place names and transliterations one uses when writing about this region is a matter of controversy. I will use well-established English place names where they exist, Volhynia and Galicia being two such place names. Otherwise, I will use the place names and transliterations as they appear in the sources I reference.

[31] Snyder, Timothy. *The Shoah in Ukraine*. Edited by Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower. Indiana University Press, 2008, 97.

[32] How members of various national groups in this region and time are referred to is another matter of controversy. These people were all Polish citizens, given that the area before the war had been part of the Polish state, and in this sense "Pole" could refer to any of them. "Non-Jewish Poles" is another term which in this context lacks specificity, as it fails to distinguish between Polish speakers who practiced Catholicism and Ukrainian speakers who identified either with Orthodoxy or with the Uniate church. Identifying groups by their primary language is equally problematic. The Holocaust Survivor Joseph Grossman, whose testimony I reference in this paper, grew up primarily speaking Yiddish, but during his years of hiding spoke almost exclusively in Ukrainian. "Ethnic Pole" is a

The decision to classify a particular instance of mass killing as a genocide is a perennial matter of controversy. Instructive is the fact that the US government did not recognize the Armenian genocide, the instance of mass killing which inspired Raphael Lemkin to invent the term genocide, as a genocide until 2021.[33] [34] Contemporary political realities often influence whether or not a particular instance of mass killing is widely referred to as a genocide. This is the case with the massacre of ethnic Poles in Volhynia and Galicia. Contemporary Poland and Ukraine are close allies, a relationship largely motivated by a mutual fear of Vladimir Putin's Russia. The appetite to dig up such a painful memory between these two nations has been understandably limited. For all that it may be politically inconvenient to acknowledge in the present environment, I argue that the massacre of ethnic Poles in Volhynia and Galicia was a genocide.

According to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, key to distinguishing between an act of genocide and other acts of mass killing is the element of intent, specifically, the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such."[35] The leadership of the OUN intended not merely to drive out the Poles who resided within the borders of a future independent Ukraine, but to destroy them. A report from the wartime Polish underground quotes a UPA[36] leader as saying that "when it comes to the Polish question, this is not a military but a minority question. We will solve it as Hitler solved the Jewish question."[37] A secret directive issued by UPA commander Roman Dmytro Klachkivskyi (also known by the *nom de guerre* "Klym Savur") reads: "We should undertake the great action of the liquidation of the Polish element. We should take advantage of the occasion, before the Germans withdraw, to liquidate the entire Polish population from 16 to 60."[38] Though the directive lists an age range, the massacres of Poles targeted those of all ages, and the order was interpreted by local OUN/UPA leaders as calling for the total destruction of ethnic Poles in their respective localities. Court testimony from the trial of Battalion Leader Stepan Koval confirms that these orders were interpreted in this fashion: "In the summer of 1943, in keeping with the orders of the commander of UPA 'Pivnych' 'Klym Savur,' I conducted an operation of annihilation against the Polish people in the Rovne region. The UPA detachment under my command destroyed

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rightly problematized phrase in a part of the world devastated by violence motivated by ethnic nationalism, but it conveys the appropriate level of specificity for the purpose of this paper.

[33] "Statement by President Joe Biden on Armenian Remembrance Day." The White House. The United States Government, April 24, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/24/statement-by-president-joe-biden-on-armenian-remembrance-day/.

[34] "Coining a Word and Championing a Cause: The Story of Raphael Lemkin." United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Accessed April 30, 2022. https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/coining-a-word-and-championing-a-cause-the-story-of-raphael-lemkin.

[35] "Genocide." United Nations. United Nations. Accessed April 30, 2022. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml.

[36] An acronym for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, a paramilitary organization under the command of the OUN. In an additional complication, the OUN split into two factions called the OUN-B and OUN-M, but by the time of the massacres targeting ethnic Poles had reunited under the leadership of Stepan Bandera, whose last name is what the "B" in OUN-B refers to.

[37] Rossoliński-Liebe Grzegorz. *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult*. Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2014, 266.

