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Director's Note

Welcome to the first edition of the North Carolina Journal of European Studies (NCJES). Thank you for reading. The outstanding work of our students and our Founding Editor, Thomas Elliott, and this year's Managing Editor, Andreas Jozwiak, have made the publication of this volume possible. We extend our thanks to Rebekah Kati of Davis Library for all her help as we prepared for publication of this year's volume. A special thanks to the UNC CES Advisory Board and all of the faculty colleagues who mentored students as they worked on their submissions for this volume. And thank you to the College of Arts and Sciences and the Senior Associate Dean for Social Sciences and Global Programs, Rudi Colloredo-Mansfeld, for supporting this project and our students.

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Contributors: North Carolina Journal of European Studies, Volume 1, Spring 2021

Executive Editor Biography

John Stephens
John D. Stephens, Gerhard E. Lenski, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Sociology; Director, Center for European Studies, European Union Center of Excellence, and Trans-Atlantic Masters program; received his B.A. (1970) from Harvard University and his Ph.D. (1976) from Yale University. His main interests are comparative politics and political economy, with area foci on Europe, the Antipodes, Latin America, and the Caribbean. He teaches European politics and the political economy of advanced industrial societies. He is the author of *The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism* (1979) and coauthor of *Democratic Socialism in Jamaica* (with Evelyne Huber, 1986), *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (with Evelyne Huber and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 1992; Outstanding Book Award, Political Sociology Section, ASA), *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State* (with Evelyne Huber, 2001; Best Book Award, Political Economy Section, APSA), and *Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America* (with Evelyne Huber, 2012, Outstanding Book Award, Sociology of Development Section, ASA; Best Book Award, Political Economy of the World System Section, ASA). He has also contributed articles to, among others, *The American Political Science Review, American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, The British Journal of Sociology, Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Journal of European Social Policy,* and *World Politics*. He is currently working on a study of social investment policy in Europe and Latin America.

Katie Lindner Katie Lindner is the Executive Director of the Center for European Studies at UNC-Chapel Hill. She joined UNC in 2015 from the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin where she spent many years managing and organizing programs including TAM, Euromasters, German-Turkish Masters as well as the international doctoral program at the Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences. She focused on such aspects as program development, student and career services, international recruitment, and collaboration with international partners. Katie has a BA in International Studies from UNC-Chapel Hill and an MA in Trans-Atlantic Studies (TAM Program) from the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Before moving to Berlin, she worked at the International Visitors Council in RTP, which is where she discovered her love of organizing programs and international education. In 2015, she moved back to Chapel Hill with her husband and three children after sixteen years in Berlin, and has been enjoying the North Carolina sunshine immensely.

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Multiculturalism Defi(n)ed? Media Bias and Immigrant Party Formation in The Netherlands

Thomas Elliott
Keywords: immigration, Netherlands, media, political parties

Introduction

The project of integrating newly-arrived immigrant groups into a host society is a multi-faceted one that takes place in both time and space. Immigrants groups and their descendants interface, among other things, with a country's economy, education system, citizenship laws, housing, and health care.[1] This paper focuses on the foundation of the political party Denk, and what the arrival of this immigrant-focused party might mean for the success or failure of the political integration of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, and descendants of immigrants, in The Netherlands.

Political integration is not typically viewed as easy to categorize in one single quantitative metric. In the introduction to their book, *Civic hopes and political realities: immigrants, community organizations, and political engagement*, Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad lay out a potentially helpful differentiation between "political presence" and "political weight."[2] Political presence, broadly speaking, refers to the extent to which immigrant populations have the option to participate in the political system and, as a result, to be represented. Political weight, on the other hand aims to understand the relative power of immigrant groups within their political system and what opportunities they possess to make their voices heard.

Hochschild and Mellenkopf broadly outline the trajectory for immigrant populations' engagement with a new political system. First, immigrant groups step into their new political stage. Entry onto the political stage is necessarily the next step after the arrival of immigrant populations into their new country. This step includes "the articulation of interests or views" and involves, at least to an extent, recognition by those already in the political system.[3] Second, immigrant groups become personally involved in the political arena: they act "as representatives, advocates, litigants, activists, or protestors."[4] Finally, a two-way interaction occurs where the political system responds (or doesn't) to the new activity and the immigrants, in turn, again respond to it. Their "interests are met and values accommodated; the actors change the political process and are changed by it."[5] It is important to note that the integration process can fail at any of these points, and in part this paper seeks to identify where in the process, if at all, such a failure is taking place with the foundation of Denk.

The question that this paper seeks to answer is how do Dutch newspapers *De Volkskrant* and *De Telegraaf* portray two immigrant origin politicians who left the traditional labor party and founded their own immigrants-rights party, Tunahun Kuzu and Selçuk Öztürk? Understanding the

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[1] Alba, Richard and Foner, Nancy. 2015. *Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Immigrant Integration in North America and Western Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[2] Ramakrishnan, Karthick, and Irene Bloemraad. 2008. "Introduction," in S. K. Ramakrishnan and I. Bloemraad (eds.), Civic Hopes and Political Realities: Immigrants, Community Organizations and Political Engagement. New York: Russell Sage Foundation

[3] Hochschild, Jennifer, and John Mollenkopf. 2009. "Modeling Immigrant Political Incorporation," in Jennifer Hochschild and John Mollenkopf (eds.), Bringing Outsiders In: Transatlantic Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 15.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

ways in which the two politicians and their immigrant-focused movement are portrayed is important because it shows how societies respond when immigrants and descendants of immigrants politicize issues relevant to them by asserting themselves within the political system. Is this viewed as a positive development, or are the politicians themselves blamed for not working with the system?

Literature Review

What does success look like in the context of political integration? Irene Bloemraad writes that success in integration might look like what has happened over time with women's participation in politics. From this point of view, as immigrants become more integrated into society, there is less of an inclination to participate in identity politics as voters' interests fan out across the political spectrum.[6]

Immigrants in the Dutch Political System
Alba and Foner evaluate several different western European systems. The Dutch system, in their eyes, presents immigrants with some distinct benefits as well as challenges. "A double edged sword," the Netherlands is incredibly representative in its parliament, as only approximately 70,000 votes are necessary in any election to gain a seat.[7] Furthermore, the preferential party-list system that exists enables any candidates of immigrant origin to gain support from their respective communities, even if they are placed relatively low on the party's list by the overwhelmingly white, male party bosses. Those same bosses do retain a lot of power, however, and potential candidates are reliant on their approval to gain a spot on the list at all.

As tensions over immigration and multiculturalism have risen in the Netherlands in past years, according to Michon and Vermeulen those same party bosses who might grant those with immigrant background access to party lists have become more reticent in order to minimize backlash against the party.[8] As a result, especially those of Turkish descent have found their political presence decreased as it has become more difficult to access power. As both politicians under study in this paper are ethnic Turks, one hypothesis will look at the importance newspapers place on that background, and what it might mean for their new party.

Understanding Political Presence in the Netherlands
As discussed previously, 'political presence' in a new host society is centered on access to politics. Access to the vote is crucial, and Alba and Foner also discuss this issue in their work. The Netherlands is relatively progressive in this respect, as only five years of established residency is required to vote in local and municipal elections. This is unlike many other countries, including the United States, which require citizenship to vote in any election at all.[9]

Citizenship is required to vote in national elections, and it can be gained after five years as well. Those born in the Netherlands are entitled to conditional *jus soli* citizenship upon reaching adulthood.[10]

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[6] Bloemraad, Irene. 2013. "Accessing the Corridors of Power: Puzzles and Pathways to Understanding Minority Representation" *West European Politics* 36(3): 652-670.
[7] Alba, Richard and Foner, Nancy. 2015. *Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Immigrant Integration in North America and Western Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[8] Michon, Laure and Vermeulen, Floris. 2013 "Explaining Different Trajectories in Immigrant Political Integration: Moroccans and Turks in Amsterdam," *West European Politics*, 36:3, 597-614,
[9] Alba, Richard and Foner, Nancy. 2015. *Strangers No More*.
[10] Ibid.

In terms of representation immigrant populations have fared rather well in Netherlands, especially when compared to other Western European countries. The numbers can be deceptive. In 2006, immigrants and those of immigrant descent filled only approximately 3 per cent of all town council seats in the Netherlands.[11] In the four major cities of Rotterdam, the Hague, Amsterdam, and Utrecht, however, the same demographic numbers 20.6 per cent.[12] When compared to the share of the total populations that immigrants represent, 8.9%, it is clear that immigrant political weight is centered on urban regions. What might such a relatively high presence of immigrant-background politicians in Dutch politics mean as newspapers analyze the foundation of Denk? A potential discursive angle the broadsheets might take is one which compares Kuzu and Özturk to other immigrants in the system that have not decided to form their own party.

Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands

Michon and Vermeulen investigated the differing presence of Moroccans and Turks in elected legislative city councils and in appointed executive positions. They found that, overwhelmingly, Turks were more likely to be elected to representative positions because of their stronger ethnic group ties. Moroccans, on the other hand, are less likely to be elected to office because they have pursued a more individualistic approach to integration generally, but are more likely to be present on executive committees, giving them more power in daily situations. The authors highlight that political integration is at least in part influenced by integration of immigrants into other elements of society. Since party leadership acts as "gatekeepers and facilitators of immigrant's political participation," the different ethnic groups experience that gatekeeping differently.[13] Turks, for example, are asked to win the votes of their ethnic communities, but once elected, "councilors of Turkish origin often refrain from expressing ethnic group interests, despite their experience in Turkish organizations."[14] As a result, immigrant political action tied to "ethnic group interests" is at least to an extent constrained by the framework of the traditional labor party in the Netherlands. It is from this last aspect of Michon and Vermeuelen's argument that this project takes its inspiration for looking at the agency of the two political actors throughout the newspaper articles. It follows that if immigrants' ability to act freely as political actors or politicians is limited, they may seek to free themselves from the confines of that restrictive political entity. Whether or not the newspapers authors agree with the decision to found a new political party, might they frame Kuzu and Özturk's actions along a discussion of agency? The distinction matters because it reflects greater society's willingness to grant political actors of immigrant background agency in their own political process.

Hypotheses

There are four hypotheses laid out for this project, the last two of which are broken down into two sub-hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that *newspapers focus on Kuzu and Özturk's struggles with the labor party PvdA instead of their substantive and ideological differences*. Newspapers will most likely seek to highlight the rather sensational nature of the two mens' departure from the labor party, particularly since the party was in government at the time. A potentially interesting

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[11] Institute for Political Participation. 2006. "Meer Diversiteit in de Gemeenteraden." Nieuwsbrief, pp. 7-9
[12] Ibid.
[13] Michon, Laure and Vermeulen, Floris. 2013 "Explaining Different Trajectories," 597.
[14] Ibid., 604.

question is whether their departure will be framed as a further fragmentation of the Dutch political left, or as an assertion of Kuzu and Özturk's independence.

The second hypothesis is that *newspapers focus on potential threats posed by Kuzu and Özturk, namely Turkish influence from Ankara and the potential formation of a national Islamic party*. The third hypothesis can be split between the two newspapers being studied. Hypothesis 3a is that *De Volkskrant will generally be more positive than De Telegraaf, and focused on policy issues*. The logical foundation for this hypothesis is that *De Volkskrant* is generally regarded as more left-leaning then *De Telegraaf*. Hypothesis 3b is that, conversely, *De Telegraaf will generally portray Kuzu and Özturk* more negatively, than *De Volkskrant does, and focus on issues of security and Islam*. Hypothesis four, regarding the agency given to the two actors throughout the process of separation from the labor party, can also be separated into the two different newspapers. Hypothesis 4a is that *De Volkskrant will portray Kuzu and Özturk as subjects more frequently than De Telegraaf*. Hypothesis 4b, on the other hand, is that *De Telegraaf will portray Kuzu and Özturk as objects to be discussed more frequently than De Volkskrant*.

Research Design

The articles analyzed in this project are from the two largest newspapers in the Netherlands, *De Volkskrant* and *De Telegraaf*. Collectively, the two newspapers generally cover much of the spectrum of Dutch newspaper journalism. They are both broadsheets with somewhat different histories and varying contemporary political orientations, which might influence their portrayal of Kuzu and Özturk. According to the *World Press Encyclopedia, De Telegraaf,* the most read daily newspaper in the Netherlands by circulation, generally aims to remain neutral editorially, but its reliance on flashy headlines and provocative cover pages occasionally incites or inflames right wing politicization. *De Volkskrant,* on the other hand, was historically the main newspaper for the Dutch catholic population. Since the 1960's, however, it has sought to increase its circulation by capturing certain more educated groups, especially in Amsterdam.[15]

The dates under consideration in the analysis of the two newspapers span a relatively long period of time, from November 1st, 2014 until February 9th, 2016. The original aim of this project was to focus on a much narrower time-span, however arriving at a suitable sample size required expanding the date range by a few months. The one-and-a-quarter years bookmarked by the above dates represent the development and foundation of the *DENK* political party in the Netherlands. The timeline begins with the conflict within the governing *Partij van de Arbeid* (Labor), which was at the time in coalition with the center-right VVD. An intraparty struggle around integration resulted in the expulsion of two elected representatives in parliament of Turkish descent. Those two parliamentarians, originally relatively unknown, then gained national fame for their foundation of the DENK, the Immigrant-Rights based political party whose name means "Think" in Dutch and "Equality" in Turkish. Finally, the dates include the first full year of the party's existence in parliament and does not include their first participation in a national election. The purpose of this restriction is to focus the data analysis on the actual foundation of the party, and the decision of its leaders to do so. The hope in doing so was to provide further insight into their ambitions and how they were received by the media, their self-professed representation of

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[15] Bechtold, Brigitte H. "Netherlands." In World Press Encyclopedia, 2nd ed., edited by Amanda C. Quick, 644-656. Vol. 2. Detroit: Gale, 2003. Gale Virtual Reference Library (accessed February 12, 2018). http://link.galegroup.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/apps/doc/CX3409900158/GVRL?u=unc_main&sid=GVRL&xid=895 780f6.

immigrant communities and interests, and above all their own and the media's portrayal of the party's future viability.

The search terms used in the LexisNexis Academic research system were rather simple. Originally, the planned search term was simply the name of the political party, Denk. However, the temporal development of Kuzu and Özturk's movement from separation with the PvdA to the establishment of new political party would not have lended itself to a successful analysis with that search term. As mentioned above, Kuzu and Özturk left the labor party in November of 2014, but did not officially found Denk until February of 2015. No newspaper articles would have come up in a search for "Denk" in that pivotal moment of political separation. Furthermore, simply searching for "Denk" would have ignored the highly personal element of the two politicians' separation from the PvdA. As a result, the search terms finally decided upon were simply "Tunahun Kuzu" and "Selçuk Özturk." Any articles in the two newspapers mentioning either of the two men during the study time period were included in the study.

Every newspaper article sampled in this study was analyzed as a whole for article type, favorability/tone, portrayal, and policy focus. Every article was also analyzed on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis for thematic content. Article types were included in data analysis primarily to explore differences in portrayal between opinion pieces and news articles. Favorability/tone was analyzed as either a positive portrayal, a negative portrayal, or a neutral portrayal in a news piece, or positive, neutral, or negative opinion in an op-ed. Often the decision to code an article between the three categories of favorability was made based on the adjectives used in the article, as well as the nature of the thematic elements discussed in the piece. The portrayal of the actors, Kuzu and Özturk, in the articles was coded as either a portrayal as subjects, or a portrayal as objects. The mechanism which differentiated between subjects and objects was whether or not the actors' were allowed to speak for themselves in the article, or if the portrayals did not engage with Kuzu or Özturk's own words. If an article discussed substantive policies at any point, it was coded as having a policy focus. Only articles that did not mention policies at all were coded as not having any policy focus whatsoever. Every theme discussed in an article was noted on an article-by-article bases in an excel worksheet for analysis. When highly-specific issues were discussed and similar objects were present, they were counted together. An example of this is the various Turkish civil organizations mentioned in the articles, they were combined under the theme "Turkish Organizations."

There are several important limitations to this study. First of all, there were simply not enough articles published in the two largest Dutch newspapers to allow a narrower timeframe of study. Studying a shorter period of time would have allowed for a more in-depth analysis of less variables. For the purposes of this study, it was not possible to focus in on either the split with the PvdA or the foundation of the new party, both of which are topics that would ideally be studied independently of one another. Furthermore, the larger time-frame may skew what aspects of the two politicians' journey are focused on, and perhaps not be as representative of how the papers actually view them. It is logical that at the moment of Kuzu and Özturk's separation from the labor party, the majority of articles mentioning the two men would include discussion of that split in detail, as opposed to a more in-depth analysis of their substantive claims. On the other end, articles published a year after the party's foundation will most likely not discuss the labor party split any longer.

Results

Before analysis, three articles were discarded from the sample for not actually discussing either Tunahan Kuzu or Selçuk Özturk. The final total count of articles analyzed was 99.

Article Type	*De Telegraaf*	*De Volkskrant*
Entertainment News	2%	6%
Interview	0%	4%
News	72%	55%
Opinion	26%	40%
Profile	0%	4%
Total Count	47	52

Table 1: Percentage of Articles by Type

Table 1 looks at the types of articles published in the two newspapers. Notably, *De Telegraaf* published significantly more news pieces than *De Volkskrant*, which provided more varied coverage of Kuzu and Özturk, including more opinion pieces, two interviews, and two profiles.

Coverage Tone	*De Volkskrant*	*De Telegraaf*
Positive	21%	0%
Neutral	60%	21%
Negative	19%	79%

Table 2: Percentage of Articles by Coverage Tone

The majority of articles published in *De Volkskrant* were neutral in tone, as table 2 highlights, and approximately evenly distributed between positive and negative coverage. *De Telegraaf,* on the other hand, was overwhelmingly negative in its coverage of Kuzu and Özturk, with almost 80% of its articles falling into that category. An example of coverage that is ostensibly "news" but with negative tone is a line from *De Telegraaf* arguing that "Turkish influences destroy the Dutch integration dream," in an article titled "Turkish lobby operates as a black cat in the dark"[16] (Author translation).

Coverage Tone	Entertainment News	Interview	News	Opinion	Profile
Positive	0%	100%	8%	37%	0%
Neutral	67%	0%	85%	16%	100%
Negative	33%	0%	8%	37%	0%
N/A	0%	0%	0%	11%	0%
Count	3	2	26	19	2

Table 3: *De Volkskrant* articles sorted by tone and article type

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[16] Olmer, Bart. 2014. Turkse lobby opereert als zwarte kat in het donker; clubs zijn uit op macht voor eigen (religieuze) belangen. De Telegraaf, 15 november, 2014.

   De Volkskrant's coverage of Kuzu and Özturk appears to speak favorably of the paper's journalistic neutrality. The articles categorized as News and Opinion, the two sections with a significant enough count for analysis, are evenly balanced between positive and negative portrayals.

Coverage Tone	Entertainment News	News	Opinion
Positive	0%	0%	0%
Neutral	100%	24%	8%
Negative	0%	76%	92%
Count	1	34	12

Table 4: *De Telegraaf* articles sorted by tone and article type

   De Telegraaf, one the other hand, portrays the two men far more negatively. Above three-quarters of all News articles and the vast majority of opinion pieces portray Kuzu and Özturk in a negative sense.

Actor Portrayal	*De Volkskrant*	*De Telegraaf*
Subjects	60%	21%
Objects	31%	77%
N/A	9%	2%
Count	52	47%

Table 5: Percentage of articles by Actor Portrayal

   De Volkskrant was significantly more likely to portray the two politicians as subjects in the political process than *De Telegraaf*, which frequently portrayed them without actually engaging their voices. A particularly egregious example of this was an article titled "The Turkish Trojan Horses" which argued they had simply been "voting cattle" for the PvdA and had "become more radical by the week."[17]

Policy Focus?	*De Volkskrant*	*De Telegraaf*
Yes	27%	17%
No	73%	83%

Table 6: Percentage of Articles by Policy Focus

   Table 6 highlights that neither newspaper was very willing to engage with Kuzu, Özturk, and other immigrant groups on questions of substantive policy issues. The majority of articles, instead, focused on the two politicians, their actions and attitudes, and what the foundation of the party might mean for the Netherlands. This number is potentially skewed upwards because several of the articles counted in this metric discuss parliamentary proceedings in which Denk participated, which were inherently about policy. Very few articles actually discussed Denk's policy goals.

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[17] de Winther,Paul Jansen en Wouter. 2014. De turkse paarden van troje; PvdA'ers schetsen een onthutsend beeld van hun voormalige partijgenoten tunahan kuzu en selzuk öztürk. De Telegraaf, 15 november, 2014.

De Volkskrant	Count	Percentage	*De Telegraaf*	Count	Percentage
Labor split	16	31%	Labor split	17	35%
Seat theft	11	21%	Behavior	14	29%
Integration policy	8	15%	Turkish government connection	13	27%
Policy	7	13%	Seat theft	8	17%
Behavior	5	10%	Integration policy	5	10%

Table 7: Most discussed theme by newspaper

Finally, table 7 explores the thematic differences between the two newspapers. In line with table 6, neither newspaper appears to engage with questions of policy on a significant level. The split with the PvdA was the most frequently discussed issue in both *De Volkskrant* and *De Telegraaf*. Following on tables 2 and 4, *De Telegraaf* discusses the behavior of Kuzu and Özturk much more frequently, and comments on the two men's potential ties to the Erdogan regime in Turkey in more than a quarter of articles analyzed.