[38] Piotrowski, Tadeusz. *Genocide and Rescue in Wołyń: Recollections of the Ukrainian Nationalist Ethnic Cleansing Campaign Against the Poles During World War II*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2008, 180.

the villages of Rafalowka and Huta Stepanska inhabited by Polish people."[39] Eyewitness testimony from Polish survivors confirms the eliminationist nature of the massacres. Aleksandra Glowinska, aged 7 at the time, recalled that she along with her entire family were shot by Ukrainian nationalists.[40] Aleksandra was the only survivor. These were premeditated acts of mass murder explicitly intended to bring about the physical annihilation of the ethnic Poles of Volhynia and Galicia. Genocide is the only term that fully expresses the nature of these crimes.

It is no coincidence that Ukrainian nationalists committed a genocide in the same territory where the Nazis organized and carried out the Holocaust. To set the stage for the ways in which both genocides were carried out, the progression of the war in this area must be clarified. Galicia and Volhynia experienced what historian Timothy Snyder terms the triple occupation. That is, they were first invaded by the Soviet Union in 1939, then by Germany in 1941, then again by the Soviet Union in 1944.[41] The triple occupation created a uniquely destabilizing dynamic in which no ethnic group felt secure. In Snyder's estimation, it is this dynamic that accounts for the ease with which otherwise ordinary people were convinced to participate in brutal acts of mass murder.

Particularly with the massacre of ethnic Poles, but also to a lesser extent during the Holocaust, the brutality and sadism of Ukrainian nationalist perpetrators appear again and again in eyewitness accounts of the massacres.[42] Holocaust survivor Joseph Grossman, several months after witnessing the aforementioned destruction of the Polish village Huta Stepanska, reported having been beaten nearly to death by a group of *banderivtsi*.[43] Ironically, he was then rescued by an older Ukrainian couple whose son was with the *banderivtsi*.[44] A group of *banderivtsi* also came to live with the couple, and kept Grossman as their prisoner for nine months, during which time they taught him to disarm unexploded ordinance and remove explosive material for later use. Grossman related that he does not know why the *banderivtsi* kept him alive, and that they killed every other Jew they came across.[45] UPA members and their local collaborators often used axes, sickles, and pitchforks to liquidate Polish villages in addition to the usual method of mass shooting. In one example illustrative of the brutality that characterizes these killings, a group of UPA partisans attacked the village of Kolonia Grada, in which all but two families had managed to escape prior to their arrival. "The partisans killed all the members of these two families, cut open the belly of a pregnant woman, took the fetus and innards from her, and hung them on a bush."[46] By the time they embarked on their liquidation of ethnic Poles in Volhynia and Galicia, the members of the OUN/UPA were seasoned killers. Perhaps, this level of brutality can be accounted for as a natural escalation from a group of men who had spent years occupied with genocidal violence.

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[39] Piotrowski, Tadeusz. *Genocide and Rescue in Wołyń,* 188.

[40] Piotrowski, Tadeusz. *Genocide and Rescue in Wołyń,* 39.

[41] Snyder, Timothy. "The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943." *Past & Present*, no. 179 (2003): 197–234. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3600827, 198.

[42] Piotrowski, Tadeusz. *Genocide and Rescue in Wołyń,* 20.

[43] This term appears often in the primary sources in reference to Ukrainian nationalist partisans. The term refers to the OUN leader Stepan Bandera.

[44] Grossman, Joseph. Interview 40248. Interview by Dale Daniels. *Visual History Archive*, USC Shoah Foundation, February 4, 1998. Accessed April 7, 2022. https://vha.usc.edu/viewingPage?testimonyID=43415&returnIndex=0, Segment 26.

[45] Grossman, Joseph. Interview 40248, Segment 18.

[46] Rossoliński-Liebe Grzegorz. *Stepan Bandera,* 268.

The collaboration with Nazi Germany by OUN/UPA members in both the invasion of Volhynia and Galicia and the Holocaust in Volhynia and Galicia is the most direct connection between both genocides. Even before the onset of war, the OUN collaborated with the German Abwehr.[47] In preparation for the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Abwehr organized two battalions comprised of OUN members named Nachtigall and Roland. The OUN was also heavily involved in the recruitment of men for the Ukrainian Police, an arm of the occupation structure.[48] An analysis of 118 biographies of OUN and UPA leaders found that 46 percent of them had received some form of training from German authorities as part of either the Ukrainian Police, Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, the Waffen SS Galizien division, or in German-sponsored military or intelligence schools.[49] German-Polish historian Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe outlines the extent of OUN participation in anti-Jewish violence. "The OUN-B organized a militia, which both collaborated with the Germans and killed Jews independently. It also incited the local population to anti-Jewish violence, by spreading antisemitic propaganda and advocating, together with the Germans, revenge on the Jews for the NKVD murders."[50] These members of the OUN/UPA could not have been better prepared to organize and perpetrate a genocide of their own.

The following UPA field report provides striking evidence of similarity between the methods used to carry out the Holocaust in this region and the methods used to carry out the genocide of ethnic Poles:

All the [Ukrainian] residents with their axes and pitchforks from the surrounding territories were brought to the village of Mosur where *Drukh* [leader] Zukh explain to them that, under the leadership of his armed unit, they were to go to the village of Ziemlica in order to settle accounts with the Poles and demanded they show no mercy to anyone they find there. The village was surrounded at night; at dawn, the residents were gathered at the center of the village. The elderly, the children, and the ill who could not walk on their own – these they killed on the spot and threw them into a well. Those gathered in the center of the village were made to dig their own graves. They killed them by hitting in the head with an axe. Those who attempted to flee were shot. All the residents of Ziemlica were liquidated; their possessions were taken for the need of the UPA; the buildings were burned.[51]

The similarity between this description of a massacre and the *Aktionen* of the Einsatzgruppen as described in Christopher Browning's *Ordinary Men* are unmistakable[52]. In both cases, those targeted for mass killing were gathered up from the village, made to dig their own graves, then

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[47] Rossoliński-Liebe Grzegorz. *Stepan Bandera,* 74.

[48] Ibid, 190.

[49] Ibid, 263.

[50] As the Soviets retreated in 1941, local branches of the NKVD executed their prisoners rather than allow them to fall into German hands. As in all branches of the Soviet government at this time, there would have been Jews among NKVD personnel, a fact which would have been known by locals. The spectacle of the murdered prisoners provided a ready means of propagating the stereotype of "Judeo-Bolshevism." Ibid, 236.

[51] Piotrowski, Tadeusz. *Genocide and Rescue in Wołyń,* 181.

[52] Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: HarperCollins, 2017).

killed in front of them, with the old and infirm killed where they were found. In this field report, the connection between the OUN's anti-Polish genocide and their role in the Holocaust is made plain as day.

Finally, a note on sources. The residents of these villages were, for the most part, illiterate. Holocaust survivor Joseph Grossman, a native of the village of Stepan in Volhynia, described looking forward to the prospect of receiving schooling as his primary reaction to the Soviet invasion.[53] Consequently, there is a dearth of written primary sources on this topic at least from the perspective of those targeted for death and from local collaborators. Documents from the German military, from the wartime Polish underground, and from the OUN/UPA themselves do provide valuable information, but without postwar testimony from survivors, a great deal of information is inaccessible. Though the reliability of postwar testimony inevitably suffers from the fragility of human memory, it should not be discounted by historians, especially in cases such as this where contemporaneous written sources are in extremely short supply.

The Holocaust and the massacre of ethnic Poles in Volhynia and Galicia are two genocides closely linked by a variety of factors. They took place in overlapping time periods, often in the same villages, and were enacted by overlapping perpetrators who shared similar motivations. They were both the design of racially motivated ethnic nationalists who sought to create racially pure space. Though the genocide against ethnic Poles was by far the smaller of the two events, it too deserves to be recognized as a genocide.