Discussion

The results confirm several of the hypotheses suggested at the beginning of this paper, and reject at least one of them. In the study period examined, both newspapers wrote the most about the decision of Tunahan Kuzu and Selçuk Özturk to leave the PvdA and take their seats with them. *De Telegraaf* in particularly frequently repeated that Özturk had said "may Allah punish you" to a fellow member of the PvdA before leaving their last meeting as PvdA parliamentarians. Hypothesis two, regarding Turkish influence, is generally rejected. Whereas *De Telegraaf* dedicated approximately a quarter of its articles to discussing potential influence from Ankara, *De Volkskrant* barely touched the issue at all.

Hypothesis three is supported in part, with *De Volkskrant* portraying Özturk and Kuzu in a relatively much more positive light than *De Telegraaf*. Contrary to what was hypothesized, however, *De Volkskrant* did not engage the politicians on substantive policy issues in the vast majority of its articles. Hypothesis four is confirmed by the data, as *De Volkskrant*, the more liberal paper, was far more likely to let Denk's founders speak for themselves in its portrayal of them than *De Telegraaf*.

An unanticipated trend which came up frequently in the coverage of the two politicians was the concept of seat-theft and an in-depth discussion of what it means for Dutch politics. In both papers, close to 20% of articles discussed the issue. This may be a result of the rather extended time-frame discussed as a limitation of the research. During the period of study, Norbert Klein also left the *50Plus* party, bringing the question of seat-theft back into the newspapers where Kuzu and Özturk would be brought up again.

Returning to the literature review and what this study might imply for the larger discussion on integration, it appears that the left-leaning newspaper is more willing to grant Kuzu, Özturk and perhaps by extension immigrant communities at large, more agency in the political process in The Netherlands. One article in *De Volkskrant* actually discussed their seat theft as a consummate act of integration into Dutch political society.[18] Granting them a certain subjectivity at least

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[18] Korteweg, Ariejan 2014. De splinterkamer. *de Volkskrant*, 19 november, 2014.

acknowledges that they have the right to form a party if they so desire, and signals that perhaps the left-of-center side of the political spectrum is willing to grant immigrants greater political room for maneuver. Curiously, little attention was paid at all to the presence of other immigrants or descendants of immigrants in parliament. The elevated political presence of immigrants in the Netherlands did not appear to factor into the coverage of Denk.

De Telegraaf, however, focused quite heavily on Kuzu and Özturk's Turkish background. Denk was characterized in that paper as "The long arm of Ankara,"[19] supporting Michon and Vermeulen's hypothesis that Turkish politicians are especially stigmatized for their ethnic connections in The Netherlands.

In the most recent Dutch election in 2017, Kuzu and Özturk managed not only to maintain their own seats in parliament, but Denk also won a third seat which would be filled by a politican of Moroccan descent, Farid Azarkan. This paper has sought to contextualize the arrival of Denk in the Dutch political arena through the lens of the two mainstream papers in the country. Although acceptance of the party's existence appears to be filtered along left-right political leanings in the Dutch media it is clear that Denk has at least some mandate from immigrant populations in The Netherlands and will remain a voice in Dutch politics and immigrant integration in the future. Finally, returning to Hochschild and Mellenkopf's framework of immigrant integration, the partial acceptance of Kuzu and Özturk's departure from the PvdA and foundation of Denk by at least the left-leaning newspaper in the Netherlands indicates that immigrant populations in the Netherlands may now exist within the theoretical third stage of political integration: the actors have been changed by the political system and they, at least in part, have changed it.[20]

Appendix 1: Articles analyzed

 [Aldus kamerleden selçuk öztürk en tunahan kuzu , di...]. 2015. *de Volkskrant*, 20 januari, 2015.

[Kwik-fitzorg wat een indrukwekkende reportage over...]. 2015. *de Volkskrant*, 14 februari, 2015.

Buitenlandse komaf en correct taalgebruik. 2015. *de Volkskrant*, 14 februari, 2015.

Felle aanklacht van opstandige PvdA'ers; 'afscheid nemen van neoliberale politiek'. 2015. *De Telegraaf*, 9 april, 2015.

'In de geest van ankara'; handelsmerk 'denk' is zwartmakerij en preken voor eigen parochie. 2015. *De Telegraaf*, 23 september, 2015.

Kamer voor hoger minimumjeugdloon. 2015. *de Volkskrant*, 9 september, 2015.

Kamer: Kolencentrales zo snel mogelijk dicht. 2015. *de Volkskrant*, 27 november, 2015.

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[19] Mikkers, Ruud 2014. PvdA krijgt klap; partij zou elf zetels overhouden. *De Telegraaf*, 17 november, 2014.
[20] Hochschild, Jennifer, and John Mollenkopf. 2009. "Modeling Immigrant Political Incorporation," 15

Nervositeit groeit bij PvdA; prominent duo kondigt aan de boel op scherp te zetten. 2015. *De Telegraaf*, 13 januari, 2015.

Nieuwe partij denk: Arabisch op scholen; ex-PvdA'ers kuzu en öztürk presenteren ideeën. 2015. *De Telegraaf*, 10 februari, 2015.

Turkse partij beloont stem uit nederland; premie op geboorten en dienstplicht afgekocht. 2015. *De Telegraaf*, 17 oktober, 2015.

Turkse woede. 2015. *de Volkskrant*, 24 juni, 2015.

De vastgelopen morph. 2015. *de Volkskrant*, 30 april, 2015.

Verzoendag. 2015. *de Volkskrant*, 18 december, 2015.

Zetelroof. 2015. *De Telegraaf*, 20 maart, 2015.

Zomerse terugblik; EenVandaag barbecuet met mensen die opvielen. 2015. *De Telegraaf*, 13 juli, 2015.

Geachte redactie. 2014. *de Volkskrant*, 18 november, 2014.

PvdA'ers zijn al veel op straat. 2014. *de Volkskrant*, 15 november, 2014.

Achterhuis, Hans. 2014. Nee: Francis fukuyama is geen groot denker meer. *de Volkskrant*, 29 november, 2014.

Albert, Sterman, Jan. 2014. 'Moge allah je straffen'; turkse PvdA'ers scheldend de fractie uit. *De Telegraaf*, 14 november, 2014.

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How Conceptions of Exceptionalism and Tokenism Present Themselves in the Refugee Crisis and *Welcome to Germany* (2016)

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Keywords: immigration, Germany, cultural diversity, refugee

Introduction

Since around 2015, Germany and other European countries have experienced a large increase in the number of refugees[21] entering their countries. As a result, there has been much pushback from native Germans against this new foreign presence; recent terrorist attacks carried out by radical Islamists throughout Europe have only made Europeans more skeptical of allowing refugees in their countries[22]. Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel has been especially criticized for her open-door policy. Last year, she and Interior Minister Horst Seehofer have clashed heavily on the issue of migration and refugees, threatening the already fragile government coalition[23]. However, more recently, Germany has decreased the number of refugees accepted while increasing deportations to other EU countries[24]. While the number of refugees is showing no signs of decreasing to pre-2015 numbers in the near future, Germany and other European countries are coming to terms with the fact that they must not only offer refuge but also successfully accommodate these refugees. Current discussions of the refugee crisis frame it as a new phenomenon, but these discussions ignore other influxes of refugees in Germany's past[25]. It would be beneficial for German politicians to also reference what they have done in the past when they are looking at how they should approach this "crisis". The issue of integration and assimilation has been a salient topic in recent discussions surrounding refugees. On one hand, many Germans expect the newly arrived refugees to fully assimilate to their customs, but many refugees are not willing to completely forfeit their own culture for Germany's. In contrast to earlier times of refugee migration, these refugees are coming from places whose cultures are viewed as antithetical to German and European culture.

In this essay, I will investigate how German society approaches the question of assimilation/integration through an analysis of the mainstream media representation of refugees in *Welcome to Germany*. I will show how the unidimensional and shallow character of the refugee in this film is indicative of a German society that is unwilling to accept refugees as fully human with

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[21] In this paper, I will use a common, broad definition of a refugee: anyone who is fleeing from their homeland because of persecution, which keeps them from being able to return.

[22] For example, the March 2019 Utrecht shootings in the Netherlands, December 2018 Strasbourg attack in France, August 2017 Barcelona attacks, May 2017 Manchester bombing in the United Kingdom, July 2016 Nice attack in France, December 2015 Cologne attacks in Germany, and November 2015 Paris attacks.

[23] Schmidt, Nadine, and Judith Vonberg. "Merkel Makes Deal with Interior Minister on Migration Dispute." CNN. July 02, 2018. Accessed March 24, 2019. http://www.cnn.com/2018/07/02/europe/merkel-seehofer-government-intl/index.html.

[24] Shubert, Atika, and Nadine Schmidt. "Germany Rolls up Refugee Welcome Mat to Face off Right-wing Threat." CNN. January 27, 2019. Accessed March 24, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/26/europe/germany-refugee-deportations-intl/index.html.

[25] Poutrus, Patrice. "Refugee Reports." Migration, Memory, and Diversity, edited by Cornelia Wilhelm, Berghahn Books, 2017, 86-107.; El-Tayeb, Fatima. *Undeutsch: Die Konstruktion Des Anderen in Der Postmigrantischen Gesellschaft*. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2016.

complexities and faults. *Welcome to Germany* is a popular German film centering around a family's decision to adopt a Nigerian refugee named Diallo that promotes a narrative that is counteractive to progressive work surrounding the political and social treatment of refugees in the country. I will analyze how Diallo's role in the movie and his relation to the Hartmanns, the family that takes him in, contribute to a more close-minded view of refugees. I will also put this into the context of the film's relative success in Germany and how the movie was received by the public.

Anti-Blackness within the Refugee Crisis

The majority of news coverage and media portrayals of the refugee crisis in Germany feature Syrian refugees, but these portrayals do not give a complete view of the demographics of the crisis. Although Syrian refugees do make up a large portion of the German refugee population in recent years, there is also a sizeable number of African refugees in Germany. For example, Eritrean, Nigerian, and Somalian refugees constitute the three largest percentages of African refugees[26]. Nigerian refugees, usually fleeing from attacks carried out by the Islamic terrorist group Boko Haram, made up 7% (6,141 refugees) of the refugee population that came to Germany in the first half of 2018. Eritrean refugees, who are fleeing from compulsory conscription in the national military, made up 4.3% (3,722) of refugees[27]. Additionally, Somalian refugees escaping inter-country warfare made up 3.5% (3,260) of refugees. In contrast, Syrian refugees made up 26.4% of the refugee population in the first half of 2018, a marked decrease from previous years[28][29]. Despite their lack of representation, African refugees make up a significant amount of the refugee population in Germany.