This conclusion has several vital ramifications. It invites closer scrutiny to acts of mass killing similar in kind to larger ones like the Holocaust or the Armenian genocide, but smaller in scale. It calls into question the exceptional nature of the Holocaust, suggesting that eliminationist genocide rather than being the result of features unique to the Nazi party or the German people is instead a broadly generalizable phenomenon. Finally, it calls into question the moral righteousness of the principle of the sovereignty of nation-states. For as much as nationalists of all stripes would have it believed that national borders are ancient, that one people has an obvious and unique right to a specific swath of land, states characterized by ethnic homogeneity have only become a feature of the Eastern European landscape in the 20th century, a reality which was crafted through brutal acts of mass killing. Today, Ukraine's western regions are those in which Ukrainian nationalism has its strongest foundation, standing in contrast to its eastern regions devastated by a war fought over competing ethnic and national loyalties. From this perspective, Lviv, the former capital of Galicia, is perhaps the most Ukrainian of Ukrainian cities. Through a desire to be sympathetic to the victims of a war of aggression, Western commentators now commonly repeat the historical claims expounded by Ukrainian nationalists, that Ukraine is an ancient nation with a sacred right to all the land encompassed by its pre-2014 borders. What must not be forgotten is the modern nature of the nation-state, and the brutal means by which nation-states were created. This does not imply that all nationalist claims about history should be rejected out of hand, rather, that such claims must always be approached with careful scrutiny.

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[53] Grossman, Joseph. Interview 40248, Segment 7.

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The German Bundesländer as Laboratories of Democracy

Aleksandar V. Trivanovic

ABSTRACT

The German commitment to federalism is one of the strongest in the world today. This essay explores the significance of German federalism and its strong subnational legislatures on policy development since the end of World War II, through reunification, and up through the present day. It finds that the German federal government has consistently looked to the Bundesländer for inspiration, with them acting as laboratories of democracy to aid in policy development. This article will also provide a literature review, analyzing the recent works of prominent political scientists to illustrate how subnational legislatures have assisted in producing national policy in the education, climate, and healthcare fields.

Keywords: German federalism, German reunification, laboratories of democracy, policy diffusion, subnational legislatures

Introduction

The development of German democracy in the 20th century was a rather tenuous and challenging process. At the beginning of the century, Germany was an authoritarian imperial power. After World War I, crippling debt and hyperinflation plagued the nation. Eventually, Hitler took power as a dictator until after World War II, when the Americans, British, French, and Soviets forcibly divided Germany into East and West. Against all odds, however, since the second half of the 20th century, Germany has been one of the most stable economies and strong democracies in the entire world.[54] Many political scientists will cite Britain as the perfect example of a gradual path to democracy, which can be traced back to the 13th century and still evolving.[55] Germany didn't quite have the luxury of developing its democracy on a gradual path. Germany had to play the catch-up game in creating a democracy in the latter half of the 20th century, with heavy sanctions imposed on them that would compete with other hegemons on the global stage. Evidently, they were rather successful. A staunch commitment to federalism deserves much credit for these successes. Due to a commitment to federalism, the German Bundesländer can act as "laboratories of democracy" in crafting policies that, if successful, can be implemented by the federal government to bolster German democracy.

Origins of West German Federalism

The Federal Republic of Germany, also known as West Germany, was nearly alone on the global stage in its staunch commitment to federalism in the immediate years following World War

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[54] Gert-Joachim Glassner. *German Democracy: from post-World War II to the Present Day.* Bloomberg Publishing, 2005.

[55] Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. *Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 2006.

II. After the war, most European countries decided to pivot towards government structure with the vast majority of power concentrated at the national level. As a result, the Keynesian economics model became the predominant school of thought in the West, as federal governments took substantial control over the economy to guide it into recovery.[56] The national governments of the West also had robust control over domestic policy to crack down on extremist political movements to prevent future conflicts. In the East, the Soviet Bloc absorbed many countries, advising them to adopt a state socialist model.

West Germany, however, engrained the concept of federalism into its constitution with Articles 30 and 70 and the Eternity Clause, inherently devolving more power from the national level to subnational levels.[57] Article 30 establishes that the exercise of state powers and functions, if not explicitly granted to the federal government, is a matter for the Bundesländer, the largest subnational units in Germany. A subnational unit is a body that holds jurisdiction over a particular region within a larger country. For example, states within the United States act as subnational units. One can imagine Bundesländer as the "states" of Germany. Article 70 explicitly grants these Bundesländer the power to oversee how they run local elections, prisons, and education. The Eternity Clause establishes that federalism is a fundamental principle of how the country functions. As such, mase it unconstitutional for the legislature to ever infringe upon this principle. The West German constitution was significantly after the American Constitution in this sense.[58]

While the concept of federalism itself was by no means revolutionary by this time, West Germany was unique in being a European state that attempted to push through and recover from the immense tragedy of World War II by weakening the central government. Arguably the most significant impact of this commitment to federalism was the speed at which the government adopted policies, as they looked to the Bundesländer for inspiration. In this case, the Bundesländer have functioned as laboratories of democracy since the ratification of the West German Constitution.

What is a "Laboratory of Democracy?"

The term "laboratory of democracy" was first coined by United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in the case of *New State Ice Company v. Liebmann* (1932) in describing the federal system of the United States. Brandeis stated, "a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."[59] At the national level, the political process is intentionally slow, but at local levels, it moves quicker. This quickness occurs because members of the legislature in a subnational government represent many similar interests. As such, they are more likely to agree on policies than those at the national level.

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[56] Ivo Maes. *The Spread of Keynesian Economics*. Journal of the History of Economics Thought, 2008.

[57] David Currie. *The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany*. University of Chicago Press, 1994.

[58] Edmund Spevack. *American pressures on the German constitutional tradition*. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 1997.

[59] Alan Tarr. *Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism, and Scientific Management*. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2001.

For example, lawmakers in Kansas are comparatively more likely to pass state legislation to aid agricultural workers than the United States Congress. This is because each Kansas legislator likely has many constituents that are farmworkers and would benefit from the passing of this legislation. On the other hand, the United States Congress has legislators from areas like Massachusetts, which does not have a committed agricultural interest, making the Massachusetts legislators overall less likely to support this legislation.

Based on this theory, strong regional governments have the power to (and would be doing their country service to) pass innovative policies not yet implemented by the national government. By taking this risk, subnational governments effectively provide a blueprint for the national executive: if the approach at the subnational level works well, the federal government may follow suit, and vice-versa; if the policy fails, then the federal government won't look to implement said policy. As a result, the federal government becomes more efficient and avoids taking massive risks.

German Case Studies

Louis Massicotte at the University of Montreal highlights that the German federal government adopted many features of the Bundestag elections from Länder policies used in local elections. For example, he highlights the double vote, the Hare-Niemeyer Formula, the 5% party threshold, and the concept of Personalized Proportional Representation.[60]

To illustrate the process of a policy moving from being used regionally to nationally, look to the latter. Personalized Proportional Representation (also known as PPR or MMPR, for Mixed-Member Proportional Representation) is a concept wherein voters get two votes: one to decide the representative for their single-seat constituency and one for a political party. Seats in the legislature are filled first by the successful constituency candidates and second by party candidates based on the percentage of nationwide or region-wide votes each party received.

PPR was adopted for the local elections of the Länder of *Nordrhein-Westfalen* and *Niedersachsen* in the late 1940s, as Germany was transforming post-World War II. The results of the ensuing elections in these Länder were favorable, as political scientists concluded that PPR successfully corrected undesirable side effects of first-past-the-post, such as wiping out opposition parties from the legislature or giving a majority to the runner-up party.[61] As such, the federal government approved PPR as a legitimate electoral system that produced promising results and implemented it in the national Bundestag elections. After West Germany implemented PPR in Bundestag elections, other Länder decided to implement PPR in their local elections. As a result, today, every German Bundesland uses or plans to use PPR in their local elections, aside from *Bremen* and *Saarland*, and it is still used in the national Bundestag elections. In this sense, *Nordrhein-Westfalen* and *Niedersachsen* acted as laboratories of democracy, experimenting with a novel electoral system that is now used all across Germany.[62]

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[60] Louis Massicotte. *To create or to copy? Electoral systems in the German Länder.* Journal of German Politics, 2003.
[61] *Ibid*
[62] Michael Krennerich. *Germany: the Original Mixed Member Proportional System*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1997.