In addition to facing Islamophobia and xenophobia, African refugees must endure anti-Black racism in Germany. This racism is not solely present in the social context. Rather, it exists throughout the German political system, particularly in local German police forces. In her book *Undeutsch*, Fatima El-Tayeb details specific infractions against African refugees by German police. In one instance, a police officer forced an African refugee to get naked, pushed him into a cell, and sprayed tear gas into the cell. Another group of police offers staged a mock execution of an African refugee in which one officer pressed his gun into the refugee's temple while another officer fired a shot into the air[30]. Although Germany prefers not to recognize the conception of race, because the term "race" is associated with the racist policies of the Third Reich, it cannot ignore the effects and prevalence of racism in its country[31].

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[26] In the first half of 2018, Nigerians made up 26.3% of African refugees; Eritreans made up 16% of African refugees; and Somalians made up 14% of African refugees.

[27] The exact reason that refugees are fleeing Eritrea is unclear because there are many conflicting accounts about the situation in the country. Some say that the government is repressive while others claim that refugees are promoting a false narrative about the country and its leader in order to be granted refugee status (Smith).

[28] In the first half of 2016, Syrian refugees made up 44% of the refugee population.

[29] "Asylzahlen." Bundesamt Für Migration Und Flüchtlinge. June 02, 2017. Accessed March 24, 2019. http://www.bamf.de/DE/Infothek/Statistiken/Asylzahlen/asylzahlen-node.html.

[30] El-Tayeb, *Undeutsch*, 214.

[31] Fehrenbach, Heide. *Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.

Amnesty International recently produced a report criticizing Germany and Europe for widespread anti-black racism present within their country[32]. As El-Tayeb states, Germans still perceive black people as "fundamentally biologically different from 'normal' people"[33]. Could this be the reason for the lack of inclusion of African refugees in media portrayals of the refugee crisis? It would be dangerous to discount the violence that Syrian refugees face due to xenophobia and Islamophobia, but it would also be unwise to ignore the violence that African immigrants face due to the combination of xenophobia, Islamophobia, and anti-Blackness.

In light of this troubling sociohistorical context, I have chosen to focus on how film treats this topic because one cannot discount the potential media representations can have for giving refugees some legitimacy to their claims to refugee status. Films, even when fictional, can heavily shape someone's knowledge about a historical event especially if they knew little about the event beforehand. In terms of the refugee crisis, most Germans have not had extended amounts of personal contact with a refugee. Therefore, a film about a refugee will have a large influence on shaping Germans' perceptions of refugees. In their paper about media discourse on the refugee crisis, Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti emphasize the role that media has in influencing society and hold that "media [can] contribute to the reproduction of stereotypes"[34]. When audiences see stereotypes being reinforced in characters, they believe those stereotypes to be true. Even though it is not clear to what extent film and media can affect audience opinions on issues, evidence shows that film does exert some influence. With this in mind, we must seriously consider and analyze the portrayals and stories that we see in film and how the lack of representation of African refugees in German media could be responsible for less acceptance to African claims to refugee status as legitimate. However, just having these portrayals of African refugees in the media is not enough; we must further consider what they contain and interrogate what these portrayals mean.

White Savior Film

The film, *Welcome to Germany* (2016)*,* directed by white German director Simon Verhoeven, presents the character Diallo as one of those aforementioned "exceptions." In contrast to the majority of media coverage, he is an African refugee, but his character is essentially domesticated and made docile, embodying Germany's ideal refugee: he is more than willing to fully assimilate to German culture and work to earn his way. The film begins with a despondent Mrs. Hartmann who, since entering retirement, has become bored with her life and is looking for a way to shake things up. After Mrs. Hartmann declares that she wishes to take in a refugee, the upper-class bourgeois Hartmann family fosters Diallo, a Nigerian refugee hoping to be granted asylum by the German state. In addition, Diallo works to fix the Hartmann's familial issues while the Hartmanns teach him Western values that seem new to him due to his upbringing in a small Nigerian village. Diallo's chances for asylum are threatened by several situations he gets into because of the Hartmann family, such as a house party that results in a visit from the police and a rap video that grandson Basti films at school using Diallo, and several scantily clad women, as extras. But in the end, the Hartmann family is instrumental in him being granted asylum. Throughout the film, Diallo

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[32] El-Tayeb, *Undeutsch*, 215.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Fotopoulos, Stergios, and Margarita Kaimaklioti. "Media Discourse on the Refugee Crisis: On What Have the Greek, German and British Press Focused?" *European View*15, no. 2 (2016): 265-79. doi:10.1007/s12290-016-0407-5.

is pushed further and further away from the center of the movie as the family's problems take over more of the plot. Due to this marginalization, the film becomes less about the issues that refugees face in Germany and more about solving the problems within the Hartmann family.

   Welcome to Germany functions as a typical "white savior film"[35]. White savior films usually include a benevolent white protagonist whose main goal throughout the film is to aide a poor and/or helpless minority. Additionally, these films work to support a narrative that people of color must rely on white people to help them out of their dire situations. Another issue with these movies is that they often ignore structural causes of racism and name one bad white person or a group of bad white people as the cause of the racism that the person of color faces, allowing the audience watching the film to feel absolved of any racist guilt, even while they remain complicit in racist structures[36]. In *Welcome to Germany*, the Hartmanns, specifically Mrs. Hartmann and her daughter Sophie, function as the white saviors; they are the benevolent Germans eager to deliver a refugee from his suffering. By taking Diallo in from the refugee center, they are bringing him into much better living circumstances and even removing him from the racism and danger he faced at the center. Diallo repays them by working tirelessly to help Mrs. Hartmann with handyman projects around the house. In the end, the Hartmanns help Diallo obtain his refugee status by testifying before court to his character and all that he has done for them. In actuality, one family's emotional testimony would not be enough to convince the German government to grant someone refugee status, especially because of strict regulations such as Dublin II[37] [38]. But *Welcome to Germany* does not do much to address the real issues that refugees face in the country. Instead, it feeds into Germans' white savior complex by showing a story where Germans open up their home to an immensely grateful refugee.

   This film is not about Diallo and his experiences as a refugee, rather it is about Germans and Germany. The Hartmann family can be seen as a representation of Germany as a whole; this metaphorical connection is more apparent when looking at the difference in the English and German titles of the movie: the German title, *Willkommen bei den Hartmanns*, directly translates to "Welcome to the Hartmanns", contrasting the more ambiguous English title, *Welcome to Germany*. It is worth noting that one of the posters that was marketed for the film features the names of the actors for all the main characters except for the man who plays Diallo, Eric Kabongo. Diallo lacks complex characterization and shows no development throughout the film, illuminating the fact that he occupies a supplemental rather than central role in the film. For instance, Diallo's identification as Muslim is barely mentioned in the movie. Furthermore, Diallo's character has no remnants of Nigerian culture. The only time he mentions life at home is when he explains how Boko Haram destroyed his village and killed his family. One might expect a film that hopes to truly be progressive on the refugee issue would show aspects of both cultures instead of just focusing on a refugee attempting to embrace only German culture. If the Hartmanns are a metaphor

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[35] Hughey, Matthew W. *The White Savior Film: Content, Critics, and Consumption*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2014.

[36] Hughey, *The White Savior Film*, 167.

[37] The Dublin II law states that refugees must apply for refugee status in the country in which they first entered.

[38] United Nations. "EU Urged to Revise Its Dublin II Regulation in Order to Protect the Rights of Refugees and Asylum-seekers." UNHCR. Accessed March 24, 2019. http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2006/4/446c83b52/eu-urged-revise-its-dublin-ii-regulation-order-protect-rights-refugees.html.

for the country as a whole, the movie shows the extent to which Germany expects refugees to do both physical and emotional labor in exchange for a chance at refuge in Germany.

A film centering around a family instead of the refugee can do little in advancing the discussion on how refugees are treated. Rather than concentrating on what problems refugees face upon arrival in Germany, *Welcome to Germany* focuses its discussions around how the country is coming to terms with itself and attempting to define its identity among this new influx of foreigners. The characters in the film offer conflicting answers to questions as to what Germany should do next and the film itself fails to take a solid position on the issue of refugees and how they should be treated in Germany.

Typically, white savior films contain either one or a few white villains on which the blame for racism is placed. In this film, there are two main villains: one that threatens Germans and the other that threatens refugees. Diverging from the trend of white villains, the villain threatening Germany is represented through the Muslim character Rayhan, the refugee revealed to be a terrorist at the end of the movie. On the other hand, the villains threatening refugees are a group of neo-Nazi protesters who gather outside the Hartmann house to protest Diallo's presence. Rayhan's character is consistently shown as being vehemently opposed to both Germany and assimilating to German culture. His role in the movie implies that Germans should be suspicious of any refugees who seem unwilling to assimilate to German culture. In contrast to Rayhan, the neo-Nazi protesters do not represent a serious threat. Even though they surround the house with torches and posters, they are presented as comical, diminishing and invalidating the dangers to which refugees and other minorities are exposed in Germany. The absurdity of the protestors outside detracts from the real dangers that refugees and minorities face and paints the source of racism and xenophobia in Germany as coming from a small number of eccentric Germans. When the protestors do begin to act dangerously (i.e. throwing items through the windows of the house), the family retreats into the house towards safety. Operating with the interpretation that the Hartmann family is a metaphor for Germany, by retreating inside the house and separating themselves from the racist, xenophobic, and Islamophobic protesters, the film is saying that these ideals do not belong in Germany. The film once again underestimates the role of racists and racism in German society when it writes off Mr. Hartmann's rudeness towards Tarek, a younger doctor played by an actor of Austrian and Tunisian descent, as a product of Mr. Hartmann's disenchantment with the aging process and jealousy of Tarek's youth instead of as a byproduct of his racism. However, this implication that racism is anti-German only provides an ineffective and superficial response to those refugees have been subjected to racism in Germany while ignoring the role that structural racism plays in Germany's treatment of refugees.

Welcome to Germany has won six film awards and been nominated for several others, including a nomination for Best European Comedy at the European Film Awards. Most notably, the film's director, Simon Verhoeven, was awarded the German Cinema Award for Peace at the Munich Film Festival. The award is reserved for films "with a humanist, socially relevant dimension" that aim to "[build] bridges and [inspire] tolerance and humanitarianism"[39] ("Awards & Winners"). Although one cannot deny the film's popularity, its acquisition of a peace award highlights the fact that many see the film as progressive. Contrary to the description of the German Cinema Award for Peace, *Welcome to Germany* does nothing to "build bridges". Instead of advocating for a more

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[39] "Awards & Winners." The German Cinema Award for Peace - The Bridge - Filmfest München. Accessed March 24, 2019. http://www.filmfest-muenchen.de/en/festival/preise-preistraeger/bernhard-wicki-filmpreis-die-bruecke-der-friedenspreis-des-deutschen-films/.

accepting outlook on the refugees coming into the country, it only works to examine the different ways in which Germans have responded to the refugee crisis.

Liberalism and Racism

Despite it being marketed as a film providing both comedy and progressive commentary on the refugee issue, *Welcome to Germany* does not actually advocate a position within the issue of the refugee crisis. When characters in the film actually discuss the refugee crisis, their comments are not liberal or progressive; rather they are uncertain and still skeptical of the migrants coming into the country. In my paper, I will define "progressive" an ideal that supports a deviation from traditional ideas and practices through change and reform. Lastly, although in layman's terms "liberal" has come to be defined as progressively antiracist, I will define liberalism as an ideology that advocates for the protection of minorities against the "abuse of an overbearing state."[40] While the film attempts to advocate a portrait of Germans as generally accepting of refugees, it actually demonstrates that Germans are only open to these exemplary migrants. In an interview, the director, Simon Verhoeven, praises his film for treating the migration crisis with "dignity and emotion…[and] in a humanistic way". Furthermore, in addressing the issue of Islam in the movie he claims that the movie attempts to question "certain conservative aspects of Islam."[41] Although it would be irresponsible to discount the conservative aspects of Islam, the film only shows the negative aspects of Islam. Diallo is Muslim, but this character trait is barely explored in the film.

The film's conflicting ideas surrounding the role of Muslims and Islam in Germany are presented through the lack of multifaceted representations of Islam. In particular, the film has multiple instances where German fear and suspicion of Muslims is validated. Recounting a night out in Cologne to her mother, Sophie explains how she was almost attacked by a group of Middle Eastern men but saved by a taxi driver. When asked by her mother, Sophie states that she is not sure whether or not they were refugees. Mrs. Hartmann is immediately suspicious that these men who attacked her daughter were refugees, highlighting her overall mistrust of refugees. Furthermore, Sophie's story could be a reference to the New Year's attacks in Cologne in 2015 where approximately 80 women were attacked by groups of male refugees totaling close to 1,000.[42] In addition, Mrs. Hartmann, who is portrayed as more tolerant and accepting, has a vivid nightmare about the Islamic State taking over Germany, which equates Muslims and their presence in Germany as threatening. In her dream, Ms. Hartmann is barred from entering her local bakery because she is not wearing a burka; the baker and his staff are wearing long beards and burkas while speaking in a Bavarian dialect. Her dream shows that she believes that the Muslims entering the country will disrupt the German way of life by refusing to assimilate into German culture and instead forcefully pushing their culture onto the native German populace. Furthermore, her nightmare highlights a xenophobic suspicion that many of the refugees are secretly members of ISIS attempting to infiltrate the country. Throughout the film, Diallo is suspected by police of being a member of an ISIS terrorist cell. However, it is revealed at the end of the film that the real culprit was Rayhan. Scenes like these just mentioned validate German fear and uneasiness

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[40] Losurdo, Domenico. *Liberalism: A Counter-history*. London: Verso, 2014, 2.

[41] "EFA 2017- Interview with Simon Verhoeven." European Film Awards. March 9, 2018. Accessed March 24, 2019. http://www.europeanfilmawards.eu/en_EN/efa-2017-interview-with-simon-verhoeven.

[42] "Germany Shocked by Cologne New Year Gang Assaults on Women." BBC News. January 05, 2016. Accessed March 24, 2019. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35231046.

surrounding the admission of Muslim refugees. Instead of exhibiting openly Muslim characters occupying positive roles, the film capitalizes on the negative stigma surrounding Middle Eastern Muslim refugees, ostracizing them from German society and making the existence of someone who is both Muslim and German seem impossible. The portrayal of Islam in the film also brings up the discussion of the good refugee versus the bad refugee. Rayhan, a refugee living in the refugee center who is revealed to be a terrorist at the end of the film, is against assimilating to German customs and refuses to renounce his "traditional" ideas. For example, the director of the refugee center mentions that Rayhan tries to keep the women from enrolling in classes at the refugee home. Diallo, on the other hand, is eager to assimilate to German culture and considers himself indebted to the country.

Conclusion

Welcome to Germany shows how including a representation of a migrant that is not necessarily bad does not make that representation helpful to achieving a general approval of migrants. In order to push the discussion forward and encourage greater acceptance, migrants must be portrayed as complex and diverse and deserving of equal and just treatment regardless of their flaws. Representations like that of Diallo and Mamoudou Gassama shield Europeans from the reality of the situation and give unrealistic expectations of refugees; not every asylum seeker will be able to save toddlers dangling from buildings or have Diallo's perfect attitude. Both of these instances demonstrate the fact that Europeans are not completely open to accepting these refugees as humans who are attempting to flee a life-threatening situation and are in need of shelter. Instead, they see them as a threat to their security and economic wellbeing. Although Gassama and Diallo are both deserving of the statuses that they were granted, every migrant cannot be expected to meet such high standards in order to have a valid claim to residency. Viewing migrants through such an unrealistic lens decreases the likelihood of an understanding between Europeans and these newly arrived migrants since Europeans will most likely never encounter these perfect examples of migrants. Furthermore, Europeans are then unwilling to accept any flaws in these migrants that they do encounter. Films that negatively influence an audience's opinion are dangerous to those hoping to advocate a more progressive agenda. Such representations do not work to improve the systematic treatment of migrants.

Far from progressive, the racist, xenophobic, and Islamophobic undertones of the movie illustrate that Germany has still not moved forward from the more racist and close-minded ideas of its past. Rather than advocating for a more accepting and open outlook towards the refugee crisis, *Welcome to Germany* validates Germany's fear and suspicion of the migrants entering the country. Through the genre of comedy, the film evades any discussion of the violence associated with racism and xenophobia and instead invites the German audience to laugh at Diallo's backwardness[43] (Malik).

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[43] Malik, Sarita. *Representing Black Britain: Black Images on British Television from 1936 to the Present Day*. Open University, 1998.

Multi-Level Governance in Eastern Europe After the Fall of the USSR: How Russian and Ukrainian Post-Soviet Governmental Institutions Affect Crimea

LoLo von Tresckow Morley

ABSTRACT

Regional authority is not always uniformly applied to all territories. How federal governments treat special regions differentiates from how they treat other sub-entities within their jurisdiction. One of the most interesting examples of a special region is Crimea because its story is not connected to just one country, but rather two: Russia and Ukraine. This paper will feature a two-pronged analysis of Crimea and its relationships with the aforementioned countries: first, it will examine late-USSR and post-Soviet history as an explanation for Crimean dependence on its surrounding nations, and secondly, it will analyze governmental institutions in Russia and Ukraine to determine how Crimea fits into each system. This paper will use these findings to elucidate plausible reasons for Crimea's bid for autonomy, and, subsequently, Russia's successful annexation of the region.

Keywords: regionalism, Russia, multi-level governance, Ukraine, territorial conflict

Introduction

Regional authority is not always uniformly applied to all territories. How federal governments treat special regions differentiates from how they treat other sub-entities within their jurisdiction. One of the most interesting examples of a special region is Crimea because its story is not connected to just one country, but rather two: Russia and Ukraine. This paper will feature a two-pronged analysis of Crimea and its relationships with the aforementioned countries: first, it will examine late-USSR and post-Soviet history as an explanation for Crimean dependence on its surrounding nations, and secondly, it will analyze governmental institutions in Russia and Ukraine to determine how Crimea fits into each system. This paper will use these findings to elucidate plausible reasons for Crimea's bid for autonomy, and, subsequently, Russia's successful annexation of the region.

Historical Background

While the 20th century saw Crimea change hands many times between Russia and Ukraine, the focus of this paper is on the Crimean question after the fall of the Soviet Union; therefore, it will only dive into the history of the Gorbachev years and after. However, briefly understanding how Russian supremacy dictated history prior to this period is also important.

In this story, there are three distinct ethnic groups, the Russian, the Ukrainians, and the Tatars of Crimea. As a result, there are also three different views as to where Crimea should fit in the geopolitical map of Eastern Europe: the Tatars essentially believe that they are the only people indigenous to Crimea, and that "the Crimea is their only homeland".[44]

Because of ethnic cleansing and other misfortunes that befell the Tatars in the 20th century, including nationalist movements that garnered little support, the Russian and Ukrainian views of Crimean history are the ones that of particular relevance in this paper. The Tatar view, while having

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[44] Kuzio, Taras. *Ukraine - Crimea - Russia: Triangle of Conflict* (Ibidem-Verlag, 2007), 95.

some importance, is not nearly as influential, as Crimea was never independent under Soviet control, and has never been since the fall of the USSR. Russia's view dictates that Crimea has always played a historically important and symbolic role in Russian history dating back to the Tsarist Russian Empire, and that it has always naturally been part of the Russian world. On the other hand, the Ukrainian version asserts that Crimea has always been linked to Ukraine more deeply than, and prior to, its linkage with Russia, due to geographical proximity, cultural affinities and ethnic similarities.[45] While this helps to explain the tension between the two countries over Crimean supremacy, one final, but crucial factor comes into play: in 1954, under Soviet control, Crimea and Sevastopol were transferred to the Soviet Republic of the Ukraine.[46] Because of this, many tense negotiations between Russia and modern-day Ukraine occurred during the period between the fall of the Soviet Union and the ratification of the Crimean constitution.

Many of these arguments stemmed from the question of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet. Many Russians argue that Sevastopol was subordinate to Moscow until the fall of the Soviet Union; therefore, it should rightfully be under Russian control. Meanwhile, Ukraine asserts that Sevastopol was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic along with the rest of Crimea in 1954. The question over whether Ukraine or Russia should inherit Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet was one of the major disputes throughout the rest of the 1990s.[47] Notably, due to over-cautious leadership, Ukraine was never able to fully gain control over the Black Sea Fleet, leaving the door open for Russian contention. These tensions came to a head in 1992 when both Ukrainian parliamentary speaker Kravchuck and Russian President Yeltsin nationalized the Black Sea Fleet, and then decided to back down following escalated tension between the two countries.[48] While the Black Sea Fleet was eventually split evenly, Russia continued to demand that Sevastopol be leased to Russia. Eventually, Russia and Ukraine were both granted ports in Sevastopol.[49]

In 1998, the Crimean Constitution that was ratified stated: 1) The Republic of Crimea was an autonomous component of Ukraine 2) the Crimea does not possess separate citizenship to that in the remainder of Ukraine 3) Sevastopol is part of the Crimea 4) Russia, Ukrainian and Tatar are official languages, while Russian is the official language of government and business.[50] While there were more provisions, these four are chief in explaining, firstly, that the final constitution appeased both the Ukraine and Tatars by affording autonomy, yet remaining part of the Ukraine, including Sevastopol. However, it also recognizes strong Russian influence as the official language of government is Russian.