On the other hand, the central government was also able to look at the failures of regional governments to make policy. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Bundesländer such as *Saarland* became over-reliant on coal for energy production. This overreliance proved problematic for two primary reasons. First, people at the time were developing a negative stigma surrounding coal. Much of the West German population began to worry about the environmentally unsafe properties of coal, which decreased demand for coal to produce energy. Second, this decreased demand meant an overabundance of supply. *Saarland* was faced with an employment crisis when coal supplies eventually became overabundant when compared to demand, resulting in the closing of the majority of the *Saarland*'s coal mines. This plunged much of their population into unemployment. Throughout the 1960s, the West German federal government began allocating millions of Marks to modern energy research and development, leading to the building of nuclear power plants across the country. The main reasons the West German federal government cited for their actions were the *Saarland* crisis and the Cold War, given that they did not want to pivot to natural gas and become over-reliant on trade with the Soviet Union.[63]

East German Adoption of Federal Concepts

This use of the Bundesländer as laboratories of democracy is not a relic reserved for 20th-century democratic development in Germany. Democracies are constantly evolving and adjusting to citizens' needs as the material conditions of social change. In fact, ever since Germany was officially reunified in 1990, the Bundesländer have arguably had more of an effect on national policy than prior to reunification. When the two countries rejoined, the new German state adopted the former West German political system, meaning that East Germany was now beholden to the laws of West Germany's Constitution, including their commitment to federalism.[64] Germany had now gained new Bundesländer and, as a result, now had 16 laboratories of democracy to craft new policies that could, if successful, someday apply to every single Bundesland through the passing of national policy. Reunification was a difficult transition, as former East Germany underwent a rapid economic transition that is still affecting them to this day. However, without the concept of federalism, it is easy to argue that this transition could have been even worse. Without looking to experimental local policy, the policymaking process to aid the East during this transition would have been much slower. The West Germans agreed with this logic and thus, with reunification, the federal government immediately moved to devolve more power to the Länder level, through the establishment of the Unification Treaty and the Joint Constitutional Convention.[65] A larger percent of tax revenue was also given to Bundesland executives to support targeted policymaking efforts

Modern German Federalism

Today, the material conditions of Germany are much different than they were in the mid-20th century. Not only has the country grown in size by also encompassing the German Democratic Republic in the 1990 reunification of the country, but new issues are plaguing Germany and the globe as a whole that many people could not have imagined back in the 1960s. Many of these

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[63] Yamina Saheb. *The History of Energy in Germany*. Planète Énergies, 2015.

[64] Jochen Frowein. *The Reunification of Germany*. American Journal of International Law, 1992.

[65] Arthur B. Gunlicks. *German Federalism after Unification: The Legal/Constitutional Response*. Oxford University Press, 1994.

problems require immediate action to work towards a solution, which is why Germany's commitment to federalism has stayed so important. In fact, political scientists have observed a trend that since the 1970s, liberal reforms have consistently been observed in every democratic republic in the Global North, meaning that democracies as a whole, especially in Europe and North America, are becoming more and more "federalist" in nature, concentrating more devolved power at the local and subnational levels.[66]

Many of the issues that global democracies, including Germany, are working to address right now can be divided into three categories: education, climate change, and health. In each of these categories, it has been observed that Germany's central government has looked to Bundesländer policies in order to further craft more precise and effective national policy.

Federalism in Education Policy

Acting as laboratories of democracy, the Bundesländer have helped frame German education policy in modern history. Jennifer Wallner from the Volkswagen Stiftung highlights this process in her article "Laboratories, Coproducers and Venues."

Wallner discusses in this article that globalization and reunification have left Germany scrambling for new education policies in recent years. There has been a great demand for stronger standardization in curriculum, instruction, and assessment among students. This demand only increased after the disappointing results that ensued after Germany participated in the Programme for International Student Assessment, colloquially referred to as PISA, in the year 2000. PISA is a standardized exam that is mandatory for many students across a variety of European nations. Germany's participation in PISA was the first participation in large-scale international assessments such as these in many years and the German public was surprised by the results.[67]

Overall, German proficiency scores ranked 21st out of 31 participating OECD countries and they ranked in the bottom quartile for educational equality.[68] The latter meant that the gap in scores, reflecting quality in German education, between those of different classes and backgrounds was greater than the results in at least 75% of the other countries tested.[69] As a result, the EU asked Germany to improve its education standards, which included the creation of its own standardized assessments to give to German students regularly, which would ensure that the quality of education was as equalized as possible.