After adopting the constitution, the leadership in Crimea continued to push for more and more autonomy. A combination of resurgent Tatars in the region that want independence and pro-Russian civilians put continuous pressure on Kiev to relinquish some control of the region.[51] While the constitution of '98, and the Black Sea Fleet agreements of '96 seemed to de-escalate the issues surrounding the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine, they also show continued unrest and lack of permanent solution. While this story illustrates the growing conflict between Russia and the Ukraine, as well as the growing push for Crimean autonomy, it does not address why it was so easy for Russia to annex Crimea in 2014. Russian and Ukrainian institutional development and

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[45] Ibid., 96.
[46] Ibid., 106.
[47] Ibid., 105.
[48] Ibid., 206.
[49] Ibid., 220.
[50] Ibid., 174.
[51] Ibid., 106.

relative treatment of Crimea can be a possible explanation for why Crimean nationalists favor Russian control.

Post-Soviet Institutions in Russia

Almost immediately after Gorbachev's resignation, Yeltsin began nationalizing commodities that once belonged to all of the USSR, and revitalizing a solely Russian military. Russia became the USSR's successor state, taking over its place in international organizations, including the United Nations. It also assumed all Soviet debt in exchange for the former USSR's assets abroad.[52] Thus, Russia immediately was met with international success and a relatively smooth political transition, unlike many of the other former Soviet states. Furthermore, Russia's Constitution outlines governmental institutions, which account for the widespread geopolitical diversity of the country.

The Russian Parliament, also known as the Federal Assembly consists of two houses: the Duma (lower house) and the Federation Council (upper house). The Duma consists of 450 deputies, who are popularly elected based on party affiliation.[53] On the other hand, the Federation Council is comprised of two representatives, one from the legislative branch and one from the executive, from each constituent region within Russia (called *sub"ekty* or subjects). The Federal Council overseas different areas of jurisdiction, as well as approving or rejecting presidential decrees, while the Duma rules on presidential appointment, raises issues of confidence in government, rules on amnesty, and brings impeachment charges.

Structure of Federal Assembly of Russia

Fig. 1: The Structure of the Russian Federal Assembly [54]

Thus, the Parliament of Russia recognizes both party agendas via the Duma as well as regional agendas via the Federal Council. The Duma is the dominant of the two houses,[55]

The other important governmental structure in post-Soviet Russia, as is relevant to this paper, is the federal system. As aforementioned, Russia is a federation made up of 89 regional *sub"ekty*. These *sub"ekty* can be classified in four ways: republics, *krya*, *oblasti* and cities of federal

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[52] Barry, Donald D. *Russian Politics: the Post-Soviet Phase* (Lang, 2002), 56.
[53] Ibid., 143.
[54]"Structure of Russian Government, How the Largest Country of the World Is Governed?" Ribttes. https://www.ribttes.com/russian-government/.
[55] Barry, *Russian Politics*, 89.

subordination, autonomous districts and autonomous *oblasti*.[56] Of the 89, 21 of these units are classified as "republics". In addition to other concessions afforded to the *sub"ekty*, republics are constitutionally permitted to have their own language and to adopt constitutions of their own (other subject may only have charters).[57] While it is stated in the Constitution that all *sub"ekty* are equal, this is clearly not the case. Furthermore, there is another issue in the Russian Constitution where seven *sub"ekty* (*krya* and *oblasti*) contain nine other *sub"ekty* (autonomous districts).[58]

While this system is extremely asymmetrical, exacerbated by the fact that Yeltsin relied on the old system of *nomenklatura* to further push certain regional agendas, it does allot significant power to autonomous regions, i.e. the Republic of Crimea. However, under President Putin, the persistence of Soviet *nomenklatura* began to dwindle, and many Constitutional reforms began to centralize power under Moscow and take power away from the regions. The Russian Federation maintains sole control over foreign, defense and security policy, taxation, federal budget, customs regulations, state borders, the economic system, etc...much like other federations. Shared rule between the regions and the central government comes into play on issues such as natural resources, law and order, public health and education.[59] Issues that are not encompassed by shared rule, or granted to the Russian Federation, are left under regional jurisdiction. This resembles the US constitution in which issues not specifically stated in the Constitution are under state control, which gives a rather large amount of jurisdiction to the sub entities.

However, in recent years, President Vladimir Putin's desire to "reassert central control in the country's regions" has watered down some of the perceived power of the regions. Under Putin, the regions grouped the *sub"ekty* into seven administrative regions. This effectively created another layer of intermediary government, which checks some of the regional power. The Putin regime also passed legislation stating that heads of territorial legislatures could not serve in the Federal Council, only lower representatives.[60] Finally, Putin created the State Council to provide another venue for governors to converse with the president, since they were banned from serving on the Federal Council. This rearranges the hierarchy in Russia to mimic a more vertical pattern.

Given this summary of Russian institutions, it appears that in the years immediately following the collapse of the USSR, Yeltsin's reforms and the Constitution would have given the Crimea an advantageous place in the political system of Russia. As a former Autonomous Republic of the Soviet Union, it would be classified as a republic under the federal system, and granted a significant portion of regional independence. Under Putin, it appears Crimea loses some of its autonomy, as the power wrangling from the Federation Council shows. However, it does not seem to have an effect on the status of Crimea as an Autonomous Republic. Therefore, it still seems that Russia's federal system grants Crimea generous self-rule. Furthermore, Russia recognizes three federal cities - individual cities that are *sub"ekty*, granted the same amount of regional authority as the rest of the 86 *sub"ekty*. One of these three cities is Sevastopol, once again showing the amount of importance that Russia places on the Crimea.

Post-Soviet Instability and Political Obstacles in Ukraine

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[56] Malfliet, K. *Elusive Russia: Current Developments in Russian State Identity and Institutional Reform under President Putin* (Universitaire Pers Leuven, 2017), 54.
[57] Barry, *Russian Politics*, 96.
[58] Malfliet, K. *Elusive Russia*, 54.
[59] Barry, *Russian Politics*, 94.
[60] Ibid., 152.

Following the breakup of the USSR, Ukraine faced many decisions regarding how to govern itself, now that it was no longer subservient to the Supreme Soviet of Russia. One of the major issues with this is that Ukraine, historically throughout the Soviet regime, was divided regionally in loyalty. While western Ukraine favored Kiev, the Donbas region and Crimea always sought guidance from Moscow.[61] Thus, centralizing Ukrainian government under Kiev was not something that was taken well throughout the entire country. While Ukraine can unite under civic and political homogeneity, its late-developing central government does not seem to be able to sway those who ethnically and culturally feel more connected to Russia. Furthermore, Ukraine saw a power-struggle between Kiev and Crimea, which worsened ethnic and economic tensions instead of strengthening political and national identities. Because of this struggle, the ratification and adoption of a Ukrainian constitution did not happen until 1996.[62] As a result, while Russia's political structures stabilized almost immediately, Ukraine had nothing in place to develop. Regions took advantage of this lack of central power, instead choosing to strengthen regional governmental structures. Regionalism became such a factor in Ukraine that by the time a constitution had been established, and an official government did sit in Kiev, the damage had already been done.

The political system of Ukraine differs significantly from Russia in that it is not a federation. The goal of Kiev after the fall of the Soviet Union was to move towards "Ukrainianization", not to give power to regions that favored relationships with Russia.[63] Today, Ukraine now functions as a unitary republic under a semi-presidential system. While many of the regional and local governments are allotted generous autonomy in determining local policy issues, they do not have a substantial platform to voice concerns on the national level, nor do they have representation. Ukraine is divided into 27 regions: 24 administrative divisions known as Oblasts, two cities with special status (Kiev and Sevastopol), and one autonomous region (Crimea). However, following the annexation the Crimean annexation of 2014, Russia officially recognized Crimea and Sevastopol as part of the Russian Federation with similar special statuses.

The Cabinet of Ministers appoints a head of each government to represent state interests in each of these subdivisions. In this way, Ukraine micro-manages how each of the Oblasts is run, and essentially attempts to bypass the regional second tier of government. Because of this, it seems that it favors a top-down approach, with limited self-rule.[64] Furthermore, the Ukrainian system's mix of centrally appointed and locally elected officials causes an overlap of competencies, which is neither efficient nor practical. This means that while officials that are elected to represent territorial interests are constantly put into conflict with officials that are supposed to realize the state's interest within the regions and vice versa.[65] While Crimea is granted exceptional powers as an autonomous republic, it still has a history of being checked against the Ukrainian Constitution, which repeatedly stipulates that it is subordinate in all ways to Kiev.

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[61] Kuzio, *Ukraine - Crimea - Russia*, 39.

[62] Ibid., 41.

[63] Ibid., 49.

[64] Misachi, John. "What Type Of Government Does Ukraine Have?" *WorldAtlas*, 28 Mar. 2017, www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-type-of-government-does-the-ukraine-have.html.

[65]*Local and Regional Governance in Ukraine and the Development of Cooperation between Ukraine and the EU.* Report no. QG-31-12-226-EN-N. Aston Centre for Europe, Aston University. European Union, 2011. Accessed April 19, 2018. https://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/studies/Documents/local-regional-government-ukraine.pdf.

Explanations for Crimean Secession

Crimean secession did not occur because of one factor; rather, it was a build-up of a events that occurred over the course of hundreds of years of history. The passing of the Crimea between Russian and Ukrainian hands created deep-rooted, divisive viewpoints over whether the republic was subordinate to Russia or Ukraine, or whether it should, in fact, be allowed to act independently and of its own accord. Therefore, one of the leading explanations for Crimean secession is identity politics.

Many people in Crimea want independence, or view Russia as more of a patron state than Ukraine. This can be seen in Ukraine's election results in 2001. During this election, Crimea voted overwhelmingly for Yanukovych, the pro-Russian candidate. Within Crimea itself, more than 50% of its inhabitants prefer speaking Russia to speaking Ukrainian.[66] All of this contributes to Crimea's desire to secede. This hold true even after annexation, as results from a German poll (GfK), conducted in 2015, show that 82% of respondents responded that "yes, definitely" they supported Russia's annexation of Crimea, while a further 11% answered "yes, for the most part".[67] Furthermore, in retrospect, Crimea was more stable under Russian or Soviet rule, in comparison to Ukrainian rule. The story of Crimea and Ukraine is one in which Ukraine is constantly trying to smother Crimean independence or reject bids for autonomy, while also trying to bolster their own government. On the other hand, Russia has always boasted a strong and stable governmental system - one in which Crimea has a place, and negotiation is taken off the table. While this may seem like the more repressive of the two options, it is also the more stable of the two. In addition, ethnic Russians in Crimea are more numerous than ethnic Ukrainians. In this respect, identity politics in Crimea favor Russia over the Ukraine.