Wallner illustrates that Germany was rather successful at meeting the EU's standards after just a few years. Germany has one of the best public education systems in the world today. She says that the Bundesländer were crucial in meeting this call to action placed on Germany by the EU. First, Germany formed a connection between their Ministry of Education (the

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[66] Liesbet Hooghe, et al. *Measuring regional authority: A postfunctionalist theory of governance, Volume 1*. Oxford University Press, 2016.

[67] Jennifer Wallner. *Laboratories, Coproducers and Venues*. Comparative Education Review, 2020.

[68] Wolfgang Ochel. *Results of PISA 2000: The case of Germany*. Ifo Institute for Economic Research, 2002.

[69] Florian Waldow. *What PISA Did and Did Not Do: Germany After the "PISA Shock"*. European Education Research Journal, 2009.

Kultusministerkonferenz, or KMK) and the Upper House of the Bundestag, the Bundesrat (where members represent the Bundesländer) to help create new education-related policies. The KMK offered Bundesländer grant money through this connection to act as laboratories of democracy to craft new policies, instruction criteria, curricula, and statewide standardized testing. The Bundesländer would experiment with new policies and report their successes and failures to the KMK, who would craft national policy based on these guidelines.

An example of how this proved successful is the implementation of the VERA (Vergleichende Arbeitsprüfungen) Exams, the standardized assessments that 3rd and 8th-grade German students take to assess proficiency. These exams started as a policy in the Bundesland of Rheinland-Pfalz, and were adopted by six other Bundesländer before becoming a nationwide exam system. The crafting of the national policy that established the VERA Exams was not only aided by the Bundesländer, but by research institutes and think tanks along the way. The role of the Bundesländer as laboratories of democracy evidently aided Germany in great achievement in the educational sphere, as evidenced by the VERA exams and other policies.[70]

Federalism in Climate Policy

The Bundesländer have also greatly contributed to innovation in climate policy. This concept is highlighted by Dr. Kirstin Jörgenson of the Journal of Integrative Environmental Studies in her article "Multi-level climate governance and the role of the subnational level."[71]

Jörgenson highlights two ways that the Bundesländer have acted as laboratories of democracy in climate policy. First, they have developed new solutions to curb climate change. Second, they also experiment with implementing other innovative climate policies that were already passed by other Bundesländer. She specifically highlights how these policies can diffuse both vertically (from the Bundesländer level to the federal government level), as well as horizontally (from one Bundesland to another Bundesland).[72] Horizontal diffusion often occurs in areas like climate policy, because climate solutions need to happen as soon as possible. Policymaking at the federal level, which involves getting many political parties to agree on a single often unproven solution can be slow and unreliable. Thus, the Bundesländer are often quicker to take action in this sense as well. This is primarily because regional legislatures tend to be less diverse in party makeup and ideology than the national legislature. For example, *Die Grünen*, the German Green Party, tends to make up a large percentage of the legislature in *Hamburg*, especially compared to their percentage of seats in the Bundestag. The *Hamburg* legislature also tends to have a much smaller percentage of the *CDU*, the dominant Christian Democratic Party in Germany. As a result, climate legislation faces less pushback preventing its passing in Hamburg as opposed to in the Bundestag. Another factor for this phenomenon of less gridlock at the regional level is that regional legislatures often have fewer lawmakers in their body by sheer numbers, which limits the likelihood of additional members disagreeing with potential laws or tacking on amendments to slow down processes and foster gridlock. In fact, Jörgenson finds that German

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[70] Jennifer Wallner. *Laboratories, Coproducers and Venues*. Comparative Education Review, 2020.
[71] Kirsten Jörgenson. *Multi-level climate governance and the role of the subnational level*. Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences, 2015.
[72] EM Rogers. *Diffusion of Innovations*. The Free Press: New York, 1962.

Bundesländer such as *Hamburg*, oftentimes at odds with the central government, will push climate policy to be more progressive and ambicious in their goals and implementation.[73]

Because of Germany's commitment to federalism and decentralization efforts in recent years, Bundesländer often have a lot of control over local climate policies. Many Bundesländer even have established networks directly with the EU to help frame climate policy. German Bundesländer such as *Schleswig-Holstein*, *Berlin*, and *Baden-Württemberg* are at the forefront of renewable energy promotion, innovation, and production in the world. These Bundesländer have also created policies with regard to conserving energy in construction and housing that have spread not only to the German federal level but to other countries within the EU. Initiatives in these subnational regions have allowed for what Jörgenson calls "bottom-up transformation," pushing German climate policy at the federal and regional level to be stronger, even if national policy itself develops slower than some of the more forward-thinking regions. This has helped Germany's transition to become a "Green" state and has established Germany as one of the most sustainable countries in the world today.[74] Jörgenson concludes that Germany is still not perfect and more central coordination is, in fact, still needed to push Germany to the next level in its green transformation.[75] However, it is still crucial to acknowledge that this bottom-up transformation has been incredibly beneficial and substantial enough to pass effective policies that have saved lives in Germany and created a path to sustainability and progressive climate action.

Federalism in Health Policy: The Coronavirus Pandemic

Finally, the Coronavirus has also necessitated a rapid policy response. Each of the world's governments has had to develop policies with regards to border security, lockdowns, and mass testing. Tim Büthe and colleagues from the School of Government at *Technische Universität München* wrote an article for the European Institute of International Relations entitled "Policy Responses to the Coronavirus," which details how the Bundesländer made this process a lot easier for Germany.[76]

In this article, the authors explain that experts on the topic of federalism have been worried about how quickly and effectively federal states can address urgent problems due to the nature of federalism to promote a lack of cohesion between regional and federal levels of government. In such a decentralized state, how can there be maximally effective, cohesive policy responses that adequately cater to each state's different needs? With all things considered, Germany has handled the pandemic rather well, especially when compared to nearby European states like the UK.[77]

In Germany's response plan, the central government once again let the Bundesländer take the lead, acting as democratic laboratories that created domino effects. In February of 2020, when COVID cases were just beginning to emerge, the German federal government was skeptical as to whether a mask mandate would be necessary in public areas. There was a taboo in most of the

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[73] Kirsten Jörgenson. *Multi-level climate governance and the role of the subnational level*. Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences, 2015.

[74] *Ibid.*

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] Tim Büthe, et al. *Policy Responses to the Coronavirus*. European Institute of International Relations, 2020.

[77] *Ibid.*

world that this would be an overreaction to a disease which, at that point, hadn't yet reached epidemic status. However, this taboo soon vanished in Germany once the Bundesländer of *Bayern* and *Sachsen* mandated masks on public transportation. Those Bundesländer had the least number of cases when COVID came to Germany and the central government was able to act quickly and enact a countrywide mask mandate. Within weeks, mask-wearing went from excessively cautious to a civic duty thanks to quick action from the Bundesländer. Other countries that took more national action rather than delegating power to subnational levels faced two results: either they never enacted a mask mandate because they didn't have democratic laboratories in their subnational units, which left their pandemic response much weaker, or they did enact a mandate and still faced massive distrust among the public.[78] *Bayern* especially had a negative short-term response to their mask mandate, but the long-term benefit and response from the entire country far outweighed this. Looking back on it, the passing of those mandates by *Sachsen* and *Bayern* saved many lives and showed that the Länder were willing to step on the gas when the federal government could not.[79]

Concluding Remarks

After the fallout of World War II, many strong democracies resorted to concentrating more power at the national level. Germany, however, had to build a brand-new democracy from scratch. In that process, they continued to reaffirm their commitment to federalism and strengthen the power of their largest subnational units, the Bundesländer. This has proved rather effective for Germany and is one of the predominant reasons why Germany has an incredibly productive democracy today, as the Bundesländer have acted as laboratories of democracy in the vision of Louis Brandeis. Before reunification, West Germany's democracy continued to be built based on policies passed at the Bundesländer level, which allowed for innovation and evolution in their electoral policies and more. This innovation has continued into the present day, especially in the spheres of education, climate, and healthcare policy.

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[78] Esmée Hanna, et al. *Experiences of face mask use during the COVID-19 pandemic: A qualitative study.* Sociology of Health & Illness, 2022.

[79] Tim Büthe, et al. *Policy Responses to the Coronavirus*. European Institute of International Relations, 2020.

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