Regional governance of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea may also be a factor in why Crimea chose to secede; however, because of the outcome of actual governance versus theoretical, this is not the best solution. The Russian Constitution allows for an ample amount of regional authority, with regions or *sub"ekty* (including Crimea and Sevastopol) being represented across the Federal Council - a body which is comprised of those who represent regional interests. On the other hand, Ukrainian governmental structure recognizes Crimea and Sevastopol as administrative regions and sends national representatives to support national interest therein. This inherently seems to allow for less self-rule and governance in the regions. However, because of President Vladimir Putin's reforms, and pro-centralization policy, this explanation does not carry the same weight as it had before, because it is unclear whether the Ukrainian system or Putin's system actually allows for more regional autonomy.

Other factors that could explain Crimean secession include traditional socioeconomic and political reasons. As Russian, the Ukrainian, and Crimean legislative branches all resemble parliaments, party politics most likely plays a role in Crimean secession. Certain parties favor independence, pro-Russian, or pro-Ukrainian standpoints for a variety of reasons including domestic politics, foreign policy, or economic reasons.

A final explanation for Crimean secession could be the imminence of a second Cold War or, perhaps, a World War III. While these ideas are rather extreme, the escalation of tensions between Russia and the European Union along with the United States is a notable event. Currently, the

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[66] "Crisis in Ukraine: What Happened and Why." *Research Guides*, 3 Apr. 2018, libguides.gwu.edu/CrisisinUkraine.

[67] Rapoza, Kenneth. "One Year After Russia Annexed Crimea, Locals Prefer Moscow To Kiev." *Forbes*, Forbes Magazine, 23 Mar. 2015,

Ukraine is the buffer zone between the EU and Russia - it is by no means a stable environment. Furthermore, the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol is a huge military asset for whomever control it. With the lease of certain ports in Sevastopol expiring in 2017, Russia may have felt a more urgent need to fully control Crimea.

Limitations and Oversights

Due to time constraints and resource availability, this paper focuses primarily on how post-Soviet governmental structures impact Crimea, and it is rather surface-level. The history section highlights key events in the 1990s, but fails to consider earlier history. Importantly, the history of the Tatars plays a much larger role than this paper suggests before the rise and after the fall of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the paper only covers surface level analysis of what the historical events of the 1990s meant for each of the three governments. The full story of the the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine over Crimea is much more nuanced.

   In relation to the governmental structures in place in Russia and the Ukraine, both descriptions are cursory. The federal system of Russia is extremely complicated with many contradictions present in the Russian Constitution. For this reason, this paper focuses on the overarching picture: that regional self-rule was strong under Yeltsin and weakened under Putin. Similarly, for Ukraine, the main takeaway is that the structure differs from the Russian structure, as it is not a federation; therefore, Crimea fits into the system differently. In addition, the administrative divisions of Russia and Ukraine are further divided, with more levels of governance; however, because Crimea sits in the second tier in both systems, this paper does not take into account further divisions. With more time, RAI coding of the Ukrainian government could have been done to further highlight the difference between the Russian system; however, I did not use Russia's RAI scores because there was not anything to juxtapose them with.[68]

   One last oversight of this paper is that because of the emphasis on regional governance, it focuses less on other chief reasons for Crimean secession. Notably, economic concerns are huge for all three governments involved, and most likely had one of the largest roles in determining Crimean secession and subsequent Russian annexation.

Conclusions

In conclusion, Crimea's history of contact with Russia and Ukraine is nuanced, convoluted, and complicated; however, one can easily see how the conflict exacerbates identity politics and crises within the region. The ethnic Tatars and Russian minorities have such a strong influence within the region that it seemed inevitable that Crimea would not be able to remain under control of Ukraine. Furthermore, the history of the Black Sea Fleet and its symbolic connections to Russia and the USSR show that Russia would never be content with Ukraine having control over Sevastopol. In regards to multilevel governance and Crimea's role within respected governments, it does appear that Crimea gets more recognition and self-rule in the Russian Federation than it does in the Ukrainian People's Republic. While the administrative divisions in Russia and Ukraine are structurally similar, the actual governmental structure at the highest level is different and provides for less regional representation. However, because of recent moves by Putin, the power of regional governments is actually much reduced from those powers originally stated in the

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[68] Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. *Community, Scale, and Regional Governance: a Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance*. Oxford University Press, 2016.

Constitution. Finally, it should be noted that the Russian annexation of Crimea was not violent, although military personnel was involved. Crimea had declared independence from Ukraine before Russia stepped in (even though it was not recognized constitutionally); therefore, the Crimea story will continue to be one of cautionary politics as its annexation is not a black-and-white event.

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Avenue De L'Observatoire: Organization in a Foggy Paris

Laura Wilder

Keywords: Brassaï, Urbanism, Art History, France

Late one Winter night, a Parisian drives along the Avenue de L'Observatoire. They are forced to continue down the avenue slowly because even their headlights are not powerful enough to reveal a clear path through the fog. Neither the street lamps or the trees can pierce this fog as it adds a film to every rough edge it touches, dulling each and every end point of objects within its reach. In Brassaï's 1934 gelatin silver print entitled *Avenue De L'Observatoire*, Brassaï captures this moment in time. By utilizing the infamous Parisian fog, Brassaï created a work of art that both plays with the viewer's eye and emphasizes the idealization of lines, segmentation, and organization put in place by Georges-Eugène Haussmann during an era of destruction and modernization. Brassaï reveals the relationship between the green space's sturdy Haussmannian elements and the fog, all the while encouraging the viewer to question traditional assumptions about Paris.

When first glancing at Brassaï's photograph, the viewer's eye is automatically drawn to the car's headlights shining through the fog. This horizontal line creates a separation between the top half of the photograph, the green space, and the bottom half, the street; naturally, the eye wants to focus on the illuminated trees on the top half of the photograph rather than the dark street below. The straight line of the beam of light then persuades the eye to move from right to left and pause briefly in each of three segments of the photograph: the statue, the kiosk, and the bench. Each segment is divided by lines of trees and illuminated by further lines of street lamps; by choosing to photograph these lines at a diagonal angle, Brassaï is able to show the division of
the space, while emphasizing the continuation of the numerous types of lines in many directions. In total, there are seven variations of lines in the photograph including the car headlights' beam of light, the tree trunks, the bare branches of the trees, the park bench's pieces of plywood, the outline of the kiosk, the lamp posts, and the rows of trees and lamp posts that fade into the distance. Each element's line slices the photograph into sections and organizes it in a way that is pleasing to the eye. This is especially true with objects like the trees that reach the edges of the photograph. Viewers can even imagine the bench and kiosk's lines extending outwards because of how dark and solid their outlines appear in comparison to the grey fog. While in person, the scene would be divided only by the solid elements such as the trees and the street lamps, photography was able to capture the element that makes this photograph so unique: fleeting light.

The foggy lighting of the photograph adds a softness to Brassaï's work that even the harsh lines of the tree branches are unable to escape. The Paris fog is draped over each element, and rather than focusing his camera for a precise photograph, Brassaï chooses to emphasize the blurry effect of the weather and take advantage of its rare visual outcomes. Rather than a beam of light hitting one precise point in the photograph, each beam is able to spread outwards by bouncing off of the water particles in the air. The stretching light also fills the normally empty, dark spaces of the green space with a film of faint greys. As the light reaches into the empty spaces of the photograph, it

encourages the viewer's eye to follow the lines of trees and lamp posts into the background, increasing the depth of the photograph; just as the fog has no boundaries or end destination, neither do the lines of trees or lamp posts as they appear to go on forever into the distance. Similar to the sharp tree branches being smoothed over in the dim mist, these continuous lines of posts and trunks are no longer visually precise as well. To achieve this fading effect in photography, the photographer must focus on a single point in the foreground.

As the focus sharpens, the elements in the background begin to appear fuzzy. Brassaï did not need to focus his camera on a point in the foreground to achieve this effect because he simply relied on the visual effect of the fog that naturally caused the foreground to appear sharper than the background. Furthermore, thanks to continuous improvements to shutter speeds on cameras, Brassaï had the opportunity to take this photograph at night and capture the prominent comparison between dark and light. In this photograph, however, the two extremes appear to blend together into a mist of grey, rather than simply black and white. Two areas in the photograph where absolute light and dark persist against the fog are the pitch-black road and the bright white headlights and lamp post lights; from these starting point extremes, the photograph then begins to fade into a foggy grey.

Through his photograph, Brassaï depicts Paris as an overcast city in Winter that lacks a night life. Known for being a foggy city, it comes as no surprise that Brassaï was able to capture Paris in such a mysterious, calm atmosphere. This constant fog affects the viewer's experience with the photograph because it alters the mood of the scene, however. Rather than a lively, beautiful city to be explored as depicted in many paintings by artists such as Monet and Renoir, Paris appears to be sullen and quiet. Without any repeatedly depicted elements of Paris such as the Moulin Rouge windmill or the Eiffel Tower, it would be difficult for a viewer lacking geographical knowledge of Paris to identify the location shown in the photograph. The only element that Brassaï leaves for potential identification of the location is the Michel Ney monument on the right, located in the 6th arrondissement of Paris; even this is so shrouded in fog that it is practically impossible to identify. This communicates to the viewer that Brassaï did not in fact want to emphasize the precise location in Paris, but rather the *type* of location: the green
space. Our focus is drawn to the organization of this space through straight, clean lines, rather than the scenery itself.

When the urban planner Georges-Eugène Haussmann was hired by Emperor Napoleon III, one of his primary interests was the creation of parks and green spaces throughout Paris.
During the early to mid 19th century, Paris was "perceived as a dangerous, unhealthy, and frustratingly difficult place to inhabit"[69]. In Haussmann's opinion, wide roads such as the Avenue De L'Observatoire would bring fresh air into the city, and the green spaces would act as "lungs", ventilating the clean air for the Paris population[70]. While the green space pictured in Brassaï's photograph is not one of Haussmann's larger developments such as the Luxembourg gardens or the Parc Monceau,[71] small green spaces like this one act as important clean-air connections for pedestrians between streets and buildings. Without hesitation, Haussmann re- created all of Paris through his vision of straight lines and clear organization. Even small parts of Paris such as the green space pictured did not escape Haussmann's attention. We see these effects of

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[69] Colin Jones, *Paris: The Biography of a City* (New York, NY, Penguin Books, 2006), 304.
[70] Ibid., 309
[71] Ibid., 313

Haussmannization in the orderly rows of trees and street lamps that line the green space. Similar to the maps of Paris created after Haussmannization, this photograph is segmented into simple squares and rectangles; for example, the center square with the kiosk is lined on all three sides by the car's light shining through the fog and the two trees closest to the Avenue de L'Observatoire reaching towards the top of the photograph. Even the weather appears to be aiding Haussmann's vision.

When looking at Brassaï's print and seeing the dense fog that sheathes the physical elements of the scene, the viewer's eye naturally wants to find something concrete to settle on. While the dim glow within the fog is mystifying, the pattern of rows and lines that remain visible in the fog are what continue to draw the eye back in. If Brassai had altered the angle of his photograph by capturing the scene straight on from the front, he would have eliminated the majority of the depth of the photograph; from this angle, the emphasis is on the lines of trees and lamp posts that stretch into the background. In this fog, every element appears to continue onward forever because the fog hides all harsh, clear edges on objects. The tree branches slowly fade at the tips, never revealing their exact end point. The beams of light have no limit as they extend onto countless water particles and spread into dark areas of the photograph. There is no escaping this dissolving effect. Even Haussmann's stiff organization is softened by the fog because the viewer is no longer able to clearly see the straight lines of trees and lamp posts; rather, we assume they continue into the background because the fog stretches the light of the lamp posts into the distance as well, creating more depth.

The fog also forces the viewer to make assumptions about the location within the photograph. Contrary to popular belief associated with countless impressionistic paintings, Paris is not always a lovely place filled to the brim with families and couples out for a stroll. Many onlookers would assume that this photograph is not in fact showing Paris because of the gloom and emptiness that it depicts. The only elements that viewers are able to use for identification are the weather, the well-organized green space, and the blurry Michel Fey monument. Brassaï did not want the associated stereotypes of bright colors and crowds that come with recognizing Paris to keep the viewer from noticing the most important elements of the photograph: the fog's effect on emphasizing *continuous* lines, segmentation, and organization within the scene. In many ways, the fog helps each line stretch on forever, as they slowly fade into a dim grey.

Evolution of Parisian Women Through Art

Lizaveta Zhytkova

Surrounded by the Tuileries gardens, the Champs Élysées, and the Seine River, the Place de la Concorde has maintained its status as one of Paris's major public squares since its construction in the late eighteenth century. It is marked by a tumultuous history, first serving as a monument to the then ruling Louis XV and subsequently transforming into a site of mass guillotine executions during the French Revolution.[72] As a public space, the Place de la Concorde has witnessed dynamic shifts in Parisian society throughout the past two centuries and has been the subject of numerous artists. French painter Jean Béraud, renowned for depicting the life of Paris during the Belle Époque, portrays a woman in the square at the end of the nineteenth century in his 1885 work titled *Parisian on the Place de la Concorde* (Figure 1). Seven decades later, Russian-French artist and early modernist Marc Chagall portrayed a man, woman, and child overlooking the square in his vibrant color lithograph *Place de la Concorde* (Figure 2). Béraud's painting, oscillating between impressionist and Salon-style techniques, offers a glimpse of the emerging dominance Parisian women began to enjoy in public spaces during the Belle Époque. Chagall's lithograph, distinct in its vivid coloring and expressive sketching, presents individuals living in a post-war Paris, categorized by reconstruction and an influx of migrants.[73] Thus, Béraud's and Chagall's diverse depictions of the Place de la Concorde and its frequenters implicate the viewer in Paris's evolution as a city that underwent "an unparalleled period of contentment and pleasures" during the 1880s, followed by a post-war period of modernization seventy years later.[74]

Béraud's portrait of an elegantly dressed woman holding a daintily wrapped package in the Place de la Concorde is characteristic of the "detailed, legible, and apparently objective images" of Paris life that distinguished his career as a Salon artist.[75] Although he was the friend of aristocrats and espoused right-wing politics, Béraud's quasi-encyclopedic apparent objectivity established his works as social analyses of the Belle Époque. In *Parisian on the Place de la Concorde*, Béraud denotes the upper-class status of the woman by emphasizing the fluid and tailored shapes of her dress whilst creating a visual juxtaposition of her dark figure with the "grey and ochre backdrop" of the square.[76] Béraud accentuates the woman's flamboyant attire and allows her figure to take up the majority of the portraits space. The neatly wrapped package the woman carefully holds, placed at the center of the painting to contrast the dark dress, is suggestive of her materialistic tendencies and ability to partake in activities of leisure such as shopping. Thus,

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[72] Paul Lagasse and Columbia University, "Concorde, Place de la," *The Columbia Encyclopedia*. Columbia University Press, 2018.
http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/columency/concorde_place_de_la/0?institutionId=1724

[73] Laure Blévis and Eric Prezet, ""CFTC/CFDT Attitudes towards Immigration in the Parisian Region: Making Immigrant Workers' Condition a Cause," *Urban Studies* 49, no. 3 (February 2012): 685-701, doi:10.1177/0042098011431619.

[74] Colin Jones, *Paris: The Biography of a City* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 343.

[75] Richard Thompson, "Jean Béraud. Paris," *The Burlington Magazine* 141, no. 1160 (1999): 699, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/888579.

[76] Ibid.

Béraud highlights the woman's privilege to enjoy luxury and benefit from the economic prosperity of the period. The presence of male figures in the background dressed in coats and top hats evinces the peace of the Belle Époque by revealing to the viewer that the men of Paris are at home living and working, rather than away at war. Béraud's inclusion of the shape of a faint horse-drawn carriage on the horizon reinforces the late nineteenth century quality of the work, as automobiles did not become widely available until the early twentieth century. The aforementioned details serve as visual affirmations of a time period in which Paris was experiencing peace and intervals of economic success from the beginning of the French Third Republic to the outbreak of World War I, otherwise known as the Belle Époque.

Along with prominent artists of the late nineteenth century such as Degas, Toulouse-Lautrec, and Picasso, Béraud embarked on a "quest for the representation of the living woman" in his art.[77] The direct gaze of the woman in Béraud's work, coupled with the absence of a male figure by her side, emphasizes her independence as well as the increased social freedom women had begun to enjoy in Paris toward the latter half of the nineteenth century. As the twentieth century dawned, French society recognized ordinary activities such as shopping alone to be "symbolically revolutionary acts" carried out by distinctly modern women.[78] Parisian women gradually began to reject their confinement to compressed interior spaces and emerged in the public sphere where they dominated squares, parks, and gardens without being categorized as sexualized or fallen.[79] The boulevard culture of promenading in public spaces enabled artists to portray women as "independent, active creators and consumers of modern culture" alongside their male counterparts.[80] Thus, Béraud's depiction of a woman enjoying independence and luxury serves as an integral element of the lingering Haussmannian vision for Paris to be the quintessential definition of modernity.

Chagall's *Place de la Concorde* advances and reshapes the concept of Parisian modernity through his allusion to immigration and urban renewal following the end of World War II. Throughout the 1950s, France experienced an influx of European immigrants searching for better opportunities that their war-ravished native countries could not offer them.[81] Jews, Armenians, Poles, and Russians were the primary immigrant groups that looked to France as a "refuge from the turmoil and persecution" that persisted in their homelands.[82] As a Belarusian Jew living in France at the time, Chagall incorporated both Eastern and Western lines of art tradition to symbolize the increasing diversification of post-war Paris, as well as his own liminality between France and Russia.[83] The concentric and circular form of Eastern art manifests in the figures of the woman and child that are being covered with a round protective veil by a male figure in the sky. In contrast, the linear form of Western art is depicted in the straight strokes Chagall uses to illustrate the Luxor Obelisk in the center of the Place de la Concorde and its surrounding buildings.

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[77] Victoria Cooke, "Femme, Femme, Femme: Paintings of Women in French Society from Daumier to Picasso from the Museums of France," *American Artist* 71, no. 776 (May 2007): 6.
http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/docview/232316825?accountid=14244.

[78] Ibid., 8.

[79] Aruna D'Souza and Tom McDonough, *The Invisible Flâneuse? Gender, Public Space, and Visual Culture in Nineteenth-Century Paris* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2006), 34.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Blévis and Prezet, ""CFTC/CFDT Attitudes towards Immigration in the Parisian Region," 685-701.

[82] David H. Kaplan, "Immigration and the making of place in Paris," *Journal of Cultural Geography* 32, no.1 (2015): 25, https://doi.org/10.1080/08873631.2015.1004855.

[83] Allyn Weisstein, "Iconography of Chagall," *The Kenyon Review* 16, no. 1 (1954): 40, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4333462.

The visual collision of East and West adheres to the immigration patterns observed in France, and reinforces the lithograph's narrative of a French fatherland providing protection to Eastern European immigrants seeking refuge.

The levitation of the figures and their overarching dominance of the landscape below, a common theme in Chagall's works, symbolizes the cultural transcendence of the immigrant psyche.[84] A faint green halo surrounds the heads of the woman and child, alluding to the iconographic images of Madonna and Child present in Slavic Orthodox churches. By painting the woman in the image of Madonna, Chagall accentuates the sacrificial role Eastern European women played in the war when summoned by their homelands to send their sons to the frontlines. Thus, the religious connotation of the woman portrays her as a votive figure seeking sanctuary in Paris, a city of cultural diversification. Chagall's choice to incorporate vehicles at the bottom of the lithograph highlights Paris's technological rebirth after the war, as the availability of resources grew due to the region's newfound peace. Through his emphasis of immigration and technological advancement, Chagall's work offers the viewer an image of a growing and recovering Paris. Whereas Béraud's concept of Parisian modernity was defined by wealth and the autonomy of women, Chagall's notion of modernity was grounded in Paris's post-war revival and its acceptance of immigrants in pursuit of better lives.

Béraud's work provides the viewer a conceptualization of late nineteenth century Paris through the image of an upper-class Parisian woman enjoying her newfound independence from the confined sphere of private life. The limited background presence of the male figure in the painting expands upon the idea that Parisian women began to exist for themselves rather than as an extension of men. Béraud presents the woman as an iconographic representation of the Belle Époque, in which Paris enjoyed a period of peace and prosperity prior to the beginning of World War I. Chagall's work conceptualizes post-war 1950s Paris as a city that provides protection for Eastern European immigrants fleeing their destroyed homelands. While Béraud emphasizes the materialistic and independent qualities of the woman in *Parisian on the Place de la Concorde*, Chagall highlights the sacrificial quality of immigrant women and the way in which they existed between two cultures in his *Place de la Concorde.* Both artists depict modes of transportation representative of their works' respective time periods. Béraud paints a horse drawn carriage that was used prior to the invention of the automobile whilst Chagall illustrates vehicles on a road to mark the technological advancement Paris experienced after World War II.

Béraud's and Chagall's portrayals of the Place de la Concorde offer two characterizations of Paris's modernity seven decades apart. The works suggest a shift in the public sphere, as well as in Parisian innovation. Thus, the artists' depictions of women and the small background details in each work illuminate life in Paris as a constantly evolving pursuit of modernity.

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[84] Lvovich, Natasha, "Translingual Identity and Art: Marc Chagall's Stride through the Gates of Janus," *Critical Multilingualism Studies* 3, no.1 (2015): 112-134. ISSN 2325-2871.

Figure 1: Jean Béraud, *Parisian on the Place de la Concorde*, 1885, oil on panel, 47.7x39.8 cm, Paris, Musée Carnavalet

Figure 2: Marc Chagall, *Place de la Concorde*, 1952, color lithograph, 35.2x26.4 cm, Washington, DC, National Gallery of Art

